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ABSTRACT 
 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Ph.D. in 
Finance 
 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MICROCREDIT ON CHINA 
RURAL HOUSEHOLD 
By Xia Li 
 
Since its introduction in Bangladesh in the seventies, microcredit has been well 
documented to have social implications such as reducing poverty and empowering the 
poor by offering them opportunities to access economic resources. Microcredit was 
introduced into China in the mid-1990s, aiming to facilitate credit access by farmers 
and mitigate rural poverty in China. However, the impacts of microcredit on China 
rural households’ livelihoods are not well documented. In addition, despite the efforts 
made by the Chinese government to support and popularise the implementation of 
microcredit, the access to institutional credits including microcredit by the rural 
population remains insufficient. 
 
This research assesses the impacts of microcredit on household welfare (measured by 
income and consumption) and women empowerment in rural China. In addition, it 
examines the key factors that influence the accessibility of microcredit by rural 
households in China. The impact of microcredit on household welfare is estimated 
using the difference-in-difference approach and logistic regression is employed to 
analyse the accessibility to microcredit by Chinese rural households and the women’s 
empowerment impact of microcredit respectively. Both primary and secondary data 
are used in the empirical analyses: primary data are collected through a household 
survey using a structured questionnaire; secondary data are obtained from the Rural 
Credit Cooperative, the largest microcredit provider in China. 
 iii 
The results support the wide belief in the literature that microcredit can significantly 
improve the households’ welfare such as income and consumption. The results also 
reveal that microcredit has a significant impact on five different dimensions of women 
empowerment ranging from economic security (i.e., control of financial resources) to 
awareness of social/legal issues (e.g., rights to protest against domestic abuse, 
minimum legal marriage age, etc). Furthermore, a total of twelve household-related 
factors (e.g., household income, family size) are identified as key factors influencing 
households’ accessibility to microcredit. Despite the optimistic findings on how 
microcredit has changed the rural households’ lives, the results show that the vast 
majority of the programme participants are non-poor, which casts some doubts on the 
social potential (such as poverty reduction) of China’s microcredit programmes. 
 
Key Words: China, microcredit, accessibility, household welfare, women 
empowerment, difference-in-difference, logistic regression 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 What is microcredit? 
Microcredit is the process of lending capital in small amounts to poor people who are 
traditionally considered unbankable to enable them to invest in self-employment 
(Kasim and Jayasooria, 2001). The World Bank (2006, p12) describes microcredit as 
“a process in which poor families borrow large amounts (or lump sums) of money at 
one time and repay the amount in a stream of small, manageable payments over a 
realistic time period using social collateral in the short run and institutional credit 
history in the long run”. 
 
“Microcredit” and “microfinance” are used interchangeably by many researchers, but 
microcredit is part of microfinance. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
(2000, p2), microfinance is the “provision of a broad range of financial services such 
as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers, and insurance to poor and 
low-income households”, and it comprises microsavings, microcredit, and 
microinsurance. Nevertheless, microcredit is similar to ‘microdebt’, which focuses on 
the provision of small loans to low income borrowers. In some cases, the microcredit 
programme involves saving services, but the services are limited to the collection of 
compulsory deposit amounts from the borrowers to collateralise the loans issued. 
Borrowers cannot access these compulsory deposits and cannot have voluntary saving 
accounts in microcredit programmes (World Bank, 2006; Cornford, 2000). 
 
1.1.2 Who does microfinance serve? 
Microfinance caters to the financial needs of underprivileged groups including female 
heads of households, pensioners, displaced persons, retrenched workers, small 
 2 
farmers, and microentrepreneurs (CGAP1
 
, 2003). In addition, microfinance borrowers 
are typically self-employed, household-based entrepreneurs who have relatively 
unstable income sources and can be divided into two groups: rural and urban. In rural 
areas, the borrowers are usually small farmers and others who are engaged in small 
income-generating activities such as food processing and petty trade; while in urban 
areas, microfinance activities are more diverse and borrowers include shopkeepers, 
service providers, artisans, street vendors, and small-medium enterprises (Sapovadia, 
2006). However, the client-focus of microfinance varies in different regions. For 
example, in Latin America, microfinance has been developed into a business rather 
than an anti-poverty programme, which is a branch of commercial banking and 
focuses more on urban small-medium enterprises than the rural poor (Poyo and Young, 
1999). By contrast, in Asia where the poor population is more numerous, especially in 
rural areas, microfinance would inevitably be directed to serve the rural poor as an 
anti-poverty instrument (World Bank, 2006). 
1.1.3 Who provide microcredit service? 
A variety of organisations have been involved in the delivery of microcredit services 
during the last two decades. World Bank (2006) categorises these organisations into 
seven types which include commercial banks, wholesale development banks/funds, 
retail development banks/companies, apex organisations funded by multilateral or 
bilateral donors and/or governments, microfinance institutions (MFIs) and non-profit 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), cooperatives, and community-based 
organisations. Institutions such as wholesale development banks/funds and apex 
organisations provide lending only to institutions such as MFIs and cooperatives, 
instead of individuals; by contrast, cooperatives and community-based organisations 
only lend to individuals. 
 
Different countries have fostered their own local organisations to provide microcredit 
                                                             
1 CGAP refers to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, which is a consortium of 33 public and 
private development agencies working together to expand access to financial services for the poor in 
developing countries. 
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and such local organisations can be generally classified as NGOs and formal financial 
institutions. For example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 
and the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) are two major NGOs while the 
Grameen Bank is the biggest financial institution providing microcredit in Bangladesh. 
These three major microcredit providers serve around 11 million borrowers 
throughout Bangladesh (ADB, 2000). Similarly, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) is 
the largest NGO in Malaysia providing microcredit to about 50,000 borrowers for a 
total loan amount of RM 200 million (Kasim and Jayasooria, 2001). In addition, the 
Unit Desa of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI-UD) in Indonesia is a successful rural 
financial institution which has attracted more than 2.5 million borrowers with total 
outstanding loan of US$ 781 million (World Bank, 2006; Timberg, 1999). 
 
1.1.4 Characteristics of microcredit 
Compared to traditional lending, microcredit has its own vivid characteristics. Loans 
from the microcredit programmes are usually in small amounts and have relatively 
shorter repayment recycles. Du (2004) argues that a major difference between 
microcredit and conventional lending is that the former targets borrowers from the 
poor and low-income groups. In addition, collateral requirements that are compulsory 
in traditional lending are removed from microcredit lending. Furthermore, microcredit 
adopts special schemes such as group lending to monitor its borrowers. 
 
Targeting the poor 
A major difference between microcredit and conventional lending is that the former 
often targets borrowers from the poor and low-income groups. Microcredit 
programmes are poverty-focused, which aim to facilitate the access to financial 
services such as credit for the poor globally who are usually regarded as 
disadvantaged groups in accessing conventional financial services from formal 
financial institutions (FIs). In addition, microcredit emphasises lending to poor 
women who are disproportionately represented among the world’s poorest people. 
According to Cheston and Kuhn (2002), about 74% of microcredit borrowers in the 
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world are women. The rationale behind lending to women is that most women 
borrowers have been proven to be more creditworthy than men, in addition to the 
better ability of controlling the use of loans by women (Garikipati, 2006; Ang, 2004). 
 
Collateral free 
Collateral is always a compulsory requirement in traditional lending as a way of 
minimising default risk anticipated by lenders. Such collateral requirement becomes 
more rigid if borrowers are economically poor. However, the poor usually don’t own 
valuable assets which can be used as appropriate collateral when applying for loans 
from traditional financial institutions, and as a result, poor people are historically 
considered uncreditworthy and precluded from the traditional credit markets. 
Microcredit is an innovative idea that challenges the traditional lending wisdom of 
‘no collateral means no credit’. It deems the poor as creditworthy as the rich and 
provides collateral-free loans to the poor to develop entrepreneurial activities. 
 
Group-lending scheme 
In place of collateral, however, microcredit disciplines borrowers through a special 
scheme such as group lending. Loans are made to an individual borrower who is a 
member of a borrowing group. However, each individual borrower assumes 
responsibility for the loan repayment of his or her group members, which means all 
group members are jointly liable. If only one member from a group defaults, the rest 
in the group will be denied future access to loans from the microcredit programme. As 
a result, the principle of joint liability creates an incentive mechanism by which 
individual borrowers are stimulated to select credible members to group with, to 
monitor the other members’ activities once the loan is received, and to enforce 
repayment in case a group member fails to fulfil his or her obligation. In other words, 
the group-lending scheme creates a special kind of collateral called ‘social collateral’ 
on the loans, which reduces the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers, and 
ensures timely repayments for lenders (Anderson and Nina, 2000; Besley and Coate, 
1995). 
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These characteristics and features of microcredit programmes are embodied in the 
Grameen Bank microcredit, introduced by Muhammad Yunus in the late 1970s. As a 
pioneer in microcredit, the Grameen Bank (GB) promotes innovative ideas in poverty 
reduction through its lending programmes. Yunus (2003) advocates that credit should 
be promoted as a human right and should be based on ‘trust’ rather than collaterals or 
legally enforceable contracts. Furthermore, Yunus stresses that in order to eliminate 
poverty, appropriate changes must be made in the institutions and policies 
surrounding the poor, rather than just providing charity to the poor. Based on this 
belief, the Grameen Bank created an accessible mechanism for the poor to access 
credit on reasonable terms to improve their welfare (Yunus, 2003; Latifee, 2003). 
Today, the Grameen Bank has a network of nearly 1300 branch offices that serve 3.8 
million borrowers of which 96% are women, and has disbursed loans worth US$4.5 
billion. Moreover, the Grameen model has been widely followed in more than 50 
countries around the world (Chowdhury, 2004; Hussain, Maskooki, and Gunasekaran, 
2001). 
 
1.1.5 How does microcredit help the poor? 
Financial services such as credit contribute greatly to the growth of individuals, 
sectors and countries, and have positive effects on poor people’s livelihoods. In the 
case of agriculture, credit is an important element in the agricultural production 
process, which allows producers to satisfy the capital needs of the production cycle. 
In addition to maintaining consumption of basic necessities, access to credit can 
increase poor farmers’ risk-bearing ability and help them alter their risk-coping 
strategies so that farmers may be willing to adopt new and riskier strategies with 
higher potential return in their production instead of risk-reducing but inefficient 
strategies (Diagne, Zeller, and Sharma, 2000). Hence, credit is a powerful instrument 
to help poor people invest and break out of a ‘vicious cycle’ of poverty because it has 
the potential to improve the users’ incomes and savings, and consequently, enhance 
investment and reinforce high incomes (Mohamed, 2003). 
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Despite the importance of financial services such as credit in helping the poor to 
improve their living conditions, poor people are excluded from the formal financial 
system and such exclusion ranges from partial exclusion in developed countries to full 
or nearly full exclusion in less developed countries (LDCs) (Brau and Woller, 2004). 
Traditional financial institutions (FIs) are reluctant to serve the poor mainly because 
poor people fail to meet the selection criteria such as the requirement of physical 
collateral set by FIs. The perceived high risks and costs arising from processing and 
servicing unsecured small loans also make FIs shy away from financing the poor, 
mainly due to the concern of financial viability. Lacking access to formal credit, most 
poor and low-income people continue to rely on meagre self-finance or informal 
credit, which limit their ability to actively participate in and benefit from the 
development process. 
 
As a special form of financial service, characterised as small scale lending, 
microcredit largely facilitates the poor’s access to institutional credit by removing 
obstacles in traditional lending. Improved access to credit at reasonable cost enables 
the poor to smooth consumption (food and non-food), better cope with crises, develop 
self-employed businesses, enhance income earning capacity, and build up assets 
gradually. The poor can use the generated income to pay for the instalment of loans 
while leaving their original capital intact. Consequently, their capital base usually 
increases in large amounts as they borrow continuously, which gives them 
opportunities to make medium and long-term investments. Therefore, microcredit 
borrowers are likely to sustain long-term development by participating in 
entrepreneurial activities and as a result, shake off poverty with economic growth. 
There is rich evidence showing that microcredit has a significant impact on poverty 
reduction around the world. For example, 48% of the poorest households in 
Bangladesh have risen above the poverty line with access to microcredit; similarly, 
BRI in Indonesia has witnessed an increase in its microcredit borrowers’ income by 
12.9% compared to only 3% increase in non-borrowers’ income (World Bank, 2006; 
CGAP, 2003). 
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In addition to working as a powerful instrument in fighting against poverty, 
microcredit has the potential to promote gender equality by directly empowering poor 
women. Since microcredit programmes have generally targeted poor women as clients, 
access to microcredit can empower poor women by increasing their contribution to 
household income and assets building, which is a significant contributor toward their 
increased self-worth and improved family status. As a consequence of participating in 
microcredit programmes, women borrowers become more financially independent, 
more likely to participate in social networks and commercialisation processes, and 
able to better confront systemic gender inequities. A regional study by World Bank 
(2006) reveals that 90% of women borrowers from Self-Help Groups2
 
 (SHGs) in 
India can freely visit local markets and make small and large purchases independently, 
while 68% of women borrowers in Nepal can make independent decisions on property, 
children’s education and marriage. 
Besides, accessing microcredit allows poor borrowers to enjoy some privileges such 
as accessing education and health care, which otherwise would be impossible for 
them if there is no microcredit. Due to the great potential of reducing poverty and 
empowering women, microcredit has been promoted as an effective development 
intervention programme by many countries and become one of the key driving 
mechanisms towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the 
United Nations (UN). The MDGs range from halving extreme poverty to halting the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education by the target date of 
2015 (UN Millennium Project, 2005). The importance of microcredit is further 
underscored by the designation of the International Year of Microcredit 2005 by the 
UN, which called for global attention to build up sustainable microfinance industry to 
serve the poor. 
 
                                                             
2 Self-Help Group (SHG) is the dominant microfinance scheme in India. The operations of SHGs 
composed of 15 to 20 members are based on the principle of revolving the members’ own savings. The 
volume of individual borrowing is determined by the volume of member’s savings or the savings of the 
group (World Bank, 2006). 
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While microcredit significantly contributes to alleviating poverty, it is not a panacea 
for poverty reduction. It may be less successful, or even counter-productive in helping 
the poorest of the poor raise their living standards because the worse-off borrowers 
use loans less effectively than the better-off borrowers due to the relatively weaker 
economic base of the former. Therefore, microcredit should be involved as a part of 
broader poverty eradication strategy combining with other intervention programmes 
such as social protection programmes (Chowdhury, 2004). In addition, microcredit 
remains inaccessible to the poorest of the poor because microcredit institutions intend 
to protect their self-sustainability to achieve larger scale of poverty reduction at 
moderate level (Druschel, 2002). 
 
1.2 An overview of Chinese agriculture 
Agriculture plays an important role in the Chinese national economy in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment. For example, agriculture accounted 
for 26.9% of GDP in 1986 and 14.8% in 2000 (see Table 1.1). In addition, the 
majority of the Chinese population (about 745 million people or 57% of the total 
population as of the end of 2005) reside in rural areas and agriculture contributes 
greatly to the national employment in China. For example, in 1978, agriculture 
contributed 70.5% of total employment. Employment in the agricultural sector has 
declined as more labourers have been attracted by the growing tertiary industries such 
as service and manufacturing during the last 20 years, but the agricultural sector still 
absorbed some 45% of the total labour force in 2005 (see Table 1.2). Furthermore, the 
agricultural sector plays an important role in China’s international trade. For example, 
agricultural exports generated foreign exchange earnings of US$91 million in 1980, 
accounting for 50% of the total exports in China (Huang, Rozelle, and Tuan, 1999). 
 
Since China initiated its economic reforms at the end of 1978, which placed high 
emphasis on reforming the rural sector, China’s agriculture took big leaps forward 
with increasing output and diversification. For example, the output of grain has been 
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substantially increased from 305 million tons in 1978 to 508 million tons in 1999 (see 
Table 1.3). With increased productivity in major agricultural products such as grain, 
cotton and oil-bearing products, China ranks first in the world in terms of agricultural 
output (Lu, 2006). In addition, the agricultural foreign trade has developed 
remarkably due to the flexible market policies during the reform period. For example, 
the volume of agricultural exports surged by 52% from 1980 to 1985, which resulted 
in a substantial increase in the balance of agricultural foreign trade during the same 
period from $21.55 million to $85.39 million (see Table 1.4). It is noteworthy that the 
average annual growth rate of China agriculture between 1978 and 1984 reached a 
peak of 7.1% compared to a growth rate of only 2.7% between 1970 and 1978 (Huang 
and Rozelle, 2002). 
 
Table 1.1 Values and composition of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China 
(million yuan) 
Year 
Total 
GDP 
Agriculture Industry Tertiary 
Value Share Value Share Value Share 
1986 10,275.2 2,763.9 26.9% 4,492.7 43.7% 3,018.6 29.4% 
1987 12,058.6 3,204.3 26.6% 5,251.6 43.6% 3,602.7 29.9% 
1988 15,042.8 3,831.0 25.5% 6,587.2 43.8% 4,624.6 30.7% 
1989 16,992.3 4,228.0 24.9% 7,278.0 42.8% 5,486.3 32.3% 
1990 18,667.8 5,017.0 26.9% 7,717.4 41.3% 5,933.4 31.8% 
1995 60,793.7 12,020.0 19.8% 28,679.5 47.2% 20,094.3 33.1% 
2000 99,214.6 14,716.2 14.8% 45,555.9 45.9% 38,942.5 39.3% 
2001 109,655.2 15,516.2 14.1% 49,512.3 45.2% 44,626.7 40.7% 
2002 120,332.7 16,238.6 13.5% 53,896.8 44.8% 50,197.3 41.7% 
2003 135,822.8 17,068.3 12.6% 62,436.3 46.0% 56,318.1 41.5% 
2004 159,878.3 20,955.8 13.1% 73,904.3 46.2% 65,018.2 40.7% 
2005 183,084.8 23,070.4 12.6% 87,046.7 47.5% 72,967.7 39.9% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006, National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 
 
However, agriculture’s contribution to national economic development in terms of 
GDP and foreign trade has been declining with the increased shares of the industrial 
and tertiary sectors in China’s national economy. For example, agriculture accounted 
for 26.9% of the GDP in 1986, while the industrial and tertiary sectors contributed to 
the total GDP at 38.6% and 29.4%, respectively. Despite a significant increase of up 
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to 20 billion yuan in the value of agricultural GDP in a span of 20 years, the 
agriculture’s share in total GDP dropped to 12.6% in 2005, while the shares of the 
industrial and tertiary sectors in the GDP increased to 42% and 39.9%, respectively 
(see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.2 Employment and employment rates by sector (10,000 persons) 
Year 
Total 
Employed 
Persons 
Agriculture Industry Tertiary 
Employed 
Persons 
% of 
Total 
Employed 
Persons 
% of 
Total 
Employed 
Persons 
% of 
Total 
1978 40,153 28,318 70.5% 6,945 17.3% 4,890 12.2% 
1979 41,025 28,634 69.8% 7,214 17.6% 5,177 12.6% 
1980 42,361 29,122 68.7% 7,707 18.2% 5,532 13.1% 
1985 49,873 31,130 62.4% 10,384 20.8% 8,359 16.8% 
1990 64,749 38,914 60.1% 13,856 21.4% 11,979 18.5% 
1995 68,065 35,530 52.2% 15,655 23.0% 16,880 24.8% 
1996 68,950 34,820 50.5% 16,203 23.5% 17,927 26.0% 
1997 69,819 34,840 49.9% 16,547 23.7% 18,432 26.4% 
1998 70,637 35,177 49.8% 16,600 23.5% 18,860 26.7% 
1999 71,394 35,768 50.1% 16,421 23.0% 19,205 26.9% 
2000 72,085 36,043 50.0% 16,219 22.5% 19,823 27.5% 
2001 73,025 36,513 50.0% 16,284 22.3% 20,228 27.7% 
2002 73,740 36,870 50.0% 15,780 21.4% 21,090 28.6% 
2003 74,432 36,546 49.1% 16,077 21.6% 21,809 29.3% 
2004 75,200 35,269 46.9% 16,920 22.5% 23,011 30.6% 
2005 75,825 33,970 44.8% 18,084 23.8% 23,771 31.3% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006, NBSC. 
 
In addition, the role of agriculture in Chinese foreign trade has shrunk over the last 
two decades. The proportion of agricultural exports plummeted from 50% in 1980 to 
only 6% in 2005, although the volume of agricultural exports experienced a 
continuous increase from US$26,338 million in 2001 to US$49,037 million in 2005 
mainly due to China’s accession to WTO in 2001 (see Table 1.4). Meanwhile, the 
share of non-agricultural exports (e.g., manufacturing goods) surged to 94% in 2005 
(NBSC, 2006). Overall, China’s agriculture has been growing since the economic 
reforms, but its growth rate has been outpaced by that of industry as a result of 
industrialisation in China. 
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Table 1.3 Outputs of China’s major agricultural products (10,000 tons) 
Variety 1978 1999 2005 
Grain 30,477.0 50,839.0 48,402.2 
Cotton 216.7 383.1 571.4 
Oil-bearing crops 521.8 2,601.2 3,077.1 
Sugarcane 2,111.6 7,470.0 8,663.8 
Flue-cured tobacco 105.2 218.5 243.5 
Tea 26.8 67.6 93.5 
Fruit 657.0 6,237.6 16,120.1 
Meat 856.3 5,960.9 7,743.1 
Aquatic Products 466.0 4,122.0 5,107.6 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, NBSC, various years. 
 
Table 1.4 Values and shares of agriculture in Chinese total exports and imports 
($ million) 
Year 
Imports Exports 
Total Agriculture % Total Agricultural % 
1980 200.17 69.59 35% 181.19 91.14 50% 
1985 422.52 52.89 13% 273.50 138.28 51% 
1990 533.45 98.53 18% 620.91 158.86 26% 
1995 1,320.84 244.17 18% 1,487.80 214.85 14% 
1996 1,388.33 254.41 18% 1,510.48 219.25 15% 
1997 1,423.70 286.20 20% 1,827.92 239.53 13% 
1998 1,402.37 229.49 16% 1,837.09 204.89 11% 
1999 1,656.99 268.46 16% 1,949.31 199.41 10% 
2000 2,250.94 467.39 21% 2,492.03 254.60 10% 
2001 2,435.53 457.43 19% 2,660.98 263.38 10% 
2002 2,951.70 492.71 17% 3,255.96 285.40 9% 
2003 4,127.59 727.63 18% 4,382.28 348.12 8% 
2004 5,612.29 1,172.67 21% 5,933.26 405.49 7% 
2005 6,599.53 1,477.14 22% 7,619.53 490.37 6% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006, NBSC. 
 
1.3 Land ownership issues in China 
Farmers in China do not have ownership of the land on which they farm. Instead, land 
is owned by the village (or collective) and is contracted or allocated to rural 
households. Therefore, the Chinese land-tenure system is actually a village-based 
communal land tenure system (Lin and Zhang, 1998). The ownership entity generally 
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retains the right to reallocate land among households and when the village or 
collective leaders exercise the right to reallocate land, rural households risk losing the 
plots they had farmed and they are not guaranteed to acquire comparable plots 
through the reallocation. While the reallocation is intended to ensure egalitarian 
access to land, it also generates significant land-tenure insecurity in rural China. 
 
With the promulgation of the Land Management Law in 1998, the contracted land use 
right by China rural households has been legally extended to 30 years. However, this 
policy directive is not always followed and the dynamics of household and village 
demographics frequently induce local authorities to reallocate land prior to contract 
expiration. In addition, the Chinese land-tenure system lacks formal rules governing 
independent land transfers between households, which hinders the development of a 
rural land market (Huang et al., 1999; Prosterman, Hanstad, Schwarzwalder, and Li, 
1998). 
 
The insecure land-tenure system discourages farmers from investing in inputs that 
have a long-term payoff such as organic fertiliser. In addition, the lack of legal titles 
on land prevent farmers from using land as collateral and limits their access to formal 
credit which is another important input in agricultural production. Moreover, the 
restrictions on land markets, frequent land reallocation and small scale landholdings 
(less than 0.08 hectare per capita) rooted in the Chinese village-based land tenure 
system have become the major hindrance to the efficiency of resource allocation and 
the improvement of agricultural productivity (Huang et al., 1999; Lin and Zhang, 
1998). 
 
1.4 Rural poverty and credit accessibility by rural households 
Like most Asian developing countries, the majority of the poor population in China 
dwell in rural areas. With the spectacular growth in agriculture, China has made a 
significant contribution to global poverty alleviation over the past two decades. The 
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number of rural people living in ‘absolute poverty’ of less than 25 cents per day has 
been dramatically reduced from 250 million in 1978 to only 26 million in 2004. 
However, there are still another 76 million ‘relatively’ poor people surviving on less 
than a dollar per day in rural China and the rural population living in both ‘absolute 
poverty’ and ‘relative poverty’ accounts for 11% of the total rural population. The 
impoverished areas are concentrated in a poverty ‘belt’ that stretches from the 
Northeast to the Southwest, and from the heart of China to the far western province of 
Xinjiang (Heilig, Zhang, Long, Li, and Wu, 2006; Wu, 2001). 
 
In addition, income inequality persists between rural areas and urban areas. For 
example, the urban income in 1978 was almost 2.6 times higher than the rural income, 
but it dropped to 1.5 times higher in 1988 as a result of the rapid rural development 
arising from the rural economic reforms. However, the urban-rural income gap has 
widened again since 1989; and in 2003, the urban income was again 2.4 times higher 
than the rural income, which presents a wide gap between rural and urban living 
standards (see Table 1.5). Moreover, a regional disparity in rural-urban income 
inequality is evident. For example, the eastern and southern provinces have a much 
smaller rural-urban income gap than provinces in Central, Northern, and Western 
China (Heilig et al., 2006). 
 
Inability to acquire formal financial support, credit support in particular, has 
constrained poor farmers’ ability to expand their production and improve their living 
conditions. The Chinese collective land-ownership system has prevented farmers from 
accessing traditional credit support from formal financial institutions because farmers 
cannot use land as collateral which is a necessary requirement in traditional lending. 
However, farmers need credit support to meet their living needs including the 
purchase of durable goods, daily consumption, and festivals and ceremonies. In 
addition to the living needs, farmers require credit as an important production input, 
with which they can invest in high-yielding varieties and purchase chemical fertiliser 
that is indispensable in agricultural production because of the infertile soils in most of 
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China’s impoverished areas. 
 
Table 1.5 Comparison between rural and urban income per capita in China 
(yuan) 
Year 
Rural Income (average) Urban Income (average) 
Urban-Rural 
Ratio of Real 
Income d 
Nominal 
Income a 
(at 
current 
prices) 
Real  
Income  
Index b 
(1978=100) 
Real  
Income c1 
(1978  
constant 
prices) 
Nominal 
Income a (at 
current 
prices) 
Real  
Income 
 Index b 
(1978=100) 
Real  
Income c2 
(1978  
Constant 
 prices) 
1978 133.6 100.0 133.6 343.4 100.0 343.4 2.57 
1980 191.3 139.0 185.7 477.6 127.0 436.1 2.35 
1985 397.6 268.9 359.3 739.1 160.4 550.8 1.53 
1986 423.8 277.6 370.9 899.6 182.5 626.7 1.69 
1987 462.6 292.0 390.1 1,002.2 186.9 641.8 1.65 
1988 544.9 310.7 415.1 1,181.4 182.5 626.7 1.51 
1989 601.5 305.7 408.4 1,375.7 182.8 627.7 1.54 
1990 686.3 311 2 415.8 1,510.2 198.1 680.3 1.64 
1995 1,577.7 383.7 512.6 4,283.0 290.3 996.9 1.94 
2000 2,253.4 483.5 646.0 6,280.0 383.7 1,317.6 2.04 
2001 2,366.4 503.8 673.1 6,859.6 416.3 1,429.6 2.12 
2002 2,475.6 528.0 705.4 7,702.8 472.1 1,621.2 2.3 
2003 2,622.2 550.7 735.7 8,472.2 514.6 1,767.1 2.4 
Source: 1) values of a and b are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook 2006, NBSC; 
2) values of c1 and c2 are calculated by multiplying Real Income Index (b) by the nominal 
income of base year (1978); 
3) values of d are calculated by dividing the values of c2 by the values of c1. 
 
Failing to access formal credit, most farmers have to resort to informal borrowings 
which are typically offered at higher interest rates. While the formal interest rate set 
by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) on short and medium term loans is low (less 
than 6%), interest rates in informal markets generally range from 12% to 30%. For 
example, in the northeast and northwest areas where the economy is relatively 
underdeveloped, informal lending rates of 100% to 200% annually are not unusual 
(Linton, 2008). Despite the high interest rates charged by the informal lenders, 
approximately 50% to 60% of rural households in China still rely on informal credit 
for their consumption and production (Han, 2004). The high interest on informal 
loans has increased farmers’ indebtedness and further kept most of the households 
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trapped in poverty. 
 
Since Chinese agriculture is dominated by small farms and farmer households are the 
basic units of agricultural production3
 
, limited access to formal credit has been 
blamed as an important constraint to improving farmers’ production, which 
potentially leads to the stagnant growth of the rural economy (Park, Ren, and Wang, 
2004; Cheng and Xu, 2003). 
1.5 Microcredit in China 
With a widening gap between rural and urban living standards and the threat of 
political instability in the countryside, the Chinese government carried out various 
agriculture-support policies focusing on farmer lending to solve ‘three rural 
problems’, namely raising rural incomes, improving agricultural production, and 
developing rural areas. For example, the government has tried to expand credit access 
by the rural poor through targeted subsidised-loan programmes since 1986. The 
national funding for the subsidised loan programmes was significantly increased from 
5.5 billion yuan in 1996 to 8.5 billion yuan in 1997. However, most of the subsidised 
loans are allocated to the rich, township enterprises, or local government-support 
industrial projects, instead of poor rural households. Moreover, the low repayment 
rates (less than 50%) made the subsidised loans financially unsustainable (Heilig et al., 
2006; Park and Ren, 2001). 
 
As a result of the failure of subsidised loans in reaching the rural poor, microcredit 
was introduced into China as part of the government’s poverty alleviation strategies in 
the mid-1990s, aiming to ameliorate rural poverty through a financially sustainable 
approach. The development of Chinese microcredit can be divided into three phases. 
                                                             
3 Before the economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, the Chinese agricultural economy was 
characterised as collective economy, of which the basic production unit was the production team. The 
most successful reform since the 1970s was the shift from the collective system to the household 
responsibility system (HRS) which restored the primacy of the individual household as the basic unit of 
production in rural China. 
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The first phase was an experimental phase from 1994 to 1996, and the microcredit 
programmes were mainly supported by international donations through the operation 
of NGOs; the second phase was an expansion phase from 1996 to 2000, during which 
more government agencies such as Poverty Alleviation Offices (PAOs) were involved 
in the implementation of microcredit besides NGOs; the third phase began from 2000 
to present, when formal rural financial institutions (RFIs) such as the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs) became involved in microcredit implementation. During the 
third phase, RCCs have quickly expanded their microcredit activities and took the 
leading role in popularising and formalising microcredit in China because they are the 
major RFIs serving the rural population with an extensive network in rural areas (Du, 
2005, 2004). 
 
Chinese microcredit programmes can be categorised into three types in terms of 
different providers. The first type includes experimental microcredit projects provided 
by NGOs and quasi-official organisations, aiming to explore the feasibility, operating 
capabilities and policy implications of microcredit in China; the second type focuses 
on poverty alleviation and is carried out by government agencies; and the third type 
centres on RCCs with the purpose of minimising credit limit in the rural areas of 
China. In addition, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) promulgated Guidance of 
Management of RCC’s Microcredit Loans in 2001 and Notice on Improvement in 
Granting Microfinance Loans and Serving Peasants in 2004, which further 
strengthened the management, systematisation and support of RCC’s microcredit 
programme (Du, 2005, 2004). 
 
Most Chinese microcredit programmes follow the Grameen Bank characteristics such 
as targeting the poor, collateral free, and joint liability (group lending). In addition, 
the microcredit loans from RCCs are provided to the rural households who are 
engaged in land farming and other related business in agricultural sector. Accordingly, 
the usage of microcredit includes agricultural production, purchase of small farming 
machinery, services before, during, and after agricultural production, and daily 
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expenditure such as housing, medical services, education and consumption. Moreover, 
the credit lines of RCCs’ microcredit are set by the Rural Credit Unions at county or 
city level according to the local economic situation, the farmers’ income levels and 
the availability of RCCs funds, which is finally approved by the PBCs (PBC, 2001). 
 
With the implementation of microcredit, China has boosted lending to farmers in 
recent years. Under the agricultural lending support from the PBC which is the main 
funding source for RCCs’ microcredit programmes, RCCs have substantially 
developed their microcredit programmes and evolved as the largest microcredit 
providers serving the grassroots level in rural China (Sun, 2003). By the end of 2002, 
the balance of RCCs’ microcredit issued to rural households had reached 74.6 billion 
yuan, an increase of 41.9 billion yuan compared to the beginning of the year. 
Moreover, RCCs’ microcredit had achieved a timely repayment rate of 81%, creating 
a foundation for realising a sound cycle of economic activities. By the end of 2005, 
31,500 RCCs nationwide, which accounted for approximately 90% of the total RCCs, 
had been involved in offering microcredit service to 71.3 million rural households, 
equivalent to 32.31% of the total rural population. Especially, in agricultural 
provinces such as Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, the share of rural households receiving 
loans was 50% or more, and more than 95% of these loans were provided by RCCs in 
the form of microcredit (Jin, 2006; Han, 2004). 
 
However, in spite of the strong efforts made by the Chinese government to facilitate 
credit access in rural areas, there is evidence showing that large numbers of poor 
farmers who are regarded as marginalised people in their villages do not have access 
to microcredit because of their weak social and economic conditions. In addition, 
women in rural China are still disadvantaged in accessing any form of formal credit 
including microcredit and on some occasions, they have to use their husbands’ names 
to apply for microcredit loans (Dyar, Harduar, Koenig, and Reyes, 2006; Han, 2004; 
Unger, 2002). Additionally, few attempts have been made to test the efficiency of 
microcredit as an instrument of poverty reduction in China, with the exceptions of the 
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studies by Li, Rozelle, and Zhang (2004) and Park and Ren (2001). This may be 
because Chinese microcredit programmes have been implemented on the assumption 
that microcredit is an effective anti-poverty tool such as those in Bangladesh and 
Indonesia (Sun, 2003). 
 
1.6 Research problem statement 
A large number of farmers in China are still trapped in poverty. Inability to obtain 
credit from formal financial institutions has long been viewed as the biggest obstacle 
to improving farmers’ living conditions in China. Alternatively, farmers have to rely 
on informal credit source to support their production and consumption by accepting a 
much higher interest rate, which leaves them in a ‘vicious debt circle’ with little hope 
to shake off poverty. The credit inaccessibility in the rural areas impedes the 
development of the rural sector, which potentially decelerates the development of 
China’s rural economy. 
 
Microcredit was introduced into China as an efficient anti-poverty programme, 
aiming to facilitate credit access by rural households and mitigate the rural poverty in 
China. However, in spite of the efforts made by the Chinese government to support 
and popularise the implementation of microcredit, empirical studies on Chinese 
farmers’ accessibility to microcredit show mixed results. On the other hand, empirical 
studies examining the social potential of microcredit such as reducing poverty and 
empowering women are limited in China and the impacts of microcredit on China 
rural households’ livelihoods are not well documented. 
 
The purpose of this research is to assess the impact of microcredit in rural China in 
two areas: household welfare and women empowerment. The lack of credit has been 
regarded as the major constraint in improving Chinese farmers’ livelihoods, thus it is 
reasonable to assume that microcredit, which targets rural households for the 
provision of credit could have a positive impact on households’ well-being such as 
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increasing the households’ income and/or consumption. In addition, the status of 
Chinese women has improved greatly in the past two decades, but gender inequality 
still exists in almost all social aspects including political power, education, health, 
employment and asset possession, and the problem of gender inequality is far more 
serious in rural, poverty-stricken areas where women usually lack sources of income 
(Dyar et al., 2006). A study by Du and Kanji (2003) find that patriarchy still prevails 
in Chinese rural families and rural women continue to be relatively disadvantaged in 
matters of survival, health, nutrition, literacy, and productivity. Therefore, it is 
believed that microcredit can contribute to the empowerment of rural women in China 
by enabling them to be financially independent. In addition to the impact assessment, 
the accessibility to microcredit by farmers is examined to identify the key factors 
affecting farmers’ access to microcredit. 
 
This research focuses on the microcredit provided by the RCC, the largest microcredit 
provider in China. RCC’s microcredit programmes are the most prevailing type of 
microcredit in rural China, which have significant influence on rural households’ 
livelihoods compared to the other two types of microcredit programmes in China (i.e. 
the microcredit programmes carried out by NGOs and governmental agencies). 
 
1.7 Research objectives 
The research objectives in this research include the following: 
1. to provide an overview of Chinese microcredit programme development; 
2. to identify the determinants influencing the accessibility of microcredit by 
rural households in China; 
3. to assess the impact of microcredit on household welfare in regards to income 
and consumption in rural China; 
4. to assess the impact of microcredit on women empowerment in rural China; 
5. to provide policy implications from the research findings. 
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1.8 Methodology and data 
The methodology used in this research is divided as follows: 
1. Descriptive analysis is used to answer Research Objective 1: 
Graph, average, and percentage are used to discuss secondary information from 
previous literature regarding Chinese microcredit programmes. 
2. Quantitative analysis is used to examine Research Objectives 2, 3, and 4: 
A difference-in-difference (DD) approach is employed in this research to evaluate 
the welfare impact of microcredit at the household level (see for example, Islam 
and Harris, 2008); and logistic regression is used to identify key factors 
influencing rural households’ ability to access microcredit and the impact of 
microcredit on women empowerment, respectively (see for example, Mohamed, 
2003; Zaman, 1999). 
 
Primary data were obtained through a rural household survey using a structured 
questionnaire. The information gathered from the household survey included 
household characteristics, such as age, gender, family size, etc., which were 
hypothesised to influence the households’ accessibility to microcredit. These 
household characteristics also served as control variables in the impacts analyses. 
Moreover, the information obtained from the female respondents was used to 
construct the empowerment indicators to evaluate the impact of microcredit on 
women’s empowerment. Secondary data were obtained from the selected RCC branch 
offices, which comprised of household characteristics (such as age, family size, etc.) 
in the pre-programme period, household annual income and consumption in both the 
pre- and post-programme periods, and accumulative micro-loan amounts (in the 
post-programme period only). Specifically, a two-year panel dataset was used in the 
DD approach for welfare impact analysis with income/consumption as welfare 
measures. Cumulative loan amounts reflect the extent of household involvement in 
the microcredit programme, which is the primary variable used in the microcredit 
impacts analyses (welfare and empowerment). 
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The structured interview was administered in Hubei Province in China. Hubei 
Province is one of the major agricultural provinces in China, where farmers are 
geographically distributed in both plain and mountain areas and produce various 
agricultural products such as crops, aquatic products and livestock. The net income 
per capita and consumption per capita of rural households in Hubei Province are $378 
and $296 respectively, which represents the average living standards of rural 
households in China4
 
 (NBSC, 2005). In addition, the rural population in Hubei 
Province comprises different minorities, such as Tujia and Hui minorities. The 
minority population in Hubei Province is around 3 million (NBSC, 2005). The sample 
drawn from the rural areas in Hubei Province included households from different 
ethnicities at different wealth levels. Therefore, studying rural households in Hubei 
Province allowed comparisons based on characteristics such as income inequality and 
multinationalism. 
1.9 Contribution of this research 
The development of microcredit in China still lags behind those of other developing 
countries such as Bangladesh and India. The development of China’s microcredit 
programmes is constrained by many factors such as the lack of technological support 
and the lack of strong regulatory frameworks. The findings of this research will 
provide useful information pertaining to the roles of microcredit in poverty reduction 
and women empowerment, which reflect the influence of the microcredit programmes 
on the Chinese rural economy and social development. In addition, the findings of this 
research will provide relevant information to policy makers in establishing supportive 
regulatory environments to sustain a viable microcredit sector. It would be appropriate 
for the policy makers to liberalise regulations and restrictions which have 
bottlenecked the development of Chinese microcredit to a large extent. 
 
Besides, an understanding of how accessibility to microcredit or financial services 
                                                             
4 The national average of net income per capita of Chinese rural households in 2005 is $396; the 
national average of consumption per capita of Chinese rural households in 2005 is $311 (NBSC, 2005). 
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would change the farmers’ lives helps policy makers to take the appropriate actions 
towards reforming the rural financial system and further enhance farmers’ 
accessibility to financial services including credit, which could potentially accelerate 
the development of China’s rural economy. 
 
1.10 Outline of this thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature 
including a background of the Chinese rural financial system, credit demand and 
credit accessibility by rural households, and the performance of governmental credit 
programmes; Chapter 3 reviews the development of Chinese microcredit programmes 
and previous empirical studies on credit accessibility and the impacts of microcredit. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the empirical models, the estimation techniques, and data 
collection methods. Chapter 5 analyses the data and discusses the empirical results. 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the major research findings and policy implications, 
followed by the limitations of this research and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S RURAL CREDIT 
MARKETS 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
This chapter provides an overview of rural credit markets in China, including the rural 
financing system (credit supply), credit demand, and credit accessibility by rural 
households, and the performance of government rural credit programmes. The chapter 
is organised as follows: Section 2.1 focuses on the credit supply-side and provides a 
review of the formal rural financial system as well as informal rural financing in 
China. Section 2.2 discusses credit demand by the rural households in China; Section 
2.3 discusses credit accessibility by the rural households in China. The gap between 
credit supply and credit demand in rural China is discussed in Section 2.4; and 
Section 2.5 discusses the performance of the government credit programmes in China. 
 
2.1 Rural financing in China 
As a result of the rural reforms since the late 1970s, China’s rural economy has been 
developing rapidly, which has created a demand for pluralism of investment and 
finance in rural areas. The enormous demand for financial services gave an impetus to 
the formation and expansion of rural financial institutions, leading to gradual 
improvement in the overall rural financial system (Scott and Wang, 2006; Zhang, 
2004). At present, formal financial institutions and informal financial institutions 
coexist within China’s rural financial system (see Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1 shows 
China’s rural financial system consisting of three kinds of financial institutions 
including banking institutions, non-banking financial institutions and informal 
funding organisations. The PBC acts as the central bank implementing a unified 
monetary policy and supervising the overall financial system in the country (Zhang, 
2004; Ma, 2004). 
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Figure 2.1 Rural financial system in China (adapted from Zhang, 2004) 
 
2.1.1 The formal financial system in rural China 
The formal rural financial sector is characterised as a “three-tier system”, composed 
of a state-owned commercial bank (Agricultural Bank of China), a government 
policy-based bank (Agricultural Development Bank of China), and Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs). Each of the three rural financial institutions plays a unique role 
in providing lending support to the agricultural sector and rural households in China. 
 
(1) The Agricultural Bank of China 
The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was established in the late 1970s to implement 
rural financing policies formulated by the PBC, but restructured into a commercial 
bank serving both rural and urban markets after 1994 (Gale and Collender, 2006)5
                                                             
5 The ABC was first founded in 1955 to provide credit support for rural credit cooperatives. Since then, 
ABC has undergone several abolishment and re-establishments and the present ABC in China was 
re-established in 1979 (IFAD, 2001; Gale and Collender, 2006). 
. 
The ABC is the largest commercial bank involved in agriculture. Loans from the ABC 
include specialised agricultural loans (such as comprehensive development and 
subsidiary businesses in grain, oil, and cotton), conventional agricultural loans (such 
as farming, forestry, livestock, fisheries, and the processing of agricultural products), 
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loans for township and village enterprises (TVEs), loans for rural supply and 
marketing co-operatives (SMCs), and loans for basic rural facilities construction. 
However, the main targets of the ABC’s lending are agricultural enterprises rather 
than rural households. Between 1980 and 2001, the cumulative balance of agricultural 
loans issued by the ABC reached 9,449 billion yuan, accounting for 66% of the 
ABC’s total lending business (Ma, 2004; Zhang, 2004; Druschel, 2002). 
 
However, Han (2004) notes that the ratio of ABC’s agricultural loans to its total loans 
has been declining. Before the 1990s, the ABC played the leading role in China’s 
rural financial system and more than 98% of total loans from the ABC were issued to 
support agricultural development. However, owing to the commercialisation reform 
from the mid-1990s, the ABC’s financial resources are no longer restricted to 
agriculture and more resources have been allocated to rural infrastructure construction 
such as the rural electricity network, transport, and communication. After the 1990s, 
the ABC gradually withdrew its branches from the countryside and shifted its 
business focus from agriculture to industry. Consequently, the share of agricultural 
lending by the ABC has decreased and the ABC has lost its dominant position in the 
rural financial system (Dong and Featherstone, 2004; Zhu and Gemert, 2001). 
 
(2) The Agricultural Development Bank of China 
The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) is founded in order to separate 
the policy-based banking business from the ABC in 1994. The scope of the ADBC’s 
credit business in the early days of its establishment included loans for the 
procurement and storage of grain, cotton, oil, sugar, and meat; loans for the transfer, 
marketing and wholesale of grain and oil; policy loans for grain, cotton, and oil 
processing enterprises; loans for poverty reduction and development, and loans for 
rural infrastructure construction (Ma, 2004; He and Guo, 2004; Druschel, 2002). 
However, in the late 1990s, the range of the ADBC’s credit business shrank to the 
supply and management of funds for the procurement of grain, cotton, and oil by the 
state-owned enterprises. The other policy banking businesses such as financing 
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poverty-relief and comprehensive agricultural exploitation were handed over to the 
ABC (Wang and Liu, 2005; Ma, 2004; He and Guo, 2004). By the end of 2001, the 
ADBC had issued procurement loans for grain, cotton and oil amounting to 707.3 
billion yuan, accounting for approximately 98% of its total lending balance (Ma, 2004; 
Zhang, 2004). 
 
Zhang (2004) argues that it is difficult for the ADBC to assume the heavy burden of 
China’s policy finance because ADBC’s capital sources are insufficient. Generally, 
the main source of the ADBC’s capital should be funds assigned by financial 
administration and loan repayment. However, owing to the imbalance between 
government revenue and expenditure accumulated over years, the allocation of 
supplementary funds cannot be guaranteed on time. Instead, the ADBC raises its 
capital through issuing financial bonds to commercial banks and borrowing from the 
PBC, which subsequently increases the ADBC’s cost of financing (Zhang, 2004; He 
and Guo, 2004). The other reason is that the ADBC’s scope of business is too narrow 
with a single function. As a result of policy adjustment, the ADBC only acts as a 
‘purchasing bank’ to meet the financing needs of agricultural products procurement 
and stockpiling by the state-owned enterprises (Zhang, 2004; He and Guo, 2004; Zhu 
and Gemert, 2001). Zhu and Gemert (2001) argue that the ADBC should engage more 
in issuing policy-related loans to support agricultural production rather than solely 
extending loans to state-owned enterprises, which is an appropriate way of ensuring 
an efficient supply of agricultural products. 
 
ABC and ADBC both serve the rural areas, but they mainly focus on agricultural 
product processing companies and large-scale agricultural development projects run 
by the state government and do not issue loans to farmers in general (Druschel, 2002; 
Ma, 2004; Zhang, 2004). 
 
(3) Rural Credit Cooperatives 
Established in the late 1950s, Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) are financial 
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cooperative organisations with rural labourers as share-holding members. RCCs 
operate at either village-level or township-level: the township-level RCCs can run 
both savings and credit businesses but the village-level RCCs are only allowed to take 
in deposits from villagers, plus collecting loan applications and submitting them to 
township-level RCCs for approval. Since the start-up capital of RCCs comes from 
farmers (80% or more of RCCs’ funding comes from farmers’ savings deposits), 
RCCs have a close relationship with farmers and loans provided by RCCs principally 
target rural households (Druschel, 2002; Guo and Lei, 2000). Loans issued to rural 
households are mostly in the form of microcredit, giving key support to crop 
production, fish breeding, raising animals, as well as children’s education and daily 
consumption (Zuo, 2001; PBC, 2001). Operating at county or township level, RCCs 
are the only formal financial institutions reaching the grassroots of rural society, since 
other financial institutions such as the ABC have largely withdrawn their financial 
services from rural areas to target more profitable operations in urban areas (Cheng, 
2006; Empel and Smit, 2004). 
 
A study by Zhang (2004) reveals that the proportion of RCCs’ agricultural loans in 
terms of the total formal agricultural loans rose from 26% in 1979 to 78% in 2001, 
while the proportion of agricultural loans from the ABC dropped from 74% to 22% 
over the same period of time, which further confirmed the predominant position of 
RCCs in China’s rural financing system. As a mainstay of China’s rural financial 
system, RCCs cater for the basic financial needs of rural households and play a 
decisive role in providing financial support for agriculture and rural economic 
development. 
 
Despite the crucial roles played by RCCs in China’s rural finance, many problems 
exist in the way of RCCs’ unique roles in rural financing (Scott and Wang, 2006; 
Wang and Liu, 2005; Wang, 2004; Dong and Featherstone, 2004; Zhu and Gemert, 
2001; Guo and Lei, 2000). For example, RCCs are hampered by ambiguous 
governance as RCCs in China are established on the basis of government directives 
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and are only ‘cooperative’ financial institutions in name. Before 1997, RCCs were 
managed by ABC as an affiliate. After separating from ABC in 1997, RCCs began 
their own business under the direct supervision of the PBC. In addition, RCCs were 
still partly under control of the local governments, which increased the supply of 
capital for agricultural production with little regard to RCCs’ institutional 
sustainability (Wang and Liu, 2005; Dong and Featherston, 2004; Zhu and Gemert, 
2001). Such ambiguous governance is further complicated by the fact that the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has begun to exert both quasi-managerial 
and supervisory influence on RCCs since 2003 (Scott and Wang, 2006; Scott and 
Druschel, 2004). On the other hand, the theoretical owners of RCCs, that is, the 
farmers in villages, join RCCs under administrative pressure and have virtually no 
right to participate in management and supervision of the operations of RCCs. In 
addition, the members’ share capital is generally in deficit due to the operational 
losses by many RCCs (Wang, 2004; Guo and Lei, 2000). Without management rights 
and bonus incentives, the farmers would rather forego their small shares of capital and 
are unwilling to bear any responsibility for RCCs’ poor performance (Wang, 2004). 
Dong and Featherstone (2004) argue that RCCs in China are not ‘cooperatives’ in 
principle because they fail to meet the requirements of a ‘cooperative’ such as 
voluntary participation, democratic management, and mutual risks and benefits. 
 
In addition to the supervisory imperfection, the legal position of the RCC in China’s 
financial system is equivocal. China has not enacted laws regulating co-operative 
finance and the legal position of the RCC is only defined by the Regulations for the 
Management of Rural Credit Co-operatives formulated by the PBC (Dong and 
Featherstone, 2004; Wang, 2004). For daily business RCCs’ legal role is to provide 
financial services to farmers or rural households; but at the macro level, RCCs play a 
dual role of acting as a quasi-policy financial institution to support agriculture and 
operating as commercial banks to generate profits to maintain their viability. The 
combination of cooperative, commercial, and policy finance in one entity inevitably 
results in frequent confusion with regard to RCCs’ operational roles and behaviours 
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(Wang, 2004; Druschel, 2002). Furthermore, the professional quality of RCCs’ staff as 
well as the management methods and basic facilities of RCCs still lag far behind 
those of commercial banks, which makes RCCs less competitive compared to 
commercial banks (Park, Ren, and Wang, 2004). 
 
Problems such as governance ambiguity and unclear legal directives have created 
disincentives for RCCs to operate effectively to achieve the goal of financial 
sustainability. In addition, political intervention in lending decisions by local 
authorities, usually motivated by intentions such as tax collection and employment 
maintenance, leads to non-recoverable loans made to poorly performing enterprises. 
This perpetuates weak incentives to implement commercially sustainable lending 
practices and fosters an unfavourable credit culture within RCCs (Scott and Druschel, 
2004). As a result, many RCCs have incurred severe financial losses. According to 
studies by Han (2004) and Ma (2004), the accumulative losses of RCCs throughout 
the country stood at 108.3 billion yuan at the end of 2000, accounting for 10% of 
RCCs’ total assets. In spite of the positive response by the PBC to mitigate RCCs’ 
debt burden by writing off bad loans through one-time capital injections, RCCs still 
had non-performing loans amounting to 514.7 billion yuan at the end of 2002, 
comprising 37% of their total loans outstanding. 
 
Since the 1978 reform, China has enjoyed a relatively stable rural financial system 
that is geared towards meeting the diversified financial needs in rural areas. Within 
the system, the three major financial institutions, i.e., the ABC, ADBC, and RCC, 
perform their own functions in regards to commercial, policy, and co-operative 
finance (Zhang, 2004; Zhu and Gemert, 2001). However, there are still many 
criticisms targeted at the rural financing arrangements. China has a much shorter 
history of using modern financial instruments to support economic and social 
development compared to developed countries. In addition, the national development 
strategy implemented in China has long favoured urban areas and industry at the 
expense of the countryside and agriculture. The contribution of capital to the national 
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economy by the agricultural and rural sectors has been far greater than the capital 
support received by these two sectors. The rural financing system has been mostly 
criticised for the functional defects in meeting the basic capital requirements by both 
the agricultural and rural sectors (Zhang, 2004; Han, 2004; Ma, 2004). 
 
2.1.2 Informal finance in rural China 
Informal finance refers to all transactions, loans and deposits, occurring outside the 
regulation of a central monetary authority (Atieno, 2001). Informal credit in China 
includes loans obtained from non-commercial sources such as friends, relatives and 
acquaintances with low interest rates or interest free, and loans from private lending 
and borrowing organisations (PLBs) such as professional moneylenders, traders, 
pawnbrokers and usurers with high interest rates. PLBs are the dominant source of 
informal finance in rural China (Han, 2004; Cheng and Xu, 2003). 
 
Informal credit plays an important role in the rural sector in meeting the credit needs 
of the rural poor. Tilakaratna (1996) estimates that the share of informal credit in the 
rural sector in developing countries ranges from 30 percent to more than 80 percent. 
For example, a study by Ma (2004) shows that informal credit has become the main 
source of credit among the rural population in China, accounting for more than 70% 
of the farmers’ total borrowing. Compared to formal financing, informal financing 
possesses many advantages that provide reasons for its popularity in China. These 
include: 
 
1. Personal relationships with clients 
Generally, informal lenders lend to persons who are part of their social network 
within which the contracts can be enforced, and they can keep personal touch with 
their clients. The close relationships with clients enable informal lenders to have 
adequate information about the borrowers such as family background and business 
situation. Such personal knowledge of the borrowers largely releases informal lenders 
from information constraints, such as the borrowers’ creditworthiness, the borrowers’ 
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repayment capacity and the borrowers’ willingness to repay (Atieno, 2001; Wenner 
and Proenza, 2000; Zeller and Sharma, 1998). Unlike formal lenders who tend to 
establish stringent screening criteria such as the requirements of a co-signer and 
physical collateral to ensure repayment, informal lenders base their transactions more 
on the confidence arising from their relationships with their clients and social 
sanctions within a community (Qadir, 2005; Atieno, 2001; Wenner and Proenza, 2000; 
Zeller and Sharma, 1998). 
 
2. Flexible lending schemes 
Most services of informal finance are client-oriented. With intimate knowledge of the 
borrowers, informal lenders are able to offer flexible arrangements to adjust to 
changing economic circumstances of the borrowers and provide different credit 
demands, without serious risk of loss (Atieno, 2001; Zeller and Sharma, 1998). Such 
flexibility is reflected in the loan amounts, loan repayment schedules and loan 
purposes. For example, the repayment structure of informal lending is closely related 
to local production cycles associated with the borrowers’ occupations; and informal 
loans can be renegotiated in view of both the lender’s and borrower’s respective 
circumstances (Zeller and Sharma, 1998). In contrast, the rigid lending policies set by 
formal lenders include prescribed minimum loan amounts, restrictions on credit for 
specific purposes and strict terms of repayment (Atieno, 2001). 
 
3. Rapid processing of loan applications 
The informality of operations allows informal lenders to process loan applications 
promptly with little or no paperwork and disburse credit to the borrowers quickly 
compared to the technical process and lending procedures of formal lenders 
(Tilakaratna, 1996). 
 
4. Low transaction costs for the borrowers 
Informal lenders reduce their borrowers’ costs of borrowing to a minimum level by 
applying lending practices which reflect the needs and realities of the borrowers 
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(Islam, 2007). First, they impose little or no costs on borrowers as direct financial 
charges except explicitly high interest rates. In addition, informal lenders offer a fast 
and responsive service so that accessibility costs due to delays in loan disbursements 
are minimised under informal lending (Qadir, 2005; Klein, Meyer, Hannig, Burnett, 
and Fiebig, 1999). By contrast, the interest rate charged by formal credit is relatively 
low but does not cover all transaction costs incurred by the borrowers in securing 
formal loans, such as opportunity costs resulting from the loss in investment due to 
the delay in credit delivery, and time and travel costs incurred during the processing 
of the loan (Islam, 2007; Atieno, 2001). 
 
In short, personal relationships, flexibility, rapidity, and low transaction costs 
comprise the main strengths of informal finance. These superiorities have made 
informal finance either the exclusive or the preferred credit source in rural areas 
despite high interest rates (between 60% and 240% p.a. charged by PLBs in China) 
(Cheng and Xu, 2003; Guo and Lei, 2000; Yaron, 1992). 
 
Informal credit also faces severe constraints. For example, Atieno (2001) argues that 
the limited resources restrict the extent to which the informal sector can effectively 
and sustainably satisfy the credit needs of its borrowers. The informal lenders in 
China seldom manage savings deposits, and financial intermediation which provides a 
common clearinghouse for both borrowers and lenders does not take place within the 
informal sector (Zhang, 2004; Zeller and Sharma, 1998). Therefore, the supply of 
credit by the informal sector is quite limited. In addition, Zeller and Sharma (1998) 
note that the credit shortage within the informal sector is further worsened when 
natural disasters such as droughts and floods affect both informal lenders and 
borrowers simultaneously in the agricultural sectors. This is mainly because informal 
lenders are sporadically distributed and have not formed a network of branches across 
different regions, which has crippled their ability to diversify risks. 
 
As a result, borrowings from informal lenders are usually in small amounts for short 
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periods, which can neither stimulate significant business growth in the 
micro-enterprise sectors nor finance long-term investment in assets. Tilakaratna (1996) 
argues that informal finance is generally insufficient for development purposes. It is 
often for short-term purposes and rarely for capital build-up, usually for traditional 
rather than innovative activities, and mostly for survival needs instead of 
developmental needs. 
 
Informal finance remains controversial in China’s rural financial construction. On the 
one hand, there are opponents who traditionally regard informal finance as a violation 
of normal financial discipline in China despite its contribution to meeting farmers’ 
urgent financial needs. The evidence supporting such argument is that the Chinese 
government never gives overt recognition to the legal existence of the informal sector 
and the development of informal credit is generally clandestine and out of the 
government’s supervision (Jia, Heidhues, and Zeller, 2007; Zhang, 2004). The 
opponents suggest excluding informal credit from rural financial markets by 
improving the lending operations of formal financial institutions to provide more 
loans in favour of rural households, which is crucial in establishing a sound rural 
financial system and maintaining the sustainable development of China’s rural 
economy. However, the proponents of informal finance contend that the existence of 
informal credit in China reflects the imperfections of China’s formal rural financing 
system, which is characterised as unable to meet the diverse capital demands of the 
rural households. If no changes are made in the current situation, the persistence of 
informal credit will be both necessary and rational in view of the credit facilities 
provided to the farmers (Ayyagari, Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; IFAD, 2001; Guo 
and Lei, 2000). 
 
2.2 Credit Demand by Rural Households in China 
Credit is important in agricultural production as it enables producers to meet their 
cash needs during the production cycle. This agriculture cycle includes preparation, 
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cultivation and harvesting, which typically lasts for several months during which cash 
revenue is seldom earned. Moreover, cash remuneration is always received some time 
after harvest. However, the farmers’ expenditure and consumption must be in cash. 
This gives rise to a high demand for credit in rural areas (Diagne and Zeller, 2001; 
Feder, Lau, Lin, and Luo, 1990). For example, poor rural households need credit to 
maintain their consumption of basic necessities such as food when there is a shortage 
of cash – for example, after a bad harvest or between the production seasons. 
 
Wang and Liu (2005) argue that there are generally three reasons why China’s farmers 
seek credit. First, they seek credit to finance their simple production. Farmers have to 
spend large sums of money on purchasing production inputs such as fertilisers, 
pesticides, seeds, and livestock. Many farmers cannot afford such heavy expenditures 
without loans. Second, production alone is not enough to raise farmers’ income 
effectively. Consequently, farmers tend to diversify their production and expand their 
business so as to improve their living conditions, which results in substantial capital 
demand as well. Third, farmers require credit to support their daily consumption. For 
example, house-building, weddings and funerals are costly expenditures in China. In 
addition, expenses for health-care and children’s education are generally very high in 
China, and are not affordable for many low-income families if they do not borrow. 
 
The demand for credit by China’s rural households largely hinges on the type of 
economic activities that rural households are engaged in. For example, a study by the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2001) shows that the 
activity with the highest credit needs was livestock (75%), followed by self-employed 
activities (64%) and cropping (27%). In addition, credit demand has changed with the 
fast changing structure of economic production. Park et al. (2004) compare the 
composition of households’ credit demands in 1997 and 2000 using data from the 
China Rural Poverty Survey (CRPS) and found that there is a significant increase in 
credit demand for self-employment (the share of loans used for self-employed 
activities rose from 5.9% in 1997 to 21.6% in 2000), while credit demand for 
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traditional agriculture inputs such as fertilisers and livestock tend to decline except 
when large investments are made for economies of scale or growing new 
input-intensive crops6
 
. Changes in the composition of credit demand correspond to 
the changes in income composition of rural households, where an increase in the 
share of income from self-employment, but a dramatic reduction in the share of 
income from traditional agriculture (cropping and livestock) could be observed (Park 
et al., 2004). 
Rural households in China are likely to borrow from different sources of credit for 
different purposes. For example, a study by Feder et al. (1990) reveal that the 
predominant purpose of formal loans reported by the sampled rural households in 
Jilin Province was for the financing of current production, while most informal loans 
were obtained primarily for construction and social expenditures (such as, weddings 
and funerals). Similarly, Chen (2004) reports that rural households in Sichuan 
Province borrowed from RCCs largely to support their agricultural production such as 
purchasing chemical fertilisers and raising livestock (accounting for 52% of the total 
formal borrowing), while the households borrowed frequently from friends or 
relatives to supplement their consumption including house building, medical 
treatment and children’s schooling. The study by IFAD (2001) provides further 
evidence of the strong positive association between formal credit and production 
loans, and between informal credit and consumption loans. Table 2.1 summarises the 
types of credit demand in rural China found in these studies. 
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that rural households at different wealth levels have 
different financing objectives and needs. The wealthier households are more likely to 
borrow for small businesses and for housing, but less likely for consumption. On the 
contrary, the poorer households are more inclined to borrow to supplement their daily 
consumption, especially for medical treatment and children’s education (Chen, 2004; 
                                                             
6  The China Rural Poverty Survey is a longitudinal household survey conducted in officially 
designated poor villages in four poor provinces in China – Shanxi, Gansu, Sichuan and Guizhou. 
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IFAD, 2001). 
 
Table 2.1 Major credit demand in rural China 
Sources Production Consumption 
Fe
rti
lis
er
 
O
th
er
 in
pu
t f
or
 
cr
op
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
Li
ve
st
oc
k 
Fi
xe
d 
ca
pi
ta
l 
Se
lf-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
D
ai
ly
 e
xp
en
se
s 
W
ed
di
ng
s a
nd
 
fu
ne
ra
ls
 
Sc
ho
ol
in
g 
H
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
H
ou
si
ng
 
Feder et al. 
(1990) 
   √  √ √   √ 
IFAD (2001) √ √ √ √ √ √ √   √ 
Park et al. (2004) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Chen (2004) √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
2.3 Access to Credit by Rural Households in China 
Farmers in China, similar to those in most developing countries, have been 
historically constrained from accessing formal credit, and such constraint has impeded 
farmers from enhancing their productive capacity and improving their welfare. This 
deprives them opportunities to escape poverty. Most banks do not serve the poor 
farmers because of the high risks and costs involved in small transactions, the 
relatively low profit, and the inability of the poor to provide proper collateral (ADB, 
2000). 
 
From the perspective of banks, lending to small farmers implies considerable risks. 
For example, banks frequently relate high default risks to agricultural lending. 
Agricultural production is seasonal and subject to geographic and climatic conditions, 
as a result, a farmer’s production and ability to repay the loans can be seriously 
influenced by natural factors not directly under his or her control. Aside from natural 
conditions, other factors such as market prices and government policies will also 
affect farmers’ revenues, which brings uncertainty to their loan repayment (Klein et 
al., 1999; Carter, 1988). In addition to default risks, agricultural lenders face specific 
challenges, such as covariant risks where many or all borrowers are affected 
simultaneously by external factors (such as market price fluctuations and changes in 
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agricultural policies), which can severely worsen the quality of lenders’ loan 
portfolios (Klein et al., 1999). Because of these considerations, banks perceive 
farmers as high risk borrowers, leading to their reluctance to grant loans to farmers 
due to high financial losses. 
 
Secondly, banks are unwilling to transact with rural households owing to the high 
costs incurred from small lending. This is because the low population density, 
together with the scattered location of rural households, makes the provision of formal 
financial services costly. The long distances between the villages and insufficient rural 
transportation facilities in many rural areas greatly raise the costs of loan appraisal, 
loan monitoring and enforcement of loan repayments. Besides, an irregular 
distribution of the agricultural lending operations over the year increases the fixed 
costs of personnel and the profits from lending may be insufficient to cover these 
costs (Okurut, Schoombee, and Berg, 2004; Klein et al., 1999). During the periods of 
high seasonal credit demand, liquidity requirements increase the prices of loanable 
funds; in times of low demand, however, surplus liquidity has to be invested in low or 
non-earning assets. This again imposes opportunity costs on the lenders. In other 
words, banks are burdened with high costs in agricultural lending (Islam, 2007; 
Okurut et al., 2004; IFAD, 2001). 
 
However, banks are not alone in facing high costs; poor farmers have to confront 
substantial transaction costs as well when dealing with banks, which discourage them 
from borrowing from banks (Okurut et al., 2004). Other than loan interest, the 
borrowing costs of farmers in China consist of the time and money spent on travelling 
and loan applications, gifts and kickbacks to loan officers, and membership fees 
(Cheng and Xu, 2003). Borrowing from banks implies high opportunity costs in time. 
Farmers have to visit the bank branch office several times to conclude redundant loan 
application procedures which require a long time to process. Tilakaratna (1996) 
argues that the earnings foregone during the loan processing time constitute the major 
cost encountered by the poor when borrowing from formal institutions. Apart from the 
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time costs, farmers have to bear high transportation costs especially when banks are 
not conveniently located (Okurut et al., 2004; Klein et al., 1999). It is also quite 
common for loan applicants to invite loan officers to banquets and/or give kickbacks 
directly to loan officers for loan approvals. In the case of RCCs, farmers have to pay 
membership fees (usually USD$7 to USD$20) to RCCs before they can lodge their 
loan applications (Cheng and Xu, 2003). In fact, these non-interest costs can 
significantly increase the effective interest rates of formal borrowing given the small 
size of the loans borrowed by farmers (Tilakaratna, 1996). 
 
In addition to the high borrowing costs, the strict collateral requirement in traditional 
formal lending also prevents poor farmers from participating in the formal credit 
market. To address the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arising from 
asymmetric information between banks and the poor, banks usually attach collateral 
requirements to loans. Collateral is used to assist in determining creditworthiness, as 
well as solving the incentive and enforcement problems (Klein et al., 1999). Such 
collateral requirement becomes more stringent when the borrower is resource-poor. 
Land is always a preferred form of collateral in formal agricultural lending. However, 
farmers in China do not have the ownership of the land on which they farm. Instead, 
farmland is owned by villages and distributed on an egalitarian basis among village 
members. This lack of land ownership equals a lack of proper collateral, which makes 
formal credit inaccessible to China’s farmers (Gale and Collender, 2006; Unger, 2002). 
In some special cases, a savings account of equal value to the loan principal becomes 
the only acceptable form of collateral, making formal loans inaccessible by many 
poor farmers (Park et al., 2004). 
 
Some studies have documented that farmers from the poorest strata in China cannot 
access microcredit which is a special credit scheme aiming to facilitate poor farmers’ 
access to credit (see for example, Cheng, 2006; Unger, 2002). Cheng (2006) notes 
that China’s microcredit programmes have automatically targeted the relatively poor 
or better off rural households in the poor areas, while excluding the poorest from their 
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programmes. A reason for such exclusion lies in the principle of self-selected groups 
for peer monitoring adopted by microcredit programmes (Cheng, 2006; Evans, Adams, 
and Mohammed, 1999). This is because in group lending, individual performance will 
decide future access to credit by the whole group. Accordingly, farmers with 
relatively strong loan repayment capacities and similar socio-economic backgrounds 
are likely to form into groups, while those with weaker economic bases are rejected 
from joining groups, losing access to microcredit. In particular, Cheng (2006) 
observes that some very poor farmers who cannot access microcredit are self 
risk-rationed, which means they do not apply for microcredit loans because of the 
perceptions of being unable to repay the loans. Finally, the arrangements inherent in 
microcredit programmes such as regular meeting attendance also preclude a large 
number of poor farmers from participating owing to the concerns of additional 
transportation and opportunity costs incurred (Evans et al., 1999). 
 
Failing to access formal credit and microcredit, the majority of poor farmers have to 
fall back on informal sources to meet their credit needs. According to a study by 
Wang and Liu (2005), the Chinese farmers’ credit needs for consumption can be met 
by borrowing from their friends and relatives free of charge, while the needs for 
production are mostly met by borrowing from PLBs with high interest rates. Despite 
the strengths of informal credit such as close personal relationships, flexibility and 
speed, informal lenders are generally ill-equipped to finance substantial, long-term 
investments since they depend on personal funds (Zeller and Sharma, 1998). The 
limited credit supply by informal lenders then leads to either severe credit rationing or 
exploitive interest rates for some borrowers. Atieno (2001) argues that for the formal 
financial institutions it is the lending terms and conditions that constrain the access to 
credit by poor farmers, whereas for informal lenders it is the limited financial 
resources that bring credit constraints to the poor. 
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2.4 Gap between Credit Demand and Credit Supply in Rural China 
Rural financial institutions (RFIs) in China tend to restrict farmers’ access to formal 
credit to protect their financial viability due to the high risks and costs in small farmer 
lending. On the other hand, the limited resources of informal lenders cannot satisfy 
the credit needs for substantial, long-term investments by rural households. As a result, 
there is an excess demand for rural credit, leading to the emergence of a credit gap. 
 
The credit gap has been intensified by the inadequate credit supply in rural China 
given the considerable credit demand required by the enormous number of rural 
households in China. First, the credit insufficiency arises from the lack of RFIs in 
providing financial services to farmers. Although ABC and ADBC serve the rural 
areas, they mainly focus on agricultural product processing companies and large-scale 
agricultural development projects run by the state government and do not issue loans 
to farmers in general (Ma, 2004; Zhang, 2004). As a result, the RCCs are the only RFI 
penetrating the grassroots of rural society with the provision of financial services 
(Zhu and Gemert, 2001). However, there are only about 40,000 RCCs across the 
country and the credit supply is insufficient to meet the overall credit demand of the 
large rural population in China (Ma, 2004). 
 
Secondly, the insufficient credit supply is further exacerbated by the increasing 
financial losses of RFIs resulting from the capped lending rates set by the PBC, which 
have crippled the RFIs’ ability to provide credit support to rural households. The low 
lending rates do not generate sufficient revenues for RFIs to make a profit given the 
high transaction and operational costs incurred in lending to farmers. In the case of 
RCCs, the maximum lending rate currently charged by RCCs is around 8%, but still 
remains the flexibility for RCCs to charge higher lending rates in different areas 
(Cheng and Xu, 2003). For example, to be profitable, the minimum lending rate for 
RCCs in major agricultural areas should be 11.5% p.a. and the minimum lending rate 
in the poor and remote areas should be 16% p.a. (Cheng and Xu, 2003). Besides the 
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interest rate ceilings, the unclear governance and inefficient management system have 
caused further deterioration in RCCs’ financial bases and many poorly-performing 
branches had to be closed down, which substantially reduced the credit supply in the 
countryside (Wang and Liu, 2005). 
 
The rural financial institutions in China are part of the national banking system, in 
which a large proportion of lending is motivated by government policy objectives 
(about 42% of total loans as estimated by Park and Ren, 2001). This thus leaves less 
funds for RFIs to undertake commercial lending. 
 
Finally, large amounts of rural funds have flowed from rural to urban areas, driving a 
growing wedge between the demand for and supply of agricultural credit in China 
(Cheng and Xu, 2003). The main outflow channels are postal savings and commercial 
banks. Postal savings take in deposits but do not advance credit to rural households, 
and the deposits absorbed by the postal savings are all re-deposited into the PBC. In 
addition, commercial banks such as the ABC have taken up large amounts of deposits 
from rural households but seldom issue loans to the households. In particular, after the 
ABC removed most of its branches from the countryside in the 1990s, funds outflows 
from rural areas to cities channelled through banks became greater. Moreover, RCCs 
also channel out funds from rural areas by purchasing bank bonds, issuing loans to 
urban clients and lending funds to other urban financial institutions (Wang and Liu, 
2005). Furthermore, the government control over financial markets has impeded the 
establishment of new types of RFIs and such control is stricter in rural areas 
compared with the cities. For example, the government gives consent for the 
establishment of non-governmental banks in the cities but not in the countryside, 
which also encourages the flow of funds from rural to urban areas (Ma, 2004). 
 
2.5 Government Credit Programmes for Rural Poverty Alleviation 
The provision of financial services, credit in particular, to the poor at reasonable cost 
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has been increasingly regarded as a crucial mechanism aimed at poverty alleviation. 
However, rural households in China find it very difficult to access formal credit, 
mainly because they cannot offer appropriate collateral, a requirement in formal 
lending. As an alternative to formal credit, informal loans are often available, but their 
usurious interest rates have increased the farmers’ indebtedness and blocked farmers’ 
access to that market as well (Islam, 2007; Cheng and Xu, 2003). 
 
Lack of access to credit has long been viewed as a key constraint on the economic 
development of poor areas and the chief reason for the persistence of poverty in rural 
areas. Given the failure of formal financial institutions in serving the rural poor and 
the disadvantages of informal credit such as illegal operations and exploitative interest 
rates, China’s government has implemented a scheme of providing subsidised credit 
to the rural poor over the past two decades. The purpose of providing subsidised 
credit is to combat poverty by expanding the poor’s access to credit through the 
easing of interest rates. Providing subsidised loans to the poor to help them increase 
their income is a popular government intervention policy in many developing 
countries for poverty alleviation programmes7
 
 (Park and Ren, 2001). 
Since the launch of the subsidised-credit programme8
                                                             
7  Besides the subsidised loan programmes, there are other poverty alleviation programmes 
implemented in China, such as Food for Work, Agriculture Tax Reduction, and Direct Subsidies to 
Farmers (Grants Programmes). For details see Heilig et al (2006). 
 in 1986, the government of 
China has increasingly invested funds in this programme. The annual amount of 
subsidised loans used for poverty alleviation increased from 2.3 billion yuan in 1986 
to 8.7 billion yuan in 1997, and significantly, the accumulative funding investment 
mounted to 48.3 billion yuan at the end of 1997 (Rozelle, Zhang, and Huang, 2000). 
In addition, the Chinese government had officially designated poor counties as 
‘national poor counties’ from which the poor households were targeted by the 
subsidised loans programmes. Most of these counties are concentrated to the west of a 
8  In this section, ‘subsidised-credit programme’, ‘subsidised loan programme’, ‘poverty loan 
programme’ and ‘the programme’ have the same meaning of a credit programme with a 
subsidised-interest rate. 
 43 
north-south line that runs through the central mountainous parts of the country from 
Heilongjiang, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia in the north to Guangxi and Yunnan in the 
south, while the remaining poor counties which are generally better off are mostly 
situated in the hills of Eastern and South-eastern China (Heilig et al., 2006; Rozelle et 
al., 2000). 
 
Some studies show that the input of subsidised poverty loans has increased the 
production and income of poor households to some degree (see for example, Rozelle 
et al., 2000; Zhang, 1993). However, China’s subsidised-credit programme, similar to 
those in other developing countries, has been heavily criticised for failing to reach the 
hard core poor and for the high rates of default9
 
. 
Previous studies show that much of the benefit produced by the subsidised loan 
programmes is enjoyed by the non-poor and local enterprises. For example, Rozelle et 
al.’s (2000) study indicates that almost all subsidised (over 90%) loans in China in the 
early 1990s were invested in industrial production instead of agricultural production. 
Many of the loans were granted to township and village enterprises (TVEs) or 
county-owned enterprises, which raised the local revenue base for local governments 
but did not benefit the poor households. This policy failure in targeting the poor can 
be attributed to several reasons (Heilig et al., 2006; IFAD, 2001; Park, Wang, and Wu, 
2002; Rozelle et al., 2000; Wu, 1997; Holcombe and Xu, 1996): 
Non-targeting issue 
 
1. The poverty alleviation strategy adopted by the Chinese government is partly 
responsible for the failure of the subsidised-credit programme. 
The Chinese poverty reduction strategy is essentially a trickle-down regional 
economic development strategy, which expects to realise income growth of poor 
households via regional economic development. The government carried out a 
                                                             
9 The problems of non-targeting and low repayment rates arising from subsidised-credit programmes 
also exist in other developing countries (see Adams, Graham and Van Pischke, 1984; Klein et al, 1999). 
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poverty loan policy based on the concept of promoting economic development in poor 
areas (Heilig et al., 2006; IFAD, 2001; Holcombe and Xu, 1996). The poverty loan 
policy is the consequence of a compromise between economic considerations and 
political and moral pressures (promoting unity and integrity of the country), while the 
economic factors played an important role in the government’s introduction of this 
policy. Thus the conflict between the dual roles of the poverty loan programme, i.e. 
reaching the poor and promoting economic development, resulted in the poor 
targeting of the programme (Park et al., 2001; Rozelle et al., 2000). Since the local 
governments have the authority to select projects for receiving subsidised loans, they 
may favour diversion of funds to enterprises and investment in more promising areas, 
rather than lending to the poor with the concerns of generating revenues and boosting 
overall economic development. 
 
2. The government’s involvement in loan allocation also reduces the targeting 
incidence of the programme. 
Rent seeking is an unavoidable issue in any economy that employs loan subsidisation. 
Rent seeking can result in the benefits of subsidies primarily going to those who can 
pay higher rents, which will certainly preclude most if not all poor households (Klein 
et al., 1999). Given the low subsidised interest rate in China (about 2.88%), the real 
poor have few chances to benefit from the subsidised loan policy if the subsidised 
loans are distributed using the so-called ‘iron law of interest rate restriction’ (Tsai, 
2004; Wu, 1997; Gonzalez-Vega, 1984). As a result, the government has to assume 
the responsibility for allocating the loans to the target groups so as to minimise the 
effect of rent seeking on the distribution of the loans. However, the direct involvement 
of the government in loan allocation may raise problems associated with a 
centrally-controlled planned economy, such as distortions in resource distribution, 
given the discrete information and uncertainty about the risks posed by the loan 
applicants, and consequently, many poor households could not benefit from the 
poverty loan programmes owing to misallocation of funds. 
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3. Profit concerns prevent banks from delivering subsidised loans to the poor. 
When implementing the subsidised-credit programmes, banks 10
 
 are required to 
perform two tasks: (a) as enterprises they must make every effort to pursue the goal of 
profit maximisation; and (b) they have to execute government policy on delivering 
subsidised loans to the poor (IFAD, 2001; Rozelle et al., 2000). However, the two 
objectives, profit pursuit and policy implementation, often conflict with each other, 
and this conflict is then exacerbated by the asymmetric responsibility between the 
government and banks (Wu, 1997). However, the wages and bonuses of bank staff are 
closely related to the profits from lending and the government intervenes in the 
allocation of subsidised loans and influences the selection of projects for receiving the 
loans, but leaving all the risks and losses resulting from such intervention to be borne 
by the banks (IFAD, 2001; Holcombe and Xu, 1996). Compared to normal lending, 
subsidised lending to the poor usually involves higher transaction costs and greater 
risks because of the difficulties caused by the enforcement of repayment as well as the 
lack of collateral. Nevertheless, the government does not offer any additional 
compensation to banks to cover such costs and risks (Rozelle et al., 2000; Wu, 1997). 
The problems arising from the implementation of subsidised loan programmes 
inevitably exert a strong influence on the action of the banks. To reduce losses and 
risks incurred from providing subsidised loans, banks frequently either lend to the 
non-poor or TVEs who represent a higher repayment rate and less risk, or put off 
delivery of the loans to poor clients as a way of earning money from the time delay 
(Wu, 1997). 
 
4. The target problem is also associated with the difficulty in identifying the real poor. 
In the absence of reliable household income data, the only way to differentiate the 
poor from non-poor is principally the instinctive judgement of local officers who 
                                                             
10 Prior to 1995, the subsidised loans were mainly disbursed by the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). 
Since 1995, the business of issuing poverty loans has been transferred to the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China (ADBC) as required by the central government. But the ADBC does not have branches 
in rural areas. It contracts all its credit business to the ABC. Therefore, the ABC is the actual executor 
of this programme. 
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often have an obscure and varied understanding of the poverty line set by the 
government (Wu, 1997). Thus, it is difficult to monitor the delivery of the subsidised 
loans to ensure that the loans actually reach the poor. 
 
The loan repayment of China’s subsidised-credit programmes does not match the 
initial expectations of the central government. Studies suggest that the average timely 
repayment rates are about 50% (see for example, Park and Ren, 2001; IFAD, 2001; 
Holcombe and Xu, 1996). The potential reasons leading to such high default rates 
include (Park and Ren, 2001; IFAD, 2001; Wu, 2001, 1997; Holcombe and Xu, 
1996): 
High default rates 
1. There are too many welfare components involved in the poverty loan programmes 
and the poor tend to treat the subsidised loans as government grants which do not 
need to be repaid (Wu, 2001; Park and Ren, 2001). Thus, the high default rate in 
the repayment of subsidised loans is related to such misconceptions among the 
poor. 
2. The defects inherent in the poverty loan policy adopted by the Chinese 
government are likely to distort the behaviour of poor households towards the use 
of loans, reducing their ability and willingness to repay loans. For example, the 
policy stipulates that projects to be financed by the poverty loans should be 
selected by local governments instead of poor households themselves. If the 
households cannot repay the loans due to the failure of loan-funded projects, they 
can still evade the loan repayment because they are not the only decision maker 
involved in poverty loan utilisation (Park et al., 2002; Wu, 1997). Without proper 
monitoring and penalties, the households may not use their loan-funded projects 
in a profitable way, thereby increasing the probability of default. 
3. Households may not be able to repay the loans as the term of the loans might be 
shorter than the term needed for capital investment returns (IFAD, 2001). 
4. To maintain the operation of the subsidised loan programmes in some poorer areas, 
the government has to provide funding support to absorb all or part of the risks in 
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subsidised lending. This, in turn, promotes the inertia of banks in collecting loans 
in arrears and further increases loan defaults (Wu, 1997; Holcombe and Xu, 
1996). 
 
It can be concluded that the subsidised-credit policy in China is a double-edged sword 
that has placed the Chinese government in a dilemma. On the one hand, the dual 
functions of the policy, income generation and social justice, make it difficult to 
deliver the loans to the real poor. On the other hand, however, once the poor are 
targeted, which is the intended goal of the policy, the programme implementers 
(including local governments and banks) in China have to face the problem of high 
default rates. The high delinquency will substantially impair the financial viability of 
the programmes, which in turn will reduce the outreach of the programmes to the poor 
(Wu, 1997; Holcombe and Xu, 1996). 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter consists of two parts: Part One provides an overview of the development 
of Chinese microcredit programmes, and Part Two reviews the empirical models used 
in analysing credit accessibility and examining the impacts of microcredit. The 
chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the development of China’s 
microcredit programmes. Section 3.2 reviews the empirical studies analysing the 
determinants of credit accessibility by the poor. Section 3.3 discusses the impacts of 
microcredit on various aspects of poor people’s lives. A discussion of the impact 
assessment methodologies is provided in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 reviews the 
empirical studies evaluating the welfare impact of microcredit on poor households, 
followed by a review of empirical studies measuring the empowerment impact of 
microcredit on poor women in Section 3.6. 
 
PART I   Microcredit in China 
3.1 Development of China’s Microcredit Programme 
A microcredit scheme is supposed to overcome some of the lending problems to the 
poor by offering collateral-free loans at near-market interest rates through 
group-based programmes operated by different financial institutions and NGOs (Islam, 
2007). The outstanding function of microcredit schemes in reducing poverty has been 
well documented in many developing countries such as Bangladesh and India. 
Frustrated by the failure of subsidied-credit programmes in efficiently delivering rural 
credit to poor famers and inspired by the successes of other developing countries in 
implementing microcredit programmes, the Chinese government launched the 
microcredit programmes in the countryside in 1994, aiming to achieve poverty 
alleviation in a financially sustainable way (Park et al., 2004). 
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In terms of different organisations and sources of funds involved, the development of 
China’s microcredit programme can be roughly divided into three stages: the 
experimental stage from 1994 to 1996, the expansion stage from 1996 to 2000, and 
the steady development stage from 2000 to the present (Du, 2005,2004; IFAD, 2001; 
Wu, 2001; Du and Sun, 2000). Regardless of the different types of microcredit 
programmes operated in different phases, the overwhelming majority of China’s 
microcredit programmes have adopted Grameen Bank (GB) methodology including 
collateral-free, targeting the poor and joint-liability (Sun, 2003; Park and Ren, 2001). 
 
3.1.1 The Experimental Stage from 1994 to 1996 
The microcredit programmes from 1994 to 1996 were experimental projects operated 
by NGOs or quasi-official institutions in collaboration with international 
organisations11
 
. These pilot practices aimed to investigate the feasibility of GB 
methodology, operating modes and policy propositions of microcredit in China, as 
well as the relevance to poverty alleviation. The outstanding characteristic of this 
stage is that most projects relied on international donations and soft loans and scarcely 
at all on government capital (Xie, 2007; Du, 2005, 2004; Druschel, 2002, Wu, 2001). 
The experimental projects were carried out by two types of institutions. One type 
consisted of specialised institutions (offices) established to manage foreign aid funds 
and implement bilateral or multilateral projects in conformity to donor requirements 
(Gao and Hu, 2005; Du, 2004; Du and Sun, 2000). Projects with this type of 
organisational structure included projects funded by UNDP, World Bank, UNICEF, 
AusAID, and CIDA. The other institutions were NGOs set up to carry out poverty 
alleviation. Projects operating in this form of organisational structure included the 
Funding the Poor Cooperative (FPC) projects which were initiated by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and supported by the Ford Foundation and 
                                                             
11  These international organisations include the World Bank, United Nations Development 
Programmes (UNDP), Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Food Programme (WFP), and Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA). 
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Grameen Trust, and Hong Kong Leshi Association’s projects (Gao and Hu, 2005; Du, 
2005, 2004; Sun, 2003). According to Du (2004), the experimental microcredit 
programmes funds stood at 90 million yuan at the end of 1996. 
 
Previous studies suggest that early NGO microcredit programmes in China performed 
successfully in three areas: targeting the poor (including poor women), financial 
sustainability, and positive impact on the poor. For example, Park and Ren (2001) 
found that the NGO programmes effectively targeted poor farmers and poor women 
by charging a moderate interest rate, and achieved both operational sustainability and 
financial self-sufficiency (an average financial self-sufficiency rate of 95%). The low 
operating costs and perfect loan repayment (nearly 100%) accounted for the excellent 
performance by the NGO programmes (Park and Ren, 2001; Wu, 2001). The 
empirical analyses by Park and Ren (2001) also provide evidence of a rise in income 
of the programme participants. 
 
However, the scale of NGO-led microcredit programmes has significantly diminished 
since the late 1990s and most programmes failed to institutionalise commercial 
banking practices that are requisite to maintain sustainable growth (Park et al., 2004). 
A critical reason for their failure was that the NGOs in China have no legal status to 
provide any type of financial service and regulatory restrictions in China have 
prohibited NGOs from mobilising their own deposits, which has severely reduced the 
possibilities for expansion12
 
 (Du, 2005; Park et al., 2004; Druschel, 2002; IFAD, 
2001). Lau (2008) argues that the ambiguity and the lack of a clear and legal financial 
role for the NGO microfinance programmes have undermined the development of 
China’s microfinance to some extent. 
In addition to the illegal status, poor reporting and information systems and the 
                                                             
12 When implementing microcredit programmes, the local governments and donors have to negotiate a 
temporary legal status for NGOs. The PBC has adopted a compromise method with regard to the 
important role played by NGOs in microfinance and their legal limitations, which silently permits the 
NGOs to provide microcredit for poverty alleviation (Du, 2005). 
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outdated internal management of many NGO programmes have impaired their vitality. 
The majority of the experimental programmes carried out by NGOs did not have 
sound accounting and financial reporting systems (Wu, 2001; Du, 2004). 
Consequently, the NGOs had little information about their programmes’ performance 
because they did not have consolidated profit and loss statements or comprehensive 
loan quality and business progress reports. Moreover, the NGO staff usually regarded 
the programmes as development projects or experiments and seldom had personal 
stakes in the programmes’ commercial viability or growth (Du, 2004; Park et al., 
2004). As Park et al. (2004, p258) conclude, “No NGO programmes have evidenced 
institutional potential for widespread expansion and outreach”. 
 
3.1.2 The Expansion Stage from 1996 to 2000 
Encouraged by the successful performance of the NGO microcredit programmes in 
achieving ‘win-win’ goals, i.e., helping the poor households and maintaining financial 
sustainability, the Chinese government decided to lead rather than follow the 
microfinance movement in 1997, employing the GB model to disburse loans as part 
of its subsidised loan programme for poverty alleviation (Xie, 2007; Gao and Hu, 
2005; Park et al., 2004; Sun, 2003; Park and Ren, 2001). In October 1998, the Third 
Plenum of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party passed the 
‘Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on some 
major problems of agriculture and rural work’, which proposed that effective methods 
of delivering funds to households for reducing poverty, such as microfinance should 
be implemented (Du, 2004; Sun, 2003; Du and Sun, 2000). This was the first 
confirmation of microfinance as an effective anti-poverty instrument by the central 
government. In the subsequent working conferences held in 1999 and 2000, the 
government reiterated the significance of microfinance in combating poverty and 
emphasised that microfinance programmes should be actively and steadily developed 
(Park et al., 2004; Du, 2004; Du and Sun, 2000). 
 
As a result of the policy encouragement, government agencies (e.g., poverty 
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alleviation offices) and financial institutions (the ABC) began carrying out 
poverty-focused microcredit programmes on a large scale between 1996 and 2000, in 
addition to the microcredit programmes led by NGOs (Druschel, 2002; Du and Sun, 
2000). The main funding sources of government-led microcredit programmes were 
national fiscal funds and subsidised loans from the poverty alleviation funds. The 
main characteristic of the expansion stage was the active involvement of the 
government with a supply of financial, manpower and organisational resources to 
achieve the goal of poverty alleviation (IFAD, 2001; Wu, 2001; Du, 2005, 2004). 
Meanwhile, practitioners began highlighting the necessity of developing China’s 
microfinance practice in accordance with international best practice standards (Wu, 
2001; Du, 2005, 2004). 
 
The government programmes developed to cover 605 counties in 22 provinces 
nationwide as of August 1998, and issued loans amounting to 600 million yuan. The 
balance of the loans advanced by the government microcredit programmes was then 
raised to 24 billion yuan at the end of 2001 and an outstanding total of 17.2 million 
impoverished rural households had been targeted (Park et al., 2004; Park and Ren, 
2001; IFAD, 2001; Du and Sun, 2000). 
 
The rapid expansion of the government-led microcredit programmes almost 
immediately dwarfed the NGO-led programmes (Park et al., 2004). However, the 
government programmes have been frequently criticised for not targeting the poor 
effectively and achieving low repayment rates. For example, Park and Ren (2001) 
reported that the timely repayment rate of microcredit loans from the surveyed 
government programme was only 64%, much lower than the NGO programmes 
(98%). The authors noted that while the rich were effectively excluded from 
participating in the NGO programmes, they were more likely to take part in the 
government programme mainly due to the higher rents associated with lower interest 
rates. Likewise, studies by Sun (2003), Drusched (2002), and Wu (2001) also provide 
evidence of the problems in the government-led programmes such as limited targeting 
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and poor performance of repayment. 
 
In terms of targeting the poor and repayment performance, the government 
microcredit programmes differed little from the unsuccessful subsidised-credit 
programmes which they attempted to replace (Park and Ren, 2001; Wu, 2001; Du and 
Sun, 2000). The failure of the government microcredit programmes resulted both 
from the rapid expansion without proper preparation, and from the inherent incentive 
conflicts when local governments intervene in the programmes (a similar situation to 
the subsidised loan programme) (Park et al., 2004; Du, 2004; Du and Sun, 2000). Zuo 
(2001) further summarised three problems associated with the implementation of 
government-run programmes including tight budget and staff constraints, 
non-professionalisation of government staff in operating credit activities, and 
frequently, diversion of programme funding by the local governments for purposes 
other than poverty reduction, such as supporting revenue-generating businesses and/or 
local industrial development. 
 
Park and Ren (2001) argue that the performance of the microcredit programmes 
administered by government agencies in China is very disappointing compared to 
those in other developing countries such as Indonesia13
 
. Druschel (2002) stresses that 
the monitoring of project funding usage must be strengthened to ensure that the funds 
are properly invested in microfinance projects. In addition, reforms, such as providing 
strong managerial incentives, fostering professionalism among the programme staff 
and establishing independent financial accounting systems must be carried out for the 
sake of sustainable development (Du, 2004; Park et al., 2004; Du and Sun, 2000). 
3.1.3 Year 2000 onwards 
From the end of 2000, formal rural financial institutions such as RCCs gradually 
became involved in China’s microcredit programme to facilitate credit access in rural 
                                                             
13 The bank-supervised microfinance programme in Indonesia which utilises the village governance 
structure is a successful example of a government programme in contrast with China’s government 
programme (Llanto and Fukui, 2004).  
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areas as required by the People’s Bank of China (PBC). In December 2001, the PBC 
published an ‘Opinion on directing the management of microfinance by RCCs to rural 
households’, mandating that microcredit programmes should be fully implemented by 
RCCs to solve the problem of ‘loan difficulties for rural households’ (Gao and Hu, 
2005; Du, 2005, 2004). Druschel (2002) revealed that the RCC’s microcredit 
programme was not solely a means of alleviating poverty but rather a method of 
increasing credit supply in rural China. With the on-lending loans from the PBC as 
their main funding source, RCCs launched the microcredit programmes on a national 
scale by the end of 2002, becoming the main force in popularising and formalising 
China’s microcredit programmes with their extensive network penetrating the 
grassroots level (Du, 2005, 2004; Sun, 2003). The amount of microcredit loans issued 
to rural households by RCCs nationwide totalled 96.7 billion yuan in 2002 and around 
60 million rural households had received microcredit loans provided by RCCs. The 
scale of RCCs’ microcredit programme has far surpassed the scales of both the NGO 
and government programmes (Gao and Hu, 2005; Du, 2004; Druschel, 2002). 
 
Compared to the microcredit programmes operated by the NGOs and government 
agencies, the lending scheme adopted by RCCs’ microcredit programme is much 
more flexible, reflecting the desire of satisfying different credit demands among the 
rural population. For example, a notable shift in the RCCs’ microcredit programme is 
placing a greater emphasis on individual borrower accountability for loan repayment 
and less reliance on group-liability (Du, 2004; Sun, 2003; Wu, 2001). Accordingly, 
RCCs’ microcredit programme has two types of loan products including the 
individual micro-loan and the group-liability loan for rural households. Individual 
micro-loans are issued to individual farmers or households according to their credit 
limits, which are established by RCCs based on an assessment of farmers’ 
creditworthiness, i.e. the credit ratings of farmers. The group-liability loan targets 
clients who have credit needs exceeding their individual credit limits but lack 
sufficient collateral. Both types of loan products do not require physical collateral 
provision, except potential social collateral used in the group-liability loan product 
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(Yang, 2006; Du, 2004; Situ, 2003; Sun, 2003). In addition, while the NGO and 
government programmes have imposed compulsory savings on the borrowers to be 
used as a group fund replacing mortgages and guarantees, RCC microcredit 
programmes encourage rural households to save but do not link it to the offer of loans, 
making the access to credit by rural households, especially the poor, much easier (Du, 
2004; Wu, 2001). 
 
Zuo (2001) concludes that the RCC model of microcredit can outperform both the 
NGO and government models in terms of financial sustainability and programme 
replicability. First, the operational cost of the RCC microcredit programme is low 
since it makes use of existing RCC service outlets and thus reduces the marginal costs 
for carrying out microcredit programme. Second, unlike the other two types of 
microcredit programmes which rely heavily on external or government funding, 
RCCs can mobilise their own programme funds via their saving facility. The low 
operational costs, combined with the strong capacity to mobilise funds for expansion, 
leads to the sustainable development of RCCs’ programmes. In addition, the RCC 
model can be easily replicated owing to the well-established network of the existing 
RCC branches throughout the country. Furthermore, RCCs’ microcredit programmes 
are supposed to be less financially risky because as a formal financial institution, 
RCCs are strictly regulated and supervised by financial authorities such as the 
People’s Bank of China. This further enables RCCs to easily acquire government 
support for their programme replication, which is an important condition to operate 
any programme in China (Zuo, 2001; Wu, 2001). Table 3.1 provides a comparison 
between the three types of microcredit programmes implemented in China. 
 
Despite the leading role played by RCCs in China’s microcredit programs, RCCs still 
face many constraints that have impeded the development of their microcredit 
programmes to a large extent. The most prominent problem is that the interest rates 
have been regulated and set at artificially low levels by the PBC. The interest rates of 
micro lending by RCCs can only float within a range around the PBC base interest 
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rate (usually between 0.9-2.2 times around the base interest rate). Despite the good 
intention of ensuring affordable rates for the rural poor, the interest rate ceilings are 
far from sufficient to cover the high transaction costs arising from lending to the poor 
(Du, 2005; Park et al., 2004; Cheng and Xu, 2003). 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of microcredit programmes in China 
 NGOs Government RCC 
Starting time (year) 1994 1997 2000 
Loan size (yuan) 400-1,000 1,000-2,000 1,000-20,000 
Loan terms 3-12 months 1 year Ranging from few 
months to 1 or 2 years 
Repayment frequency 1-4 weeks 1-4 weeks Single repayment at 
maturity 
Lending methods 5-member groups 
with group funds as 
collateral 
5-member groups 
with group funds as 
collateral in rural 
areas; physical 
collateral required in 
urban areas 
Individuals; 
joint-liability groups; 
no physical collateral 
required 
Savings  Compulsory on 
members 
Compulsory on 
members 
Voluntary  
Targeted borrowers Poor households Poor households All households in 
rural areas 
Interest rates Between 6-20% 
p.a. 
Between 2.88-7.2% 
p.a. 
Based on bank rates 
(6-7% p.a.) 
Sources: Du (2004); Sun (2003). 
 
The maximum lending rate currently charged by RCCs is only 7.97% p.a. However, 
as suggested by Cheng and Xu (2003), RCCs should at least charge a rate of 15% p.a. 
to sustain a viable development. In fact, many studies have revealed that the poor 
farmers in China are able to pay high rates of interest to access scarce credit. However, 
“there remains deep-seated resistance to charging anything but a subsidised rate of 
interest to the poor borrowers” (Holcombe and Xu, 1996, p31). Many RCCs have 
suffered considerable financial losses due to the interest rate ceilings, resulting in 
either a decline in credit supply or unwillingness to lend (Park et al., 2004; Cheng and 
Xu, 2003). Drusched (2002) argues that the elimination of the interest rate ceiling on 
microcredit would be crucial for the sustainable development of microcredit in China, 
and market-enforced interest rates should be adopted by China’s financial system. 
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In addition to the interest rate ceilings, weak governance and ambiguous ownership 
have severely constrained RCCs’ ability to expand their microcredit programmes. The 
supervisory imperfections have led to low incentives to implement commercially 
sustainable lending practices and have fostered a weak credit culture within the RCCs 
(Park et al., 2004; Scott and Drusched, 2003). In addition, with the lack of farmers’ 
participation, there are no owners with the ability and appropriate incentives to 
maintain the value of RCCs’ capital. Instead, managers appointed by the PBC respond 
to contractual incentives which stress high rates of repayment, deposit mobilisation 
and profitability. However, the poor governance system, along with inefficient 
motivations, can easily induce deceptive strategies such as rolling over bad debts, 
which on paper satisfy the managers’ short-term objectives while undermining RCCs’ 
financial viability (Park et al., 2004; Scott and Drusche, 2003). Moreover, limited 
innovations in financial instruments and lack of experience and expertise in 
commercial financial management practices have hindered the expansion of RCCs’ 
microcredit programmes as well (Dyar et al., 2006; Park et al., 2004). 
 
Microcredit in China has developed quickly since its initiation in 1994, given the 
relatively short history of microcredit in China compared to other developing 
countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and India. The expansion of microcredit 
programmes in China is attributed to the positive attitude towards and active 
participation in microcredit programmes by the government (Du, 2004; Park and Ren, 
2001; Zuo, 2001). The government has fully recognised the link between microcredit 
and poverty alleviation and endorsed it as an important part of China’s long-standing 
development strategy. Moreover, the Chinese microcredit programme has evolved 
from an anti-poverty instrument that only targets the rural poor (such as the NGO-led 
programmes) to a popular rural financial programme that is provided by RCCs to 
facilitate credit accessibility by the whole rural population (Du, 2004; Druschel, 
2002). 
 
However, some defects have been exposed during the course of development, which 
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have held back further development of China’s microcredit considerably. As far as 
NGO microcredit programmes are concerned, not being legally recognised as 
financial institutions has severely limited NGOs and quasi-official organisations in 
developing microcredit (Lao, 2008; Park et al., 2004; Druschel, 2002). Although the 
government-led programmes contributed significantly to large-scale aid to the poor, 
these programmes only aimed at assisting the government’s poverty reduction 
initiatives without a long-term goal of continuing development (Du, 2004; Park and 
Ren, 2001; Wu, 2001). Moreover, the development of RCC’s microcredit programmes 
has been hampered by the capped interest rates, as well as incentive problems and 
managerial authority limits, which have largely discouraged RCC managers from 
fostering the necessary motivations to perform profitably with microcredit design 
features (Cheng and Xu, 2003; Druschel, 2002). In other words, the stagnation of 
China’s microcredit programmes in general is mainly a consequence of an 
unfavourable legal and regulatory environment, and microcredit cannot be fully 
extended without some critical reforms (Park et al., 2004). 
 
 
PART II   Empirical Models Review 
3.2 Factors Affecting Credit Accessibility and Modelling Techniques 
Okurut (2006) defines ‘credit accessibility’ as the supply side phenomenon of credit 
markets because it is the lenders who decide whether borrowers can access or be 
denied credit. The credit process involves two stages. First, borrowers who demand 
credit decide how much to apply for, and from which particular lender (the formal or 
informal sector) at the prevailing market interest rates. This process constitutes the 
demand side. In the second stage, the lenders decide who can access the credit and 
what amount, based on their financial viability, which represents the supply side. 
Similarly, focusing on the supply side, Diagne et al. (2000) and Diagne (1999) argue 
that the household’s accessibility to certain types of credit is determined by the 
lender’s choice of credit limit to a larger extent. The credit limit is the maximum that 
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the lender is willing to lend, and is a subjective assessment of the likelihood of default 
and the borrower’s characteristics. Diagne (1999) points out that every potential 
borrower faces a credit limit owing to asymmetric information between the borrower 
and lender and the imperfect enforcement of loan contracts. Accordingly, Diagne 
(1999, p7) defines that a household has access to a certain type of credit “when the 
maximum credit limit for that credit type is strictly positive” and a household lacks 
access to credit from a given source “when the maximum credit limit for that source 
of credit is zero”. 
 
Mohamed (2003) conducted an empirical study examining the accessibility to formal 
and quasi-formal credit by smallholder farmers in Zanzibar and found that they had 
limited access to formal credit. The empirical evidence of his study indicated that 
social-economic characteristics of rural households such as age, gender, education 
level, and income levels significantly influence smallholder farmers’ accessibility to 
formal credit. For example, the education level was found to be an important factor 
affecting an individual’s access to formal credit because educated borrowers manage 
their loan expenditures much better. Moreover, the awareness of credit availability by 
farmers had a positive significant relationship to the accessibility to formal credit, 
which implies that farmers who are aware of the availability of credit services have 
better chances to access formal credit than those who are unaware of it. 
 
Besides household characteristics, Mohamed (2003) also revealed that the 
cumbersome lending procedures and rigid conditions set by the rural financial 
institutions have restrained the rural households from accessing formal credit to a 
larger extent. This view is supported by Atieno (2001) who observed that lending 
terms and conditions reflected in collateral, application procedures and repayment 
schedules have considerably restrained the poor in Kenya from accessing formal 
credit and, in turn, forced the poor to find alternatives such as informal credit. 
Similarly, an empirical study by Umoh (2006) also revealed that inadequate collateral 
security, difficult loan-processing procedures and high interest rates are three major 
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obstacles in obtaining formal credit by micro-entrepreneurs in Nigeria. 
 
Okurut (2006) investigated household-level factors that influence households’ 
accessibility to different sources of credit in South Africa, including formal credit, 
semi-formal credit and informal credit. The author found that people who are 
relatively poor14
 
 have very limited access to both formal and semi-formal credit but 
could easily access informal credit owing to the absence of collateral requirements by 
informal lenders. Household factors including household head age and gender, 
location, household size, educational level and household per capita expenditure were 
found to have different effects in determining accessibility to different sources of 
credit. For example, factors such as household size and household per capita 
expenditure contributed greatly to facilitating accessibility to formal and semi-formal 
credit by households. In addition, Okurut (2006) found that a male household head 
can significantly help the household gain access to formal credit, but was inversely 
related to household accessibility to semi-formal credit. Moreover, educational level 
was a facilitator of household accessibility to formal credit but appeared to have a 
negative effect on household accessibility to informal credit. Interestingly, the rural 
location of a household was found to impede his or her accessibility to semi-formal 
credit in Okurut’s (2006) study. 
Vaessen (2001) conducted an empirical study of accessibility to formal rural credit in 
Northern Nicaragua and revealed that accessibility to credit was influenced by both 
the bank (supply-side) and household (demand-side) characteristics. At the bank level, 
the interest rates of the loans and client selection criteria were important 
characteristics influencing accessibility to credit by a rural population. High interest 
rates can crowd out poor and more risk-averse households in favour of less poor and 
more risk-taking households. In addition, the selection criteria included the 
requirements of a guarantor and physical collateral, which excluded the resource-poor 
                                                             
14 In Okurut’s (2006) study, ‘the poor’ are not identified as the population below a fixed poverty line, 
but refer to the households in the bottom 40% of the distribution of expenditure of all households in the 
survey. 
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people from accessing formal credit (Vaessen, 2001). At the household level, Vaessen 
(2001) emphasised that household access to networks of recommendation/information 
such as connections between households in the area and existing clients of the bank 
and bank staff members, plays a decisive role in obtaining formal credit. The 
empirical results suggest that household characteristics including education level, 
family size, occupation, availability of informal credit and access to the networks of 
recommendation/information have a significant effect on the probability of gaining 
access to formal credit. 
 
Davis, Gaburici, and Hare (1998) examined private farmers’ characteristics among 
those who had accessed formal credit in Rome and found that the existence of 
off-farm income sources (for example, small businesses) can noticeably increase the 
chances of acquiring formal loans. Similarly, the empirical analyses also provide 
evidence that a reasonable level of farm income is important in obtaining formal loans 
by farmers. The authors’ findings suggested that improved asset values and a secure 
non-farm income provide good quality collateral, making the farmers less risky and 
more attractive to banks. 
 
A study by Evans et al. (1999) demystified the inaccessibility to microcredit by the 
majority of poor households in Bangladesh, including in areas of well-established 
microcredit programmes. First, the authors detected four programme-related barriers 
that inhibited the eligible poor from accessing microcredit. The barriers included an 
insufficient supply of microcredit, membership requirements, peer group expectations 
(self-selected groups) and institutional incentives. The authors criticise the 
membership requirements of microcredit programmes including attending regular 
meetings, paying registration fees, depositing minimum savings, and joining 
educational/planning activities, as having imposed too many impossible obligations 
on the poor given the scarce resources (time and money) owned by the poor, which 
pose a barrier to credit accessibility. The self-selected credit group is another way of 
impeding accessibility, because the group selects members based on social class, 
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literacy, health status, and other socio-cultural norms and practices, and those who do 
not meet these criteria are excluded (Evans et al., 1999). Furthermore, institutional 
incentives to meet target repayment goals and to respect the programmes’ 
self-financing principle lead microcredit programme managers to reject potential 
clients who are, or appear to be at risk of repaying the loans. These 
programme-related barriers are also evidenced in Weiss and Montgomery’s (2004) 
study. In addition to the programme-related barriers, Evans et al. (1999) investigated a 
large number of indicators covering household health, demographic, and 
socioeconomic characteristics to study household-related barriers to credit 
accessibility. The authors identified three ‘risk factors’ including low female 
education, small family size and landlessness which characterise those with high 
probability of not accessing microcredit. 
 
Okurut (2006) concluded that the poor face constraints in accessing formal credit due 
to both institutional and household level factors. At the institutional level, the banks 
incur high information costs in assessing the creditworthiness of small borrowers and 
low returns due to the small loan amounts borrowed. This motivates the formal 
lenders to adopt strict collateral requirements as a screening mechanism to minimise 
default risk, hence rationing out the poor from the formal credit market. At the 
household level, the low levels of income and poor asset accumulation, and highly 
skewed income and asset distribution give the poor households a high risk profile, 
which makes them less attractive to formal lenders. 
 
Table 3.2 summarises the key factors influencing household accessibility to 
institutional credit including microcredit from the studies described above. However, 
some factors have an ambiguous effect on household accessibility to credit given the 
heterogeneous nature of different study contexts. For example, family income level is 
found to be positively related to the probability of accessing formal credit in Davis et 
al. (1998) but as a negative effect on credit access in Mohamed’s (2003) study. 
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Table 3.2 Key factors affecting household access to institutional credit 
Institution-level factors Household-level factors 
Interest rates (-) Mohamed (2003); 
Atieno (2000); 
Umoh (2006); 
Vaessen (2001) 
Household head features 
including age (-/+), male 
(+), educational level (+) Mohamed (2003); Okurut (2006); 
Vaessen (2001); 
Evans et al. (1999) 
Collateral 
requirements (-) 
Lending procedures 
(-) 
Credit limits (+) Diagne (1999); 
Diagne et al. (2000) 
Credit sufficiency 
(+) 
Evans et al. (1999); 
Weiss and 
Montgomery 
(2004) 
Family size (+) Evans et al. 
(1999); 
Vaessen (2001); 
Okurut (2006) 
Membership 
requirementsa (-) 
Family income level (-/+) Davis et al. 
(1998); 
Mohamed (2003) 
Self-selected credit 
groupb (-) 
Household expenditure (+) Okurut (2006) 
Incentives for target 
repayment (-) 
Land ownership (+) Evans et al. (1999) 
Awareness of credit 
availability (+) 
Mohamed (2003) 
Access to networks of 
recommendation/information 
(+); available informal credit 
(-) 
Vaessen (2001) 
Note: 1. a and b only apply to microcredit programmes; 
2. Signs in parentheses are empirical relationships between these factors and probability 
of accessing credit by households. 
 
Modelling techniques of credit accessibility can be categorised into two types: logistic 
regression models (see for example, Okurut, 2006; Mohamed, 2003; Vaessen, 2001; 
Evans et al., 1999; Davis et al., 1998) and probit models (see for example, Umoh, 
2006; Okurut, 2006). For example, in Mohamed’s (2003) logit model, the dependent 
variable ( iY ) is designated as “obtain formal/semi-formal loans or did not obtain” and 
takes the values 0 (respondent did not obtain formal/semi-formal loans) or 1 
(respondent obtained such loans). The independent variables ( iX ) used in Mohamed’s 
(2003) model include a range of demographic and socio-economic factors of 
households including age, gender, occupation, income level, etc. Similar to Mohamed 
(2003), Davis et al. (1998) also used a logit model to analyse farmers’ credit 
accessibility in Rome. The dependent variable and independent variables are defined 
similarly as those in Mohamed’s (2003) model, except that Davis et al. (1998) also 
include detailed farm information such as ‘pastures and moistures areas (in Ha)’ as 
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independent variables. Omoh (2006) employs the probit model to estimate the 
relationship between ‘a micro-entrepreneur’s access to credit’ (dependent variable) 
and a vector of household/enterprise characteristics including age, family size, 
educational level, firm size, age of enterprise, type of enterprise, etc. 
 
Regardless of the different types of modelling techniques, previous studies focusing 
on households’ credit accessibility have generally used ‘probability to access credit’ 
as the dependent variable, with a range of household characteristics such as age, 
education, and family size as independent variables. Logistic regression models have 
dominated the credit accessibility literature. Logistic and probit models are very 
similar to each other and both of them can render asymptotically consistent, efficient 
and unbiased estimates (Train, 2003; Omoh, 2006). The difference is that logistic 
models assume the probability of credit access to be logistically distributed, but probit 
models assume such probability to be normally distributed. Since the empirical results 
of logistic and probit models tend to be very similar in large samples, logistic models 
are commonly preferred to probit models due to their simplicity (Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; 
Train, 2003). 
 
3.3 Impacts of Microcredit on the Livelihoods of the Poor 
Microcredit has impacted the poor in various aspects via improving their accessibility 
to credit, and such impacts can be classified as economic impacts and non-economic 
or social impacts (World Bank, 2006). By extending small collateral-free loans to 
underprivileged people at affordable costs, microcredit enables its borrowers to 
actively take up job-creating activities which generate a range of improvements in 
their economic conditions. Islam (2007) notes that microcredit can positively impact 
the poor’s welfare in terms of income, employment, assets/capital accumulation, and 
productivity. According to Islam (2007, p101), microcredit can create a ‘virtuous 
circle’ for poor borrowers: low income, credit, investment, more income, more credit, 
more investment, and more income. The continued growth in income will then push 
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up the total consumption levels of the households, which constitutes an immediate 
welfare result from borrowing from microcredit programmes. In addition, enhanced 
income from borrowing encourages the poor to increase investment in working capital 
(for example, raw materials, seeds, and fertilisers) and assets (physical, such as 
machinery, and financial such as cash savings). As the microcredit loan is repaid in 
small instalments at relatively short intervals (usually one week), it is easy for a 
borrower to pay the instalment from their income while leaving the original capital 
untouched (Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Hossain and Diaz, 1999). Capital/assets 
accumulation, which is a long-lived welfare effect brought about by microcredit, in 
turn reinforces the income-generating capabilities of borrowers (Islam, 2007). 
 
Microcredit also contributes greatly to borrowers’ productivity, which is a crucial 
determinant of the economic condition of the rural poor (Islam, 2007). For example, 
financial support from microcredit allows the poor to invest in high-yielding varieties 
and advanced technology, which significantly stimulates productivity and promotes 
production. According to Islam (2007), increased productivity is important for a 
‘concomitant’ and ‘secular’ rise in income, which is crucial for rural poverty reduction. 
Furthermore, microcredit also creates employment opportunities for a vast 
under-utilised labour resource by undertaking economic activities on a self-employed 
basis. As the self-businesses expand over time, more labour is demanded. On the 
other hand, owing to the advantages of self-employment such as flexible working 
time and low opportunity costs in terms of foregone household production, a number 
of microcredit borrowers substitute self-employment for wage employment (Islam, 
2007; Hossain and Diaz, 1999). The wage employment opportunities given up by 
microcredit borrowers may be pursued by those who, for example, cannot obtain 
microcredit loans to start self-businesses. As a result, the total employment is 
improved through the intervention of microcredit. 
 
Microcredit has been universally accepted as an efficient tool for fighting poverty due 
to its positive impact on the poor households’ economic well-being such as increasing 
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income/consumption levels and creating employment opportunities. In addition, 
microcredit has the potential to empower the poor, women in particular, which reflects 
the social impact of microcredit. Microcredit generally targets poor women who are 
the most marginalised group among the poor in many developing countries, being 
both economically and socially disadvantaged (Ang, 2004). The rationale for lending 
to women also relates to the fact that women are a better credit risk and have a greater 
tendency to use increased earnings to improve their family’s well-being, compared to 
male borrowers (Ang, 2004; Mourji, 2000). 
 
Osmani (2007) described how poor women can be empowered through participation 
in microcredit programmes. First, microcredit enables poor women to earn an 
independent income and contribute financially to their families, which immediately 
raises their self-esteem as well as their esteem in the eyes of others. This is supposed 
to give women greater power within the household. Second, women will free 
themselves from the narrow confines of household precincts and move into a wider 
world in the process of taking out loans and using loans to initiate income-generating 
activities. The exposure to the outside world, together with the formation of networks 
with other women in the community, is expected to help women foster 
self-confidence and courage so as to exercise more power both within and outside 
households. Women’s empowerment can be manifested in various dimensions, such 
as increased decision-making, a more equitable status of women in the family and 
community, and being more active and mobile in participating in social networks and 
the commercialisation process (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Maclsaac, 1997). 
 
Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002) further point out that women become more 
conscious about the quality of their life and family welfare as a result of 
empowerment, leading to beneficial effects on other outcomes including fertility 
control, child health and education, and household well-being. For example, a study 
by Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley, (1997) reveals that poor women in Bangladesh 
become empowered from participation in microcredit programmes. Such 
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empowerment leads to more use of contraceptives, which greatly contributes to 
reducing fertility rates in Bangladesh. The authors emphasised that the reduction in 
fertility rates substantially helped ameliorate poverty situations through population 
control given the limited natural and financial resources available in most developing 
countries such as Bangladesh. 
 
According to Basher (2007, p1), microcredit functions as a catalyst in transforming its 
participants from a “passive credit recipient to a well responsive and active agent in 
economic and non-economic aspects of life”. Because of the potential to reduce 
poverty and empower women, microcredit plays a major role in many countries’ 
gender and development strategies. 
 
However, microcredit can have negative impacts on the poor as well. Islam (2007) 
found that microcredit borrowers who are extremely poor experienced a further 
deterioration rather than improving their situation. Islam (2007) noted that those who 
experience further deterioration are either trapped in previous debts from informal 
lenders so that they could not use microcredit loans for productive purposes; or for 
any natural calamity or illness, or sudden incidents such as theft or death of livestock 
purchased with microcredit loans. Likewise, Maclsaac (1997) observes that 
microcredit is less effective, or even counter-productive, in helping the poorest of the 
poor to raise their living standards. This may be because the worse-off borrowers use 
the loans only for consumption or invest in less risky (and generally less remunerative) 
activities compared to the better-off borrowers who tend to invest in riskier and more 
productive ventures including technological improvements, which provide 
opportunities for generating a greater income to improve their living standards. 
 
Considering these negative impacts, microcredit, or credit in a wider sense, cannot 
ultimately reduce poverty by itself, and it will be more effective when combined with 
other financial interventions such as savings and insurance (Islam, 2007; Maclsaac, 
1997). For example, Islam (2007) emphasises that accessibility to reliable and 
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monetised saving facilities can improve the economic security of the extremely poor 
and it is only when they acquire some economic security that accessibility to credit 
can help lift them out of poverty by increasing the productivity of their businesses or 
creating new sources of livelihood. Khandker (1998) suggests that the ultra-poor need 
initial help provided by public work programmes to get over the food, health, or 
labour market thresholds before they can respond to the positive changes brought by 
any financial programmes. 
 
3.4 Impact Assessment Methodologies 
Hulme (1997, p3) constructed a model of impact chain (see Figure 3.1) and defines 
‘impact assessment’ (IA) as to “assess the difference in the values of key variables 
between the outcomes on ‘agents’ (individuals, enterprises, households, populations, 
policymakers, etc.) which have experienced an intervention against the values of 
those variables that would have occurred had there been no intervention”. Based on 
this model, the process of IA includes three steps: choosing ‘agents’ (assessment 
units), choosing ‘outcomes’ (assessment indicators) and assessing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Model of impact chain (adapted from Hulme, 1997) 
 
Common parameters used in IA of microcredit include individual, household, 
enterprise, and institutional environments within which microcredit agents operate 
Agent Behaviours and practices 
over a period of time 
Agent  Modified behaviours and practices over a period of 
time 
Outcomes for the agent 
and/or other agents 
Modified outcomes for 
the agent and/or other 
agents 
Programme 
intervention 
The impact is the 
difference between 
outcomes 
Impact 
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(Hulme, 1997). Most impact studies have been conducted at the household and 
community levels, assessing the poverty reduction potential of microcredit (for 
example, Coleman, 2002; Khandker, 1998); while studies conducted at the individual 
level seem relatively limited and are generally restricted to evaluating the 
empowerment impact of microcredit on women (for example, Goetz and Gupta, 1996). 
A comprehensive attempt has been made by USAID’s AIMS15
 
 Project, which seeks 
to assess the impacts of microfinance on individual, household and community levels 
and produce a complete picture of the overall impacts of the microfinance 
programmes (Hulme, 1997). 
Impact studies that use performance indicators such as high repayment rates as a 
proxy for increased income to measure the success of microcredit programmes in 
alleviating poverty have been heavily criticised. Maclsaac (1997) argues that timely 
loan repayment is not an accurate indicator of improved income because even when a 
borrower repays a loan on time, the fund of repayment is not necessarily from the 
income generated from credit-supported businesses. The high loan recovery rates may 
be attained from the social, peer, and other forms of pressure imposed on borrowers 
by microcredit programmes. If the borrowers must commence weekly repayment 
immediately after the investment is made, they will have to repay the loan from other 
sources (example, from family income or moneylenders) in order to maintain their 
good standing with microcredit lenders (Swain, 2004; Maclsaac, 1997). Maclsaac 
(1997) further points out that the drop-out rates may also be high with high repayment 
rates, indicating that the repayment figures only report the repayment ability of those 
who remain in the programme. Maclsaac (1997) concludes that no direct correlation 
can be found between repayment and business success (improved income), and even 
less so between repayment and impacts on social and gender relations. 
 
Hulme (1997) argues that assessment indicators for microfinance programmes must 
be precise and measurable, and the author classifies the assessment indicators into two 
                                                             
15 AIMS stands for Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services.  
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categories: economic indicators and social indicators. Economic indicators include the 
levels and patterns of income, expenditure, consumption, and assets. Social indicators 
such as individual control over resources, involvement in household and community 
decision-making, levels of participation in community activities and social networks 
have been extended into the socio-political arena in an attempt to assess whether 
microcredit can promote empowerment (Hulme, 2000, 1997). 
 
The commonest methods used in IA include sample survey, rapid appraisal, 
participant-observation, case studies and participatory learning and action (PLA) 
(Hulme, 2000). Table 3.3 provides a summary of the IA methods including a 
description of the key features of each method. Each method has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Hulme (2000) suggested that impact studies should adopt pluralistic 
approaches instead of a single method to avoid the weaknesses of individual 
methods.16
 
 
Table 3.3 Common impact assessment methods 
Method  Key Features 
Sample Surveys Collect quantifiable data through questionnaires. Usually a random 
sample and a matched control group are used to measure 
predetermined indicators before and after intervention. 
Rapid Appraisal A range of tools and techniques developed originally as rapid rural 
appraisal (RRA). It involves the use of focus groups, semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, case studies, participant observation 
and secondary sources. 
Participation 
Observation 
Extended residence in a program community by field researchers using 
qualitative techniques and mini-scale sample surveys. 
Case Studies Detailed studies of a specific unit (a group, locality, organisation) 
involving open-ended questioning and the preparation of ‘histories’. 
PLA The preparation by the intended beneficiaries of a program of 
timelines, impact flow charts, village and resource maps, well-being 
and wealth ranking, seasonal diagrams, problem ranking and 
institutional assessments through group processes assisted by a 
facilitator. 
Source: Hulme (1997, p8) 
 
One major obstacle to assess the impacts of microcredit programmes is the difficulty 
in addressing the ‘attribution’ or determining the ‘counterfactual’ (Islam, 2007; Baker, 
                                                             
16 For detailed comparison between the strengths and weaknesses of these methods, see Hulme (1997, 
p9). 
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2000; Hulme, 2000, 1997). Attributing specific effects (impacts) to specific causes is 
at the core of impact evaluation. In other words, how observed changes or impacts are 
attributed to microcredit or what would have happened in the absence of microcredit 
(Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Mosley, 1997). However, changes or impacts after a 
project intervention (like microcredit) may have been affected by other factors 
irrelevant to the particular project being evaluated, which makes the attribution of an 
observed change or impact to the project under evaluation difficult (Islam, 2007). 
 
The attribution problem can be demonstrated through experiments in which the 
treatment is randomly allocated among a well-defined set of people. The random 
allocation process itself then creates comparable treatment and control groups that are 
statistically equivalent to one another given appropriate sample sizes. In theory, the 
control group automatically generated through this experimental design can serve as a 
perfect counterfactual in that it is assumed to be identical to the treatment group 
except for the difference in accepting treatment 17
 
 (Baker, 2000). Thus the 
comparisons made between the treatment group and the control group established 
through an experimental process are considered to be an accurate estimate of the 
impact of the given project (or treatment) (Baker, 2000; Hulme, 2000). 
However, experimental designs are thought to be unethical in social science due to the 
denial of benefits to otherwise eligible members of the population for the purposes of 
the study, and as a result, are relatively difficult to conduct (Baker, 2000; Khandker, 
1998). Alternatively, impact evaluations of anti-poverty programmes such as 
microcredit programmes resort to non-experimental (or nonrandomised) designs to 
establish comparable control groups as similar as possible to treatment groups through 
econometric techniques. These techniques include matching method 
(propensity-scoring matching), difference-in-differences (double difference) method, 
and instrumental variables method (Baker, 2000). Table 3.4 provides explanations on 
                                                             
17 There can still be differences due to sampling error. The larger the size of the treatment and control 
samples, the less the error. 
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the different methods used in non-experimental impact assessment designs. 
 
Table 3.4 Methods used to conduct quasi-experimental designs 
Method  Description  
Matching method In which one tries to construct an ideal control group that 
matches the treatment group from a larger survey; 
Propensity-scoring matching Most widely used matching, in which the control group is 
matched to the treatment group on the basis of a set of 
observed characteristics or by using the “propensity 
score” (predicted probability of participation given 
observed characteristics); the closer the propensity score, 
the better the match; 
Double difference or  
difference-in-differences 
method  
In which one compares a treatment group and control 
group (first difference) before and after a programme. It is 
sometimes combined with the use of the matching 
method. 
Instrumental variables (IVs) 
method 
In which one identifies one or more variables that affect 
participation but not outcomes given participation and 
applies the IVs to predict programme participation, then 
sees how the outcome indicators vary with the predicted 
values 
Source: Baker, 2000. 
 
However, unlike experimental designs in which the selection of the treatment and 
control groups is random, non-experimental designs select the treatment and control 
groups after an intervention using non-random methods, which may give rise to a 
number of biases such as sample selection bias. Selection bias arises mostly from the 
unobserved or unmeasured characteristics, such as individual abilities, pre-existing 
conditions, and a subjective (often politically driven) process of selecting programme 
participants (Islam, 2007; Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Baker, 2000). These 
unobserved characteristics may bias the estimation of outcomes being investigated, 
including under or over estimations of actual programme impacts, negative impacts 
when actual impacts are positive (and vice versa), and statistically insignificant 
impacts when actual impacts are significant (and vice versa) (Aghion and Morduch, 
2005; Baker, 2000). Baker (2000) argues that statistical techniques such as matching 
and using instrumental variables can possibly control for selection bias, but cannot 
fully remove it, leaving a major challenge for impact assessments. 
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3.5 Welfare Impact of Microcredit at Household Level 
Impact assessments of microcredit have placed an increasing emphasis on addressing 
sample selection bias (such as non-random programme placement bias and 
self-selection bias), which otherwise would misestimate the true impact (see for 
example, Coleman, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 1998). This section 
reviews previous impact studies using different techniques to mitigate selection bias 
based on the heterogeneous nature of the study context. 
 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) evaluate the impacts of group-based microcredit 
programmes in Bangladesh on a set of household behaviours (e.g., labour supply, 
children’s schooling) and intra-household distribution of resources (e.g., household 
consumption). Based on cross-sectional data, they used a method called 
WESML-LIML-FE18 to address bias arising from self-selected participation and 
non-random programme placement. This intricate econometric method relies 
ultimately on an instrumental variable constructed on the basis of the interaction 
between participation eligibility and programme availability19
)()( inenipep YYYYimpact −−−=
. The impact analysis is 
based on double difference, which is simplified as follows: 
           (3.1)                                             
where Y is an outcome measure (such as consumption, income), e and i stand for 
eligible and ineligible households, respectively; p and n stand for programme and 
non-programme villages, respectively. The authors’ results show that microcredit not 
only has a direct and significant effect on households’ material poverty by increasing 
annual household consumption, but also indirectly contributes to the households’ 
well-being by improving children’s schooling and the labour market supply including 
self-employment. Moreover, credit provided to women seems to influence all the 
                                                             
18 WESML-LIML-FE refers to an econometric framework consisting of weighted exogenous sampling 
maximum likelihood, limited information maximum likelihood and village fixed effects (Pitt and 
Khandker, 1998). 
19 In order to obtain the instrumental variables, the authors conducted a quasi-experimental survey 
design in which households in villages with and without credit programmes are separated by an 
exogenous eligibility criterion - those with more than 0.5 acre of land cannot be borrowers - which 
allows the authors to avoid the self-selected participations.  
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outcomes investigated more significantly than credit provided to men. 
 
However, the main problem of Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) study is that the 
‘exogenous’ eligibility criterion is found to be violated in many cases – households 
which should not have been eligible for loans are actually programme participants – 
which creates a further source of error (Morduch, 1998). In addition, their 
methodology may not be replicable because many microcredit schemes do not use 
formal eligibility criteria to screen participants. The Chinese microcredit programmes 
are such an example, in that they do not set explicit eligibility rules for programme 
participation20
 
. 
Park and Ren (2001) provided an early impact assessment of the Chinese microcredit 
programmes. Three microcredit programmes are examined in their study, including an 
NGO programme, mixed programme (NGO-government), and government 
programme. The authors implemented two strategies to identify suitable instrumental 
variables (IVs) to identify programme impacts. They first tested the appropriateness 
of ‘consumer durables’ as IVs. However, the durables as instruments performed 
poorly, failing to explain participation in the programmes. Following that, the authors 
constructed IVs (eligibility interacted with participation variables) by directly asking 
non-participants whether they are eligible in their survey. This IV approach was 
applied to each programme and performed well in controlling for selection bias. 
Compared to the naive estimation using OLS, the estimation using eligibility 
instruments suggested much greater benefits from programme participation in terms 
of increasing household income, especially for NGO programmes. The study also 
raised concerns about the efficiency of government programmes which have been 
found to attract rich households rather than the poor and deliver few benefits to their 
poor participants. 
                                                             
20 Unlike Bangladesh which used landholdings as the eligibility rule, land size is not an ideal eligibility 
criterion in China since it is distributed on an egalitarian basis within villages. In most cases, the 
screening is largely based on the observations by loan officers in terms of the values of housing and 
consumer durables. 
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Khandker (2005) argued that the IV approach is a good way to correct for the 
endogeneity problems in model estimation, but it is difficult to acquire appropriate 
and reliable instruments if the identification conditions are not adequately restrictive, 
which leads to the sensitivity of the study results. Given the sensitivity to the 
instruments used, Khandker suggests using alternative methods to demonstrate 
whether microfinance matters. For example, based on Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) 
study, Khandker (2005) carried out an impact assessment study using a dynamic 
regression model with panel data to estimate the time-varying borrowing effects on 
household welfare (measured by household consumption) for programme participants 
and nonparticipants including average villagers. With the benefit of panel data, the 
author opted for a household-level fixed-effect method without instrumental variables 
to solve any time-invariant participation-related endogeneity. The empirical results 
revealed that besides imposing the positive effects on the poverty reduction of 
borrowers by raising their household consumption per capita, microcredit also 
benefits nonparticipants through growth in local income and reduces village-level 
poverty through spillover effects, which reflects the aggregate impacts of microcredit 
on poverty reduction. 
 
Coleman (1999) made use of a unique survey design to address selection bias in 
assessing the impact of microcredit programmes in Northeast Thailand, which drew 
on the fact that most microcredit activities operated by village banks start in a 
narrowly defined area and then expand their coverage to similar villages elsewhere. 
The author first made a comparison of household outcomes between participants and 
non-participants in ‘treatment villages’ where the microcredit programmes were 
already available21
                                                             
21 Among the 14 villages surveyed by Coleman, eight had village banks (VBs) operating at the start of 
1995, the remaining six ‘control villages’ did not but would receive VB funding a year later. 
Interestingly (but crucial for evaluation), at the beginning of 1995, households in ‘control villages’ 
were allowed to self-select into VBs according to VBs’ standard procedures but were forced to wait for 
one year to get the first loans. 
. Following this, the author made the same comparison between 
participants and non-participants in ‘control villages’ where the programmes would be 
introduced later. The impact was thus estimated as follows: 
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where M and N stand for members and non-members of microcredit programmes 
respectively; t stands for the time length of the programme’s operation in a particular 
village, and (t +1) and t cover the early and the late entrant villages respectively. 
Similar to Pitt and Khandker (1998), Coleman applied the village-fixed effects 
method to correct for programme placement bias. In addition, the self-selecting 
participants in the ‘control villages’, who have not yet received a loan, provided an 
accurate ‘control group’ for current borrowers in ‘treatment villages’, thereby 
controlling for selection bias. 
 
Unlike Pitt and Khankder (1998) who estimate marginal impacts using a cumulative 
amount of borrowing variable, Coleman (1999) estimated average impacts using a 
membership dummy and found that the membership of village banks’ microcredit 
programmes did not have a significant impact on the household outcomes such as 
income, assets, and spending on health care and education. A follow-up study by 
Coleman (2002) improved the estimation strategy to better control for self-selection 
bias by further dividing participants into rank-and-file participants (poorer households) 
and committee participants (richer households). The author found a significant 
difference between ordinary and committee participants. While the impact of 
microcredit on ordinary members’ welfare was either insignificant or even negative, 
the impact on committee members’ outcomes such as income and production 
expenses was positive, implying that most of the benefits of microcredit programmes 
were captured by the less poor rather than the poorest. 
 
Alexander (2001) explored the poverty reduction potential of Peruvian microcredit 
programmes using data collected in two periods on the same household sample. The 
striking feature of Alexander’s study is that the author carried out both cross-sectional 
data analysis and panel data analysis due to the panel nature of the dataset. The 
cross-sectional analysis (one period data) was totally based on Coleman’s (1999) 
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model22
 
 and the household fixed effects method was used to test panel data (two 
periods). Both methods gave roughly the same results, showing that microcredit has 
statistically significant effects on increasing household income, leading to a great 
reduction in household poverty. Based on this, Alexander (2001) pointed out that 
Coleman’s model is a satisfactory way of addressing selection bias, which means that 
expensive longitudinal studies may not be necessary for accurate impact assessments. 
Li et al. (2004) investigated the impact of one UNDP’s microcredit programme on the 
poor in China using data in year 1996 and 1998. This study is based on a 
difference-in-differences (DD) method by which the average impact of the 
programme is assessed as follows: 
)()( 1996,1998,1996,1998, nnpp YYEYYEimpact −−−=         (3.3) 
where 1996,1998, / pp YY refer to investigated household outcomes of participants in 1998 
and 1996 respectively; and 1996,1998, / nn YY refer to investigated household outcomes of 
non-participants in 1998 and 1996, respectively. The authors apply the 
propensity-score matching method to match each participant with a non-participant 
who had (almost) the same probability of joining the programme23
 
. A group of 
non-participants selected in this way can then serve as an accurate control group to 
correct for selection bias. The empirical results do not report an obvious impact of 
microcredit on the poor’s well-being in terms of accumulated assets. However, the 
authors found that the UNDP microcredit programme helped its participants switch to 
off-farm work, which is one of the best ways to escape poverty in China. 
Some studies use the Heckman two-step technique to tackle selection bias problems 
by simultaneously estimating the outcome regression equation and participation 
                                                             
22 In Alexander’s (2001) study, the households who were not borrowers in the first period but became 
borrowers in the following period served as the ‘control group’ to borrowers in the first period, thus 
controlling for selection bias in the cross-section analysis. 
23 It takes two steps to complete the matching: first, the participation probability of both participants 
and non-participants are estimated using the Probit model; then, the participation probability of each 
observation from the participant group is matched to the observation in the non-participant group 
which has the participation probability that most closely matches its participant counterpart. 
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equation. One such study was carried out by Zaman (1999) who assessed the impact 
of the BRAC microcredit programme on reducing consumption poverty in 
Bangladesh. Following Heckman’s model, the author first identified factors driving 
participation with the probit estimate, which helped to construct a household specific 
selectivity variable (referred to as the inverse of Mill’s ratio). Subsequently, the 
selectivity variable is added to the outcome equation to control for selection bias. The 
empirical analysis revealed that the impact of BRAC microcredit on consumption 
poverty is a function of borrowing beyond a certain loan threshold and is contingent 
on how poor the household is at the beginning of borrowing. Similarly, Sarangi (2007) 
and Kumar (2005) also employed Heckman’s two-step technique to examine whether 
microcredit programmes in India have the potential to increase borrowers’ income and 
both studies showed that microcredit had such potential. 
 
A major problem using Heckman’s technique is similar to that using the IV approach: 
it is difficult to find an appropriate identification variable affecting participation but 
not poverty. Moreover, even if a proper identification variable can be found, the 
estimation results would be sensitive to the choice of the variable (Zaman, 1999). 
 
There is an increasing trend to use integrated impact assessment methods to overcome 
methodological problems of selection bias and data bias. For example, in assessing 
the welfare impact of one microcredit programme (PULSE) in Zambia, Copestake, 
Bhalotra, and Johnson (2001) drew on multiple data collection methods involving 
questionnaires, focus group interviews, and key informant interviews to mitigate data 
bias. Besides, potential selection bias was addressed by establishing a ‘control group’ 
consisting of households who have been approved for loans but yet to take a loan. 
After using the ‘with/without’ and ‘before/after’ comparisons between the treatment 
group and the control group, the authors found that the positive impacts of 
microcredit on the borrowers’ business profits or household income were strictly 
associated with the receipt of a second loan and those who never qualified for a 
second loan were actually worse off, due to the collection mechanisms of PULSE. 
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Using similar methods to those employed by Copestake et al. (2001), Mosley (2001) 
evaluated the poverty impact of four microcredit programmes on borrowers in Bolivia. 
The author’s empirical results produces evidence that all the programmes studied had 
positive impacts on poverty reduction in terms of income and asset levels, but such 
impact was greater in relatively richer borrowers than in poorer borrowers. Mosley 
(2001) concluded that microfinance might be successful in reducing the poverty of 
those close to the poverty line but inefficient in reducing extreme poverty. Table 3.5 
summarises the empirical studies reviewed in this section. 
 
Despite methodological variations, the literature widely accepts that microcredit does 
improve the living standards of the poor in terms of their income and household 
consumption and is linked to other associated benefits such as increases in labour 
market supply, and accessibility to more education and better health facilities. 
 
Table 3.5 Summary of empirical poverty reduction studies 
Sources  Coverage  Main Methods  Empirical Results 
Pitt and 
Khandker 
(1998) 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, BRDB, 
Grameen Bank) 
Quasi-experimental 
survey design; 
Double differences 
comparisons; 
WESML-LIML-FE; 
Instrumental variables 
(IV) 
 Significant positive effect 
on household’s poverty 
reduction in terms of 
income and consumption; 
Indirectly improve 
households’ welfare by 
increasing children’s 
schooling and market 
labour supply; 
Khandker 
(2005) 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, BRDB, 
Grameen Bank) 
Dynamic regression 
model with panel data 
analysis; 
Household-fixed 
effects 
 Significant positive 
impact on borrowing 
households by raising 
consumption; 
 Significant aggregate 
impact on village-level 
poverty reduction (spillover 
effect) 
Coleman 
(1999) 
Thailand (village 
banks) 
Quasi-experimental 
survey design; 
Double differences 
comparison; 
Membership in microcredit 
programmes has little 
impact on household 
poverty reduction 
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Table 3.5 Summary of empirical poverty reduction studies (Cont.) 
Sources Coverage  Main Methods  Empirical Results 
Coleman 
(2002)  
Thailand (village 
banks) 
Almost the same as 
Coleman (1999) but 
some changes to the 
variables 
 Programmes favour 
better-off households; 
 Impact is larger on richer 
committee members than 
on ordinary members 
Alexander 
(2001) 
Peru (Mibanco) Coleman-type test 
with cross-section data; 
Panel data analysis 
with household 
fixed-effects 
Significant and positive 
impact on household 
income 
Zaman (1999); 
Kumar (2005); 
Sarangi (2007) 
Bangladesh; India Heckman two-step 
estimation technique 
 there is a loan threshold 
before microcredit can 
significantly increase 
household consumption 
(Zaman, 1999); 
 positive significant 
impact on increasing 
borrowers’ income 
Park and Ren 
(2001) 
China (NGO 
programme, 
government 
programme, mixed 
programme) 
Probit estimation for 
participation and 
eligibility for each type 
of programme; 
OLS and IV for 
impact analysis 
Positive effects on poverty 
reduction in terms of 
income; 
The rich are successfully 
excluded from NGO and 
mixed programmes but they 
are eligible and more likely 
to participate in 
government programmes 
 
 
Li et al. (2004) 
China (UNDP’s 
programme) 
Double differences; 
Propensity-score 
matching; 
No definite effects on 
increasing household total 
assets; 
But help participants 
diversify occupations by 
switching to off-farm jobs 
Mosley (2001) Bolivia (BancoSol, 
ProMujer, 
PRODEM, 
SARTAWI) 
Questionnaire-based 
sample survey, focus 
group discussion, key 
informant interviews; 
Before and after 
comparison between 
treatment and control 
groups 
 Positive impact on 
income and asset levels 
with the richer enjoying a 
larger impact; 
 Microcredit can reduce 
moderate poverty instead of 
extreme poverty 
Copestake et 
al. (2001) 
Zambia (PULSE) Almost the same as 
with Mosley (2001) 
Positive impact on 
borrowers’ business profits 
and household income 
growth  strictly arises 
from the second loan 
Note: contents in parentheses are names of individual microcredit programmes assessed in each study. 
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3.6 Empowerment Impact of Microcredit on Women 
Impact studies on women’s empowerment can be classified into two categories: those 
using process-based proxy indicators of empowerment and those using 
outcome-based direct indicators of empowerment. However, using different types of 
empowerment indicators leads to conflicting evidence of the impact of microcredit on 
women. This section reviews studies empirically investigating the empowerment 
effect of microcredit on women. 
 
Process-based impact studies do not directly measure the impact of microcredit on the 
possible outcomes. Instead, they look at the processes through which the borrowers 
are supposed to achieve empowerment, as a proxy indicator for empowerment 
outcomes (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002; Kabeer, 2001b). 
I. Process-based impact studies 
 
Goetz and Gupta (1996) tested the empowerment potential of microcredit 
programmes in Bangladesh, using a five-level index of ‘managerial control over 
loans’ as their indicator of empowerment. This index was built based on a range of 
questions concerning women’s control over the productive process. At one end of the 
index were women described as having ‘no control’ over their loans, including those 
who had no idea how their loans were being used and those providing no labour into 
the activities funded by the loans. At the other end were women considered to have 
‘full control’ over their loans, including those participating in all stages of the 
loan-supported activities as well as the marketing of produce. The authors’ findings 
revealed that the majority of women borrowers exercised little or no control over their 
loans, reflecting a widespread loss of control by women over their loans to men. 
 
Based on their findings, Goetz and Gupta (1996) suggested that this lack of control 
could have an adverse impact on the well-being of women when the loans are to be 
repaid. For example, in cases where men have appropriated loans but are unable or 
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unwilling to repay loans, women may suffer because they are forced to sell assets or 
go hungry to raise money to repay the loans. Furthermore, men’s unwillingness to 
repay the loans may result in conflicts within households, often growing into violence. 
In general, Goetz and Gupta presented a negative image of the effect of microcredit 
on women’s empowerment. 
 
Goetz and Gupta’s (1996) study is quite similar to that of Ackerly (1995), who used 
‘accounting knowledge’ as the empowerment indicator. Women who were able to 
provide financial information of their loan-funded businesses such as input costs, 
product yield and profitability, were classified as ‘empowered’. The likelihood that 
the credit process will lead to empowerment was tested in a Probit model, with 
explanatory variables including credit variables (loan amount and duration of 
borrowing) and market access variables (direct involvement in buying supplies or 
selling or accounting for the loan). The empirical analysis showed that the 
‘empowerment’ measured by ‘the knowledge of accounting’ was largely attained via 
access to the market rather than participation in microcredit programmes. 
 
In Montgomery, Bhattacharya, and Hulme’s (1996) study, the authors focused on the 
managerial aspect of loan-supported enterprises and defined ‘empowerment’ as ‘sole 
management of loan-funded activities’. Similarly, their study failed to provide 
supportive evidence of the empowerment impact of microcredit since the authors 
found most of the loan-funded activities were managed by the male partners of 
women loanees or in a form of ‘joint management’. Interpreting the ‘joint 
management’ as disguised male dominance in decision-making, the authors concluded 
that access to microcredit did little to empower women borrowers. 
 
In contrast to process-based studies, outcome-based studies measure the 
empowerment impact with direct indicators, aiming to capture the changes in the 
structures of gender inequality within the household and community (Malhotra et al., 
II. Outcome-based impact studies 
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2002; Kabeer, 2001b). 
 
Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley (1996) examined the impact on women’s empowerment 
of the microcredit programmes provided by the Grameen Bank and BRAC in 
Bangladesh. Based on the responses to a series of specific questions related to various 
aspects of empowerment, the authors constructed eight ‘empowerment indicators’ 
including mobility, economic security, ability to make small purchases, ability to 
make large purchases, involvement in major decisions, participation in public protests 
and political campaigning, political and legal awareness, and relative freedom from 
family domination. The eight indicators were constructed as scale variables and a 
cut-off point was established for each indicator so that women who scored above the 
cut-off point were labelled empowered and unempowered otherwise. This system then 
reduced the measure of empowerment to a single binary outcome for each of the eight 
indicators. The eight indicators were further compacted into a ‘composite 
empowerment indicator’ so that a woman was labelled empowered overall if she had 
been labelled ‘empowered’ on five or more of the eight categories. 
 
Using sample survey data, Hashemi et al. (1996) adopted logistic models to explore 
whether microcredit programmes affected different dimensions of empowerment. 
After controlling for potential selection bias, the authors’ results confirmed that both 
microcredit programmes contributed significantly to empowering women on the eight 
dimensions investigated. Women borrowers were able to negotiate gender barriers, 
increase their control over their own lives, and improve their relative positions within 
their households. The authors also found that controlling for membership duration, 
participation in microcredit programmes and in some cases, being a non-member in a 
village with a programme, has a greater impact on women’s empowerment. 
 
Garikipati (2006) investigated the impact of India’s SHG microcredit programme on 
women’s empowerment using data obtained from multi-stage surveys. Six 
empowerment indicators including control over household assets, role in household 
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decisions, work-time allocation, control over minor/major finances, and division of 
domestic chores were constructed based on the sample responses from a series of 
specific questions relating to different aspects of empowerment in the villages 
surveyed. Similar to Hashemi et al.’s (1996) study, the author established an index 
and chose the cut-off point for each indicator to distinguish between those women 
who were relatively more empowered than others in similar situations, rather than 
identifying those at the extremes. In Garikipati’s logistic model, the impact on 
women’s empowerment expressed in terms of the six indicators was assessed against 
three sets of independent variables such as credit programme, control variables 
measuring household characteristics and those capturing women’s personal 
characteristics, where control variables were used to correct for possible selection bias. 
However, the empirical results suggested that the impact of SHG microcredit 
programmes on women’s empowerment was rather limited and the programme 
participation may have an adverse effect on women’s domestic standing. 
 
Zaman (1999) examined the empowerment impact of the microcredit programme 
provided by BRAC in Bangladesh. Similar to the studies discussed above, Zaman first 
worked out sixteen empowerment indicators based on a detailed questionnaire given 
to rural women to elicit information on various dimensions of their lives. The 
questions were of the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ format and divided into several sections including 
ownership and control of the assets, general and legal knowledge, fertility and 
mobility. The author assessed all sixteen indicators separately with logistic models 
rather than constructing any empowerment index to avoid the problem of assigning 
subjective weights to different responses. In Zaman’s empirical model, all the sixteen 
indicators were binary variables with value one for ‘yes’ and zero for ‘no’ otherwise. 
The empirical results showed that microcredit has an overall positive impact on 
women’s empowerment in terms of the sixteen indicators and more significantly, 
microcredit largely enhances women’s control over their assets and women’s 
knowledge of social issues. 
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Pitt, Khandker, and Cartwright (2003) argued that studies using the ‘empowerment 
index’ are too arbitrary because the researchers assign weights to different 
components of a given indicator and establish cut-off scores based on their own 
judgement instead of referring to theory or data (for example, Hashemi et al., 1996). 
Responding to this weakness, Pitt et al. (2003) carried out a comprehensive study to 
examine the empowerment impact of gender-based microcredit programmes in 
Bangladesh based on a factor analytical approach. This approach treats each 
empowerment indicator (for example, purchasing capacity) as a latent factor, 
estimates the index weight of each component variable of a certain empowerment 
indicator using factor analysis methods, and computes numerical estimates of the 
latent factor. More specifically, the authors first estimated the index weight of each 
component variable using a model known as a two-parameter item-response model. 
The estimation of this model is accomplished by maximum likelihood using 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature for numerical integration. Following this, the authors 
proceed to estimate the latent factor for each respondent using Bayes’ method and the 
estimation is performed by the Gllamm6 programme24. The authors acknowledge that 
the methods they adopted are fairly demanding computationally. In their factor 
analysis, there are ten empowerment indicators (latent factors) and a total of 75 
component variables25
 
. 
On accomplishing the estimation of empowerment indicators, Pitt et al. (2003) 
applied regression analyses to evaluate the impact of borrowing from microcredit 
programmes on each empowerment indicator. The econometric methods used in the 
regression analyses were essentially the same as those presented in Pitt and Khandker 
(1998). The empirical results of the impact assessment provided strong supportive 
evidence of the empowerment impact of microcredit, suggesting that programme 
participation enables women to take a greater role in domestic decision-making, have 
wider access to financial and economic resources, have more extensive social 
                                                             
24 See Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2002). 
25 The 75 variables were chosen from 101 variables that were eligible for use and the eligibility 
criterion included variables with at least 1800 observations (out of a sample of 2074). 
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networks, gain greater bargaining power when facing their husbands, and enjoy more 
freedom of mobility. The study also revealed that men’s participation in credit 
programmes has a negative effect on some indicators of women’s empowerment such 
as physical mobility and access to financial resources. 
 
Similar to Pitt et al. (2003), Steele, Amin, and Naved (1998) conducted an impact 
study on one microcredit programme called Save the Children USA in Bangladesh, 
using a technique of latent trait analysis which is a variant on factor analysis and aims 
to locate individuals on some underlying scale or latent factor. In their empirical 
models, each respondent was allocated to a certain score which is the estimated 
conditional mean of the latent factor, given the respondent’s combined responses to a 
set of component variables. Based on this technique, the authors developed two 
empowerment indices representing a woman’s level of mobility and the extent of her 
role in domestic decision-making respectively. Specifically, the index for mobility 
ranged from -1.14 (indicating women who responded negatively to all component 
variables) to 2.14 (indicating a set of positive responses) and the index for 
decision-making ranged from -1.57 to 1.05, where negative values corresponded to 
women with below-average decision-making power in their households. However the 
authors’ findings suggested that participation in the microcredit programme had little 
impact on both women’s mobility and their decision-making power. This might be 
because a discernible change in women’s behaviour such as physical mobility is less 
plausible given a short period of participation (the maximum participation time in 
Steele et al.’s study is only two years). Table 3.6 provides a summary of the empirical 
studies discussed in this section. 
 
A review of existing studies on the empowerment impact of microcredit presents 
mixed evidence: while the process-based studies report negative evidence for the 
empowerment impact of microcredit, the outcome-based studies provide supportive 
evidence (except Garikipati’s (2006) study). Kabeer (2001a) concludes that 
process-based studies tend to render negative evaluations because they stress gender 
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antagonism within one household and discount the significance of cooperation; in 
contrast, outcome-based studies are more likely to report positive evidence because 
they do not favour individualised over joint forms of behaviour. 
 
Table 3.6 Summary of empirical women’s empowerment studies 
 Study by Research 
methods 
Empowerment 
indicators 
Findings  
Process-based 
studies 
Goetz and  
Gupta 
(1996) 
qualitative 
analysis; 
empowerment 
index 
Managerial control 
over loans 
Women lost 
most control 
over their 
loans to men, 
thus 
microcredit 
does not 
empower 
women 
Ackerly 
(1995) 
empowerment 
index; 
probit estimate 
of impact 
Accounting 
knowledge 
Women gain 
their 
accounting 
knowledge 
through 
market access 
rather than 
microcredit 
programme 
participation 
Montgomery  
et al. (1996) 
Comparisons of 
management of 
loan-funded 
activities 
between female 
borrowers and 
male borrowers 
Management of 
loan-funded 
activities 
Women lost 
the sole 
authority over 
loan-assisted 
activities, so 
microcredit 
has done little 
to empower 
women 
Outcome-based 
studies 
Hashemi  
et al. (1996) 
empowerment 
index; 
logistic 
regression for 
impact estimate 
Eight indicators 
including mobility, 
economic security, 
ability to make 
small/large purchase, 
decision-making 
power, political and 
legal awareness, 
participation in 
public protests and 
political campaign, 
relative freedom 
from family 
domination 
Microcredit 
programmes 
were found to 
have 
significant 
positive effects 
on all eight 
empowerment 
indicators 
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Table 3.6 Summary of empirical women’s empowerment studies(Cont.) 
Outcome-based 
studies 
Study by Research 
methods 
Empowerment 
indicators 
Findings  
Garikipati  
(2006) 
empowerment 
index; 
logistic 
regression for 
impact estimate 
Six indicators 
including control 
over household 
assets, role in 
household 
decision-making, 
work-time allocation, 
control over 
minor/major 
finances, division of 
domestic chores 
Microcredit 
empowers 
women little 
and 
programme 
participation 
may have 
adverse effects 
on women’s 
domestic 
standing 
Zaman  
(1999) 
Logistic 
regression 
Sixteen indicators 
falling into 3 
categories such as 
ownership and 
control over assets, 
general and legal 
knowledge, and 
fertility and mobility. 
Microcredit 
has overall 
positive effects 
on all 
empowerment 
dimensions 
investigated 
Pitt et al.  
(2003) 
empowerment 
index 
constructed on 
the basis of 
factor analysis; 
regression 
analysis for 
impact estimate 
Ten indicators 
including economic 
decision-making, 
purchasing capacity, 
control over loans, 
control over 
income/savings, 
mobility, political 
awareness, 
networks/friendships, 
family planning, 
attitudes, and spousal 
arguments and abuse 
Microcredit 
has greatly 
affected 
women 
borrowers on 
all 
empowerment 
dimensions 
investigated 
Steele et al. 
(1998) 
empowerment 
index 
constructed on 
the basis of latent 
trait analysis; 
regression 
analysis for 
impact estimate 
Two indicators 
including mobility 
and household 
decision-making 
Microcredit 
has no obvious 
impact on 
these two 
empowerment 
indicators 
 
A study by Malhotra et al. (2002) indicated that there has been an increasing trend to 
use direct outcome indicators (such as decision-making) as measures of women’s 
empowerment, and these are considered to be the most efficient representations of the 
process of empowerment since they are closest to measuring agency. Malhotra et al. 
(2002) further point out that the indicators with ‘face validity’ (i.e. empowerment 
indicators based on survey questions associated with very specific and concrete 
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actions) signify power relationships and are meaningful within a particular social 
context. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the empirical models used to investigate the accessibility to 
microcredit by Chinese rural households; evaluates the welfare impact of microcredit 
on Chinese rural households; and assesses the empowerment impact of microcredit on 
Chinese rural women. Following this, data collection is discussed including 
questionnaire design and sampling technique. 
 
4.1 Accessibility to microcredit by rural households 
4.1.1 Conceptual framework 
Household’s accessibility to credit can be defined as the ability to borrow from 
different sources of credit (Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Diagne, 1999). For example, 
Diagne and Zeller’s (2001) study showed that households characterised as 
resource-poor and/or requiring small loan amounts have better access to informal 
credit compared to formal credit. This is because these households are more able to 
secure informal loans given a credit need due to the merits possessed by informal 
lending such as no collateral requirement and flexible loan arrangements. By contrast, 
households who appear to be in better economic conditions and/or require credit in 
larger amounts can access formal credit more easily because they are capable to 
comply with formal lending policies such as collateral requirements and prescribed 
minimum loan amounts. 
 
Evans et al. (1999) present a conceptual framework in analysing factors that affect 
households’ access to microcredit in Bangladesh, in which both household-related 
factors and programme-related factors are taken into account. Similarly, Vaessen 
(2001) examines households’ accessibility to rural credit in Northern Nicaragua by 
analysing both demand-side (household) factors and supply-side (lender) factors. Our 
study employs Evans et al.’s (1999) conceptual framework to investigate households’ 
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accessibility to microcredit in rural China by focusing on the microcredit programme 
implemented by the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs). 
 
Household-related factors (such as income, occupation, age, education) are 
hypothesised to affect households’ demand for microcredit, which can directly 
influence households’ accessibility to microcredit. This is because households’ access 
to a certain type of credit can be conceptualised as a sequential decision making 
process that is initiated at the demand side (Zeller, 1994). In addition to 
household-related factors, there are programme-related (supply-side) factors 
influencing the households’ access to microcredit too. For example, Umoh (2006) 
argues that inaccessibility to credit is generally created by the lending policies of 
financial institutions, which can be manifested by complicated application procedures, 
specified minimum loan amounts and prescribed loan purposes. In addition, some 
features unique to microcredit programmes can also constrain households’ access to 
microcredit, including membership requirements, self-selected credit groups, and 
group lending (see for example, Ros, 2007; Maes and Foose, 2006; Evans et al., 1999). 
Institutional incentives such as achieving repayment targets and ensuring programme 
financial viability may induce the lenders shy away from lending to households who 
are or appear to be risky borrowers (Maes and Foose, 2006; Evans et al., 1999). 
 
Due to the supply-related factors, households who have a demand for microcredit may 
access microcredit or stay frustrated by denial. Therefore, household-related factors 
and programme-related factors, singly or in combination, may work to impact 
households’ accessibility to microcredit. Focusing on the demand side, this research 
attempts to measure households’ accessibility to microcredit by empirically 
examining the influence of household factors on the probability of securing micro 
loans from RCC. Factors studied encompass household demographics (such as age 
and gender), socio-economic factors (such as income level and asset ownership) and 
other household-related factors (such as attitude towards debt and ability to access 
other sources of credit). Data used in our empirical analysis includes primary data 
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collected from a rural household survey in China. The influence of institution-level 
factors (i.e., supply side factors) on households’ accessibility to microcredit is 
examined descriptively with qualitative information collected from the household 
survey. Furthermore, this research assumes that rural households in China prefer 
microcredit to other credit types such as formal credit and informal credit when they 
need to borrow, due to the merits of microcredit such as no collateral requirement and 
affordable interest rates (RCC’s micro loans are provided at commercial rates). 
 
4.1.2 Empirical framework 
The empirical approach used to analyse accessibility of microcredit from the 
perspective of the rural household is based on discrete choice models (DCMs). DCMs 
describe decision-makers’ choices among a set of alternatives, termed as a choice set. 
The choice set exhibits three features to fit within a discrete choice framework, which 
include (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985): 
1. The alternatives within the choice set are mutually exclusive from the decision 
maker’s perspective, which means that choosing one alternative implies giving up all 
the other alternatives; 
2. The choice set is exhaustive so that all possible alternatives are included; 
3. The number of alternatives is finite to be counted. 
 
DCMs are probability models that specify the probability of a certain choice as a 
function of the utility derived from that choice (Cramer, 1991). A decision-maker 
chooses the alternative with the greatest utility among those available at the time of 
making the choice. Accordingly, the probability that a given alternative is chosen is 
defined as the probability that it has the highest utility among the available 
alternatives in the choice set ( mC ) (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
Let inU and jnU denote the utilities that decision-maker n obtains from alternatives i and 
j respectively, then the probability that decision-maker n chooses alternative i 
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from mC is given as follows
26
,Pr[)|( jninmn UUCiP >=
 (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985): 
 ∀ i, j∈ mC and i≠j]        (4.1) 
 
It is important to note that the utilities of the alternatives are treated as random 
variables in DCMs to address the concerns of observational deficiencies arising from 
unobserved attributes, unobserved preference variations and measurement errors. As a 
random variable, utility inU is decomposed into two parts including the systematic (or 
representative) part inV and random components (or called disturbances) inε . 
Specifically, inV is a function that relates the observed information (such as key 
characteristics of the decision-maker and alternatives) to the decision-maker’s utility 
and inε captures the factors that affect utility but are not included in inV  (Train, 2003; 
Wassenaar and Chen, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Therefore, the utility 
function can be written as: 
,                                        i Cin in in mU V ε= + ∀ ∈         (4.2) 
As such, 
,                                       j Cjn jn jn mU V ε= + ∀ ∈         (4.3) 
 
When substituting Equation (4.2) and (4.3) into Equation (4.1), the probability of 
choosing alternative i can be rewritten as follows: 
)Pr()Pr()|( jnjnininjninmn VVUUCiP εε +>+=>=        (4.4) 
Hence, )Pr()|( injnjninmn VVCiP εε −>−=   ∀ i, j∈ mC and i≠j    (4.5) 
 
A special case takes place when the choice set mC contains only two alternatives i and j 
(binary choice), and such situations lead to what are termed as binary choice models. 
                                                             
26 This research ignores the probability that Uin=Ujn for any i and j in the choice set because if the 
distributions of Uin and Ujn can be characterised by a probability density function, Pr(Uin=Ujn)=0 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
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The probability of choosing alternative i rests on the probability that the utility of 
alternative i exceeds the utility of alternative j, namely (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985), 
)Pr()( jninn UUiP >=  
     = )Pr( injnjnin VV εε −>−            (4.6) 
and the probability of choosing alternative j simply is (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985): 
)(1)( iPjP nn −=                (4.7) 
 
Different binary choice models can be derived by assuming different distributions of 
the two disturbances ( jnin εε , ) or of the difference between them (i.e., )injnn εεε −=  
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). For example, probit models and logit models are 
common binary choice models, which assume nε to be normally distributed and 
logistically distributed respectively. Both models provide consistent, efficient, and 
asymptotically normal estimates, and yield very similar prediction results in empirical 
work27
 
. Due to the advantages possessed by logit model such as approximating the 
normal distribution quite well and analytical convenience, logit models always 
surpass probit models in predicting choice probabilities (Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Stock and 
Watson, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
The logit model is based on the assumption that the difference between two random 
components of utility ( injnn εεε −= ) is logistically distributed, namely, 
1( ) ,                             >0, -
1 nn n
F
e µε
ε µ ε−= ∞ < < ∞+
      (4.8) 
where F(·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and μ is a positive scale 
parameter (i.e., μ > 0). In particular, the parameter μ cannot be differentiated from the 
overall scale of β’s in the case of linear-in-parameters utilities and thus can be 
                                                             
27 Maddala (2001) suggests that it is not likely for very different results to be obtained using logit or 
probit models unless the samples are very large so that it is possible to have enough observations in the 
tails. 
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assumed to take the value 1 for convenience (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
 
Under the assumption that nε is logistically distributed, the choice probability for 
alternative i is given by (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) 
( )
( ) Pr( )
1
1 in jn
in
jnin
n in jn
V V
V
VV
P i U U
e
e
e e
µ
µ
µµ
− −
= >
=
+
=
+
              (4.9) 
The systematic part of utility inV is generally specified to be linear in parameters as 
in inV Xβ=                 (4.10) 
where Xin is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative i and decision maker 
n, and β is a vector of unknown parameters associated with the variables. With this 
specification, the logit probability becomes (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 
1985) 
( )
1( )
1
in
jn in jnin
X
n X X XX
eP i
e e e
β
β ββ − −
= =
+ +
          (4.11) 
Obviously the choice probability is dependent on the observed data (for example, 
characteristics of the decision-maker and attributes of alternatives) up to some 
parameters. 
 
In this research, the households can choose to access microcredit or not to access 
based on their evaluations of the utilities of these two mutually exclusive alternatives, 
which can be viewed as a binary choice model (Umoh, 2006). Let ,( )n n nU Y X be the 
utility function of household n, where Yn is a dichotomous variable denoting whether 
the household has access to microcredit (1 if yes; 0 otherwise); Xn is a vector of 
household characteristics. The household will choose to borrow from the microcredit 
programme if such choice implies a higher utility level compared to not borrowing, 
i.e.  
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1 0( 1, ) ( 0, )n n n n n nU Y X U Y X= > =             
or 1 0( 1, ) ( 0, ) 0n n n n n nU Y X U Y X= − = >          (4.12) 
Instead of trying to determine the household’s choice, this research utilises the 
observed information of household’s choice (borrow or not borrow) and household’s 
characteristics to estimate the probability of the household’s choice conditional on the 
household characteristics using the binary logit model. The logit model has been 
widely used in analysing credit accessibility (see for example, Yehuala, 2008; Okurut, 
2006; Mohamed, 2003; Vaessen, 2001). 
 
Let Zn be a latent variable denoting (U1n-U0n), then following Equations (4.2), (4.3), 
and (4.10), Zn can be rewritten as: 
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
n n n n n
n n n n
n n
Z V V
V V
X
ε ε
ε ε
β ε
= + − +
= − + −
= +
            (4.13) 
where the systematic component of the household utility is assumed to depend on the 
observable household characteristics represented by Xn; all unobserved and omitted 
attributes and household characteristics are captured by the error term εn which is 
assumed to be independent and identically Gumbel-distributed (Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985). 
 
Thus the logit model predicting the probability of household n choosing to access 
microcredit can be expressed as 
1 0
1( 1) Pr( ) Pr( 0)
1 nn n n n n X
P Y U U Z
e β−
= = > = > =
+
       (4.14) 
where: nY equals 1 if the household has access to microcredit and 0 otherwise; 
nP  is the estimated probability of a household having access to microcredit; 
 
Equation (4.14) represents the cumulative logistic distribution function in a non-linear 
form, which gives rise to difficulty in interpreting the coefficients. For the purpose of 
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interpretation, it is normal to write the model in terms of log-odds ratio (Ruiz-Tagle, 
2005; Maddala, 2001). If Pn is the probability of accessing microcredit by a household, 
then the probability of not accessing microcredit or (1-Pn) is given as: 
1(1 )
1 nn X
P
eβ
− =
+
              (4.15) 
 
Thus the odds of observing a successful outcome (Yn=1) versus a failed outcome 
(Yn=0) is: 
1
1 1
n
n
n
X
Xn
X
n
P e e
P e
β
β
β−
+
= =
− +
             (4.16) 
Taking natural logarithm of equation (4.16) yields the following:  
*log( )
1
n
n n
n
P Z X
P
β= =
−
             (4.17) 
where Zn* is called the log-odds ratio which is a linear function of the explanatory 
variables. By adding a constant term to Equation (4.17), the model estimated in our 
research becomes: 
*
n nZ Xα β= +                (4.18) 
where: α is a constant term; 
β is a vector of coefficients for the independent variables nX ; 
nX is a vector of independent variables including household demographics, 
socio-economic characteristics and other household-related factors.  
 
Since our model is a logit model, which is a nonlinear function of coefficients (βn), 
the use of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method is not statistically 
appropriate. Instead, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique is 
employed to yield consistent and asymptotically efficient coefficient estimates. The 
use of MLE determines the coefficients that maximise the probability (or likelihood) 
of the sample data. The likelihood function treated as a function of the unknown 
coefficients β is given by (Verbeek , 2000): 
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1
1
( ) { 1| ; } { 0 | ; }n n
N
Y Y
n n n n
n
L P Y X P Y Xβ β β −
=
= ∏ = =         (4.19) 
 
Accordingly, the log likelihood function is:  
1 1
( ) ln (1 ) ln(1 )
N N
n n n n
n n
LL Y P Y Pβ
= =
= + − −∑ ∑          (4.20) 
where Pn = P{Yn =1|Xn; β} denotes the probability of accessing microcredit. Using 
the formula for logit probabilities, the log likelihood function for the logit model can 
be written as: 
1 1
1( ) ln( ) (1 ) ln( )
1 1
n
n n
XN N
n nX X
n n
eLL Y Y
e e
β
β ββ
= =
= + −
+ +∑ ∑        (4.21) 
 
Therefore the maximum likelihood estimator
^
β can be obtained by differentiating 
Equation (4.21) with respect to β  
1
exp( )( ) [ ] 0
1 exp( )
N
n n
n n
n n n
XLL Y X
X
ββ
β β=
∂
= − =
∂ +∑          (4.22) 
 
4.1.3 Explanation of variables 
The dependent variable for the logit model is of dichotomous nature indicating rural 
households’ access to microcredit. As there is no direct measurement of microcredit 
accessibility, the ‘accessibility’ is measured by using observations on household 
borrowings such as ‘obtained micro loans’ and ‘did not obtain micro loans’. This is in 
accordance with previous studies which adopted observable formal or informal 
borrowings as indicators of credit accessibility (see for example, Yehuala, 2008; Ravi, 
2003; Mohamed, 2003; Vaessen, 2001). Specifically, the dependent variable (Yn) takes 
a value of ‘1’ for households who have secured micro loans from RCC and ‘0’ for 
households who have never secured micro loans from RCC. 
Dependent variable 
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The independent variables used in the logit model include the following variables: 
Independent variables 
1X = Age (-): age of household head (in years); 
2X = Gender (-): gender of household head (1=female; 0=male); 
3X = Location (-): geographic location of the village where household is living                  
(1=mountainous area; 0=otherwise); 
4X = Household size (+/-): number of people living in household; 
5X = Farm size (+): 1 if the farmland area is 10 mu or less; 0 if the area is larger than 
10 mu28
6X
; 
= Income (+/-): household annual income (in 1,000 yuan); 
7X = Self employment (+): 1 if household head is engaged in self-run business; 0     
otherwise;  
8X = Economic dependency ratio (-); 
9X = Assets (+/-): total value of household assets (in 1,000 yuan); 
10X = Savings (+): household savings with a RCC (1=yes; 0=otherwise); 
11X = Attitude (-): household attitude towards debt (1=averse; 0 otherwise); 
12X = Alternatives (-): access to other sources of credit (1=yes; 0=otherwise); 
13X = Official status (+): 1 if household has member working in a village or township 
committee; 0 otherwise; 
14X = Shareholding
29
15X
 (+): 1 if household is a shareholder of a RCC; 0 otherwise. 
= Distance: a vector of dummy variables indicating distance between the 
household dwelling-place and the RCC office [where X15(1) = 1for within 10 lis30
                                                             
28 mu is the common area measurement in rural China. 1 mu ≈ 0.067 ha.  
, 0 
29  RCCs were established in the late 1950s with funds invested by rural households as their 
establishment funding. Since then RCCs have kept this tradition and encourage rural household to buy 
shares. Households who have shares in a RCC then become shareholders of the RCC. 
30 li is the common distance measurement in rural China. 1 li ≈ 0.5 kilometres. 
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otherwise; X15(2) = 1 for between 11and 20 lis, 0 otherwise; X15(3) = 1 for more than 20 
lis, 0 otherwise];  
16X = Education: a vector of dummy variables for educational attainment of 
household head [where X16(1) = 1 for no education, 0 otherwise; X16(2) = 1 for 
secondary school or less, 0 otherwise; X16(3) = 1 for post-secondary, 0 otherwise]. 
 
The positive and negative signs in the parentheses indicate the hypothesised 
relationship between the variables and household accessibility to microcredit. For 
example, Age (-) means that age of household head is negatively related to 
household’s access to microcredit. 
 
Farm size and self employment are hypothesised to positively affect households’ 
access to microcredit. Households with larger farm size are likely to have a higher 
capital requirement in their farm production and are thus more likely to apply for 
micro loans (Mohamed, 2003; Ravi, 2003; Davis et al., 1998). By the same token, 
there is a higher probability for households who are running self business in addition 
to agricultural production to access microcredit owing to the higher potential need for 
financial support. Official status is a variable describing whether a household has 
family members working as village or township officials. It is assumed that 
households with members working as officials have higher demand for credit for 
off-farm investment and thus are more inclined to access microcredit (Cheng, 2006). 
Such official status also reflects households’ social standing and connections with 
local organisations such as RCCs, which could facilitate the households’ access to 
microcredit. Furthermore, savings and shareholding are used as a proxy for 
households’ relationship with the RCC. Depositing money and/or purchasing shares to 
some extent imply a higher capacity of repaying the loans. It is thus expected that 
households who have savings with the RCC and/or who are shareholders of the RCC 
are more willing to apply for micro loans if they need to borrow. 
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Household demographics such as age and gender of the household head are 
hypothesised to negatively affect households’ access to microcredit. Generally, older 
people tend to be risk averse and thus may not be willing to enter into debt obligations. 
Besides, older farmers may find it difficult to understand the operations and loan 
conditions of microcredit programmes, further reducing their propensity to access 
microcredit. Okurut (2006) and Mohamed (2003) have confirmed that the probability 
of borrowing from formal and semi-formal credit sources decreases as people become 
older. In addition to age, a female-headed household is assumed to be more 
disadvantaged in securing micro loans than a male-headed household. This is because 
rural women might have less access to information, technology information in 
particular, due to their limited freedom and mobility, which potentially lowers their 
demand for credit as an input to improve production and thus reduces the likelihood 
of accessing microcredit. Even when they have a financing need, women might be 
inhibited from taking micro loans due to the perceived low repayment capacities 
manifested by the weaker control over economic resources compared to men (Yehuala, 
2008; Evans et al., 1999; Zeller, 1994). Geographic location is also hypothesised to 
have negative a impact on households’ accessibility to microcredit. Households living 
in mountainous areas would have less exposure to information and consume less due 
to transportation inconvenience. As a result, such households have low demand for 
credit and thus have lower probabilities of accessing microcredit. Further, it could be 
possible that microcredit programmes are not available to villages in mountainous 
areas (Sharma and Zeller, 1999). 
 
Distance and Education dummy variables are hypothesised to influence households’ 
accessibility to microcredit. For example, ceteris paribus, households living 20 lis or 
more away from RCC office will be less likely to access microcredit than those who 
reside within 10 lis from the RCC office. This is because households living further 
away would incur a higher borrowing cost if they decide to borrow from a RCC 
microcredit programme, due to the high transaction costs (such as travelling expenses 
and time opportunity costs) involved (Ho, 2004; Vaeseen, 2000). In addition, 
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educational attainment of the household head reflects household human capital and is 
hypothesised to facilitate households’ access to microcredit. For example, assuming 
all else equal, farmers with formal education (for example, secondary or 
post-secondary education) are likely to have more exposure to the external 
environment including risks and possess more skills, and therefore they might require 
more credit for consumption and/or production, compared to uneducated farmers. In 
addition, educated farmers can better understand the terms and conditions of micro 
loans and might be more ready to comply with the formalities required by microcredit 
providers such as a RCC (Yehuala, 2008; Okunade, 2007; Okurut, 2006; Vaessen, 
2001). 
 
Economic dependency ratio measures the ratio of economically inactive population to 
economically active population expressed in percentage terms (Husain, 1998). In our 
research this is calculated as the ratio of household members without income to 
household income earners. A higher ratio indicates a lower ability to repay loans and 
thus lower probability for the household to access microcredit. Vaessen (2001) 
stresses that household’s attitude towards debt plays an important role in affecting 
household’s borrowing decision. It is assumed that a household holding an adverse 
attitude towards debt may refrain from accessing any type of credit including 
microcredit. Moreover, access to other sources of credit might discourage household’s 
borrowing from microcredit programmes because the transaction costs of acquiring a 
loan from an alternative source might be lower or the loan contract provided by an 
alternative lender is more attractive, compared to microcredit. This has been 
confirmed by Mohamed (2003) and, Diagne and Zeller (2001) who reveal that many 
poor households choose informal credit instead of formal credit because of the 
advantages possessed by informal credit such as flexible lending terms and rapid loan 
application processing. 
 
The relationship between households’ accessibility to microcredit and variables, such 
as household size, income and assets, however, is ambiguous according to the 
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literature. The ambiguity of the effects of the three variables on households’ access to 
microcredit arises from their uncertain effects on households’ demand for credit. For 
example, a large family may have a higher desired consumption and hence may 
demand more credit. However, a larger family size also implies a lower repayment 
capacity due to smaller future expected income per capita, which in turn decreases the 
demand for credit (Nguyen, 2007; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Ho, 2004). Similarly, 
household’s annual income and total assets, on the one hand, have an ‘income effect’ 
and households with higher level income and/or assets may feel rich and consume 
more. This has a positive effect on households’ demand for credit (Cheng, 2006; 
Ruiz-Tagle, 2005). At the same time, income and assets represent the initial capital of 
households and a higher level of income and/or assets indicates a less constrained 
budget of the households, which might potentially weaken the households’ demand 
for credit (Umoh, 2006; Ruiz-Tagle, 2005; Zeller, 1994). 
 
4.2 Assessing the welfare impact of microcredit 
4.2.1 Welfare outcomes of interest 
The most popular economic indicators used in welfare impact assessment (WIA) of 
microcredit at household-level are income and expenditure (or consumption)31
 
 (Islam, 
2007; Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon, 2002; Hulme, 1997). Empirical studies on 
WIA attempt to use the changes in the levels or patterns of the economic indicators as 
a measure of the welfare impact brought by microcredit (see for example, Islam and 
Harris, 2008; Nguyen, Pham, and Minh, 2007; Alexander, 2001; Pitt and Khandker, 
1998). Following the literature, our study measures the welfare impact of microcredit 
on the borrowers in terms of income and expenditure. Specifically, the primary 
welfare outcomes of interest in our research are household annual income and 
household annual consumption. 
Household income refers to the total income earned by all household members, which 
                                                             
31 Compared to income and consumption, asset is less popularly used as a welfare indicator due to the 
quantitative problems in measurement such as depreciating and valuing physical assets (Islam, 2007). 
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encompasses the income from all possible sources such as agriculture, non-agriculture, 
self-employment, wages, etc. Using the changes in household incomes as a measure 
of welfare impact is misleading due to the possible measurement error in income data 
(Islam, 2007; Coudouel et al., 2002; Maclsaac, 1997). First, households’ incomes tend 
to fluctuate during the year or over the year due to the dependence on agricultural 
production which largely hinges on the harvest cycle and natural conditions. This 
gives rise to a potential difficulty for households in accurately recalling their incomes, 
leading to a low quality of the income data derived from the survey. The inaccuracy of 
income data can be more severe in the case where numerical skills are low and 
records are not maintained. In addition to recall memory, some other factors can result 
in the wrong estimation of income. For example, a large proportion of incomes are 
not monetised if the households consume their own production or exchange it for 
other goods, which leads to an underestimation of household income. In contrast, 
consumption is more stable than income during the household’s lifetime, which can 
better reflect a household’s actual standard of living and ability to meet basic needs 
(Islam, 2007; Coudouel et al., 2002; Husain, 1998; Maclsaac, 1997). 
 
Based on the above discussion, our research also uses household consumption to 
provide an alternative, and possibly better, measure of household welfare in view of 
the possibility of measurement error in the income variable. Household consumption 
in this research is the sum of food consumption and non-food consumption within a 
household.  
 
4.2.2 Identifying the impact of a microcredit programme 
The major purpose of impact assessment of a programme (or any intervention) is to 
measure the extent to which the programme has changed the outcomes of subjects 
studied, where the subjects can be individuals, households, firms, cities, etc. (Nguyen, 
2007). In other words, assessing the impact of a programme requires comparing 
outcomes (e.g., household income and consumption) when a person participates in the 
programme to the same outcomes when he/she does not participate. For example, let 
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wi be a binary indicator of programme participation: wi=1 for participation by subject 
i and wi=0 for non-participation by subject i. Further let Yi1 denote the value of the 
outcome of interest when subject i participates in the programme and Yi0 denote the 
potential value of the same outcome when subject i is in the state of non-participation. 
Thus the true impact of the programme on the outcome of subject i, which is 
represented by ∆i, can be quantified by the difference between Yi1 and Yi0, as (Sarangi, 
2007; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Kumar, 2005): 
1 0i i iY Y∆ = −                 (4.23) 
 
The problem in identifying the true impact for a particular subject is that the same 
subject can never be observed in both participation and non-participation states at the 
same time and thus the true impact of participation in the programme on a certain 
outcome can not be observed. In other words, one or the other component of the 
difference expressed by Equation (4.23) is missing (Heckman, 1997; Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). Instead, the observed outcome of interest of subject i can be described 
as follows: 
1 0(1 )i i i i iY wY w Y= + −               (4.24) 
where Yi is either Yi1 or Yi0 and the unobserved outcome is called ‘counterfactual’ 
(Nguyen, 2007; Sarangi, 2007; Kumar, 2005). 
 
To overcome this missing data problem, impact assessment studies use a statistical 
approach to replace the missing data on individual subjects with group means or some 
other group statistics (Heckman, 1997). The most popular group statistics widely used 
in the impact evaluation literature, and the one adopted in this research, is the 
‘average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT)’ 32
                                                             
32 There are other group statistics used in impact assessment such as local average treatment effect, 
marginal treatment effect, or the effect of non-treatment on the non-treated which measures the impact 
the programme would have on the non-participants if they had participated in the programme. See 
Heckman (1997) for details. 
, which measures the extent to 
which the programme changes the outcome of a group of participants compared to 
what they would have experienced in the absence of participation (see for example, 
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Perry and Maloney, 2007; Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2007; Kumar, 2005). The 
true programme impact measured by ATT can be expressed by the following equation: 
1 0( | 1) ( | 1)i i i iE Y w E Y wγ = = − =            (4.25) 
where E (∙) signifies expectation in the population. Specifically, 0( | 1)i iE Y w =  
represents the counterfactual outcome for participants had they not participated 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Heckman, 1997). 
 
This gives rise to another problem of unobservability, 1( | 1)i iE Y w = can be estimated 
while the counterfactual 0( | 1)i iE Y w = cannot. As an alternative, impact evaluations 
resort to constructing ‘counterfactuals’ based on a treatment/control framework, 
where a group of programme non-participants are selected as a control group and the 
observed outcomes of this control group are supposed to serve as ‘counterfactuals’ to 
the observed outcomes of programme participants (treatment group). Accordingly, the 
ATT measured with this treatment/control framework is used to estimate the true 
impact (γ) and the basic idea of this approach is described as follows: 
*
1 0( | 1) ( | 0)i i j jE Y w E Y wγ = = − =     (i ≠ j ϵ N)     (4.26) 
where γ* is the estimation of γ, i, and j denote two different subjects in a chosen 
sample of N subjects where subject i participates in the programme while subject j 
does not; Yi1 is the outcome investigated of subject i and Yj0 is the same outcome 
investigated of subject j (see, Sarangi, 2007; Kumar, 2005; Coleman, 1999). From 
Equation (4.26), it can be seen that the average programme impact (γ) can be 
estimated by comparing the average outcomes of programme participants (treatment 
group) to the same average outcomes of programme non-participants (control group). 
An essential requirement for the treatment/control framework to function efficiently is 
that the control group should resemble the treatment group as much as possible in 
terms of both observed and unobserved characteristics (Karlan and Goldberg, 2007; 
Ezemenari, Rudqvist, and Subbarao, 1999). 
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Following this treatment/control framework, our research assesses the average 
welfare impact of microcredit programmes by comparing the average household 
outcomes (such as income and consumption) between borrowing households 
(treatment group) and non-borrowing households (control group). 
 
4.2.3 Selection bias issues in the impact assessment 
The ATT estimation with treatment/control framework depends strongly on the 
assumption that the distribution of the outcome variable for control group is the same 
as the counterfactual distribution that treatment group would have followed in the 
absence of treatment (Abadie, 2005a). This can be illustrated by rewriting Equation 
(4.26) as follows: 
*
1 0( | 1) ( | 0)i i j jE Y w E Y wγ = = − =  
  1 0 0 0( | 1) ( | 1) [ ( | 1) ( | 0)]i i i i i i j jE Y w E Y w E Y w E Y w= = − = + = − =  
  0 0[ ( | 1) ( | 0)]i i j jE Y w E Y wγ= + = − =          (4.27) 
 
Equation (4.27) suggests that γ* is an unbiased estimator for the true impact of a 
programme or treatment on the treated (i.e., γ*=γ) if and only if the term in square 
bracket is zero. However it is worth noting that the constructed 
counterfactual 0( | 0)j jE Y w = can differ significantly from the true counterfactual 
0( | 1),i iE Y w = suggesting that the difference,
*
1 0( | 1) ( | 0),i i j jE Y w E Y wγ = = − =  could 
be a potential biased estimator of the true programme impact (γ). Selection bias exists 
if 0 0[ ( | 1) ( | 0)] 0i i j jE Y w E Y w= − = ≠ . The main challenge associated with the 
treatment/control framework is to correctly establish a control group, which otherwise 
might result in selection bias particularly in non-experimental evaluation designs with 
cross-sectional data33
                                                             
33 Experimental evaluation design where a treatment is randomly assigned to a set of eligible subjects 
can resolve the selection bias problem because the randomisation balances the outcome bias between 
the treated and non-treated samples (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Baker, 2000). 
 (Sarangi, 2007; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002; Baker, 2000). 
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Selection bias in microcredit programme evaluation arises when the households’ 
participation in microcredit programmes or households’ receipt of credit from 
microcredit programmes is related to unmeasured or unobserved factors that 
simultaneously affect the outcomes of their credit application and these unobserved 
factors are not correctly accounted for in the impact assessment (Perry and Maloney, 
2007; Baker, 2000; Ezemenaris et al., 1999). This can be illustrated by the following 
cross-sectional data model, where the household characteristics (X) and village 
attributes (V) are formulated to determine both the household’s receipt of microcredit 
(M) and the household outcome investigated (Y) (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 
1998; Coleman, 1999): 
M M MM X Vα β ε= + +              (4.28) 
Y Y YY X V Mα β γ µ= + + +             (4.29) 
 
Selection bias occurs as a result of the non-zero correlation between the error terms εM 
and μY. Econometric estimation of the above equation system will yield biased impact 
estimation (γ) if such correlation exists but it is not taken into account. The non-zero 
correlation between the two error terms can result from two main sources: 
self-selection into programme by households and non-random placement of the 
programme (Islam, 2007; Coleman, 1999; Zaman, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
 
1. Self-selection into programme 
In most non-experimental evaluation designs, households themselves decide whether 
to borrow from microcredit programmes or not, based on their own perceptions of the 
expected gains from such borrowings (Sarangi, 2007). This is referred as 
‘self-selection’. In the presence of self-selection, εM and μY are likely to be correlated 
because unobserved household characteristics (such as individual ability and risk 
preference) that influence both households’ participation in microcredit programmes 
and outcomes might not be correctly controlled for (i.e., included in variables X) even 
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if the observed factors (such as age and gender) have been taken into account, giving 
rise to a potential bias in impact estimation (γ). 
 
2. Non-random programme placement 
Rather than placing programmes randomly, programme managers might choose to 
operate microcredit programmes based on observed and unobserved attributes of the 
locations (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). Given the non-random programme placement, 
selection bias is possible to occur when comparing borrowing households from 
programme villages and non-borrowing households from non-programme villages. 
This is because unmeasured village attributes (for example, village attitudes, 
leadership, and infrastructure) that determine the households’ demand for microcredit 
as well as the households’ welfare outcomes might not be properly adjusted for, 
leading to a non-zero correlation between εM and μY. 
 
It can be concluded that comparing welfare outcomes between borrowing households 
and non-borrowing households without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
(such as unobserved household and village characteristics) would produce biased 
results since it will wrongly ascribe the entire change (improvement or deterioration) 
in welfare outcomes to programme impact, which partly arises from the uncontrolled 
and unobserved attributes (Khandker and Faruquee, 2003; Coleman, 1999). 
 
Microcredit impact evaluations using non-experimental data have to carefully address 
the selection bias issue to mitigate biases in estimating programme impact. Different 
econometric methods have been applied to deal with selection bias in empirical 
studies. For example, using instrumental variables (IVs) is one standard approach in 
tackling selection bias, which aims to find exogenous variables to be included as 
regressors in the Programme Equation (4.28) but not in the Outcome Equation (4.29) 
(Coleman, 1999; Heckman, 1997). However this approach has been criticised for the 
difficulty in justifying the use of any variables affecting the households’ borrowing 
from microcredit programmes but not the household outcomes (Aghion and Morduch, 
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2005; Coleman, 1999). Another method gaining increasing popularity is panel data 
models. Using data containing at least two periods of observations on the same set of 
households characteristics, panel data models are expected to achieve reliable 
estimates of programme impact by differencing out the effect of ‘unobserved factors’. 
However it is difficult to collect panel data due to time constraints and cost (McIntosh, 
Villaran, and Wydick, 2007; Wooldridge, 2007; Ezemenari et al., 1999). 
 
4.2.4 Empirical model and estimation strategy 
Our research assesses the welfare impact of RCC microcredit programme on rural 
households in China. To mitigate the potential selection bias in the impact assessment, 
our research adopts the panel data model owing to the availability of panel data on the 
sampled households including both borrowing and non-borrowing households. In 
addition, all sampled households in our research are selected from villages where 
RCC programmes are available, which helps mitigate the potential non-random 
programme placement bias34
 
 (Osmani, 2007; Nguyen, 2007). 
The empirical analysis is built upon the difference-in-differences (DD) approach, 
which is an increasingly popular panel data method in economics for identifying 
causal effects of programmes or treatments in the absence of purely experimental data 
(see for example, Perry and Maloney, 2007; Athey and Imbens, 2006; Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan, 2004; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). The DD estimation framework 
requires that the outcomes investigated (such as household income and consumption) 
be observed for two groups over two time periods. The first group, referred to as the 
borrowing group, consists of households who received microcredit in the period after 
the start of the programme (i.e., post-programme period) but not prior to the initiation 
of the programme (i.e., pre-programme period); the second group, called the 
                                                             
34 A potential risk of using this selection procedure is that the control group could be ‘contaminated’ 
because some effects of the treatment group’s involvement in RCC’s programme may be transferred to 
the control group as well given the fact that the two groups of households live close together in the 
same programme villages. This might result in an underestimation of the programme impact (welfare 
impact as well as empowerment impact) (Islam, 2007; Osmani, 2007; Mosley, 1997). This should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the findings in this research. 
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non-borrowing group comprises of households who did not receive microcredit 
during either period (Athey and Imbens, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2004). 
 
The standard DD method can be illustrated by the following regression equation 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Meyer, 1995): 
0 0 12it t i it itY d P Mβ δ β γ ε= + + + +            (4.30) 
where Yit is the household outcome investigated (i.e., household annual income or 
consumption) for household i at period t; d2t is a time dummy variable equal to 1 for 
t=2 (post-programme period) and 0 for t=1 (pre-programme period); Pi is a group 
dummy variable and takes a value of one if household i belongs to the borrowing 
group and zero otherwise; Mit is an interaction term of the product of d2t and Pi, 
which indicates the programme participation and is equal to 1 if household i borrowed 
money and the observation occurs in the second period (i.e., participating in the 
programme), and zero otherwise; δ0 captures time influence suffered by both 
treatment group and control group; β1 captures the potential time-invariant difference 
in overall averages between the two groups; γ is the primary parameter of interest 
measuring the average programme impact on borrowing (treatment) group; εit is the 
idiosyncratic error assumed to be independent and identically distributed over 
households and time, with mean zero at each time period. 
 
The key assumption of the standard DD method, also called common trend 
assumption, is that γ would be zero in the absence of the programme, or E[εit|Mit]=0. 
In other words, the average change in the outcome variables (Yit) would not have been 
systematically different between borrowing group and non-borrowing group if there 
were no programme (Abadie, 2005a and b; Meyer, 1995). Under this assumption, an 
unbiased estimate of γ can be obtained by simply calculating the difference of two 
differences: 1) the average difference in the outcomes over the two time periods for 
the borrowing group; and 2) the same differences for the non-borrowing group (Athey 
and Imbens, 2006; Abadie, 2005a). This is illustrated by the following equation: 
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∧
= = = =
= ∆ −∆
= − = − − =
       (4.31)35
where “∆” denotes the change from t = 1 to t = 2; 
 
sddγ
∧
signifies the standard DD 
estimator of γ; the over bar stands for averages across households; B and N denote 
borrowing households and non-borrowing households respectively. As a result of 
subtracting the average differences in the non-borrowing group from the average 
differences in the borrowing group from Equation (4.31), the DD estimation strategy 
ensures two types of estimation bias to be removed: bias arising from cross-sectional 
comparisons between the two groups in the post-programme period, which could be 
the result of permanent differences between these two groups (captured by β1) but 
unrelated to the programme, and bias arising from the comparisons over the two 
periods for the borrowing group, which could be the result of time trends (captured by 
δ0) but irrelevant to the programme (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007; Athey and Imbens, 
2006; Abadie, 2005a; Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). 
 
The standard DD method is valid if the households’ receipt of microcredit is random 
(such as in experimental settings), conditional on time and group fixed effects 
(Bertrand et al., 2004). The randomisation ensures that the pre-programme attributes36
 
 
that might be associated with the outcome variables (Yit) over time are balanced 
between the two groups. However, given the non-experimental nature of our data, it is 
likely that the households in both groups are systematically different and unbalanced 
in the pre-programme attributes which are possibly related to the outcome variables. 
Consequently, the pattern of change in the outcomes could vary systematically across 
the two groups of households if there were no RCC programme, leading to biased 
estimates of RCC programme impact (Islam and Harris, 2008; Abadie, 2005a and b). 
As suggested by Islam and Harris (2008) and Abadie (2005b), a vector of observable 
                                                             
35 Equation (4.31) is a representation of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of γ in equation 
(4.30) (Wooldridge, 2007, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
36 Pre-programme attributes refer to both observable and unobservable characteristics of households 
and villages. 
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household characteristics is included in the regression as control variables to adjust 
for the observable differences between the two groups. In addition, to control for the 
unmeasured household and village attributes that can potentially result in selection 
bias, a fixed effects method is used in our research. The adjusted DD method can be 
illustrated by the following regression equation (Islam and Harris, 2008; McIntosh et 
al., 2007; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005): 
0 0 2it t it it j i itY d X M V h uβ δ α γ= + + + + + +          (4.32) 
where Yit, d2t, δ0 are defined similarly to Equation (4.30). Xit is a vector of household 
characteristics (such as age, family size); Mit is the treatment variable and γ is the 
primary parameter of interest that captures the microcredit impact on borrowing 
households; Vj is village fixed effect used to control for potential non-random 
programme placement bias, which captures both observable and unobservable village 
factors that are time-constant but affect the outcome of interest Yit; hi is household 
fixed effects capturing unobserved, time-constant household attributes that affect Yit; 
uit is the idiosyncratic error term that represents unobserved household factors which 
change over time and affect Yit. It should be noted that uit is normalised to have mean 
zero for each period and is assumed to be independent of the programme variable Mit 
and have the same distribution over time, i.e. uit ⊥ Mit, but it can be correlated with hi 
(Athey and Imbens, 2006; Abadie, 2005b). The inclusion of Xit as regressors may help 
control for confounding trends and improve the efficiency of the estimate of γ by 
reducing residual variance (Abadie, 2005b; Meyer, 1995). 
 
Studies by Islam and Harris (2008) and Khandker (2005) have documented that 
household fixed effects estimation, which treats the household-specific component (hi) 
of the error as a parameter to be estimated, can resolve selection bias at both 
household and village levels, including the upper level (e.g., township level), based on 
the assumption that the unobserved factors at the household and village level are 
invariant over time. Accordingly, our research employs household fixed effects 
estimation to correct for the potential selection bias in impact evaluation. The 
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econometric model for the welfare impact analysis is specified as the following 
two-way (time and household) fixed effects model, which is a simplified form of 
Equation (4.32) omitting village fixed effects (Vj): 
0 0 2it t it it i itY d X M h uβ δ α γ= + + + + +           (4.33) 
 
The variables and parameters in equation (4.33) are similarly defined as in Equation 
(4.32). In particular, the treatment variable Mit takes two different forms: 1) a 
continuous variable denoting the total credit amount borrowed by household i from 
RCC microcredit programmes in period t=2; and 2) a binary variable equal to one if 
household i receives loans from the programme in period t=2 and equal to zero 
otherwise. Compared to the binary treatment variable, the cumulative borrowing 
(continuous) variable is often used in assessing the impact of microcredit since it 
better represents the extent of a household’s programme participation (see for 
example, Nguyen et al., 2007; Niño-Zarazúa, 2007; Montgomery, 2005; Khandker, 
2005; Alexander, 2001). This would lead to a greater impact of microcredit on 
households with larger cumulative loan sizes, which reflect deeper involvement in the 
programme by these households. The parameter γ thus measures the average 
programme impact when Mit is a binary treatment variable and measures the average 
programme impact of additional credit amount on borrowing households where Mit 
represents the amount of loans borrowed by the household (Nguyen et al., 2007; 
Alexander, 2001). All the variables used in the welfare impact analysis are 
documented in Appendix 1. 
 
Using Equation (4.33), the underlying assumption of the adjusted DD method is that 
the counterfactual outcomes in the absence of the programme are independent of the 
programme (i.e., γ would be zero in the absence of programme), conditional on 
household characteristics (Xit) and household fixed effects (hi) (Islam and Harris, 2008; 
Abadie, 2005a and b). The adjusted DD estimator of programme impact γ no longer 
has the simple form of Equation (4.31) (but has similar interpretation) and has to be 
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obtained using a regression approach (Wooldridge, 2002). As documented in Abadie 
(2005a), the DD estimator is a particular case of fixed effects estimators for panel data, 
with only two time periods and a proportion of the sample receiving treatment in the 
second time period. 
 
One advantage of the adjusted DD method based on the fixed effects regression 
[Equation (4.33)] is that it relaxes the stringent restriction (randomisation) made in the 
standard DD method and allows the two groups of households to be systematically 
different. Assuming that the selection bias is caused by the time-invariant unobserved 
household heterogeneity (hi) and observed differences between borrowing and 
non-borrowing households (Xit), the adjusted DD estimate allows for bias on the 
condition that the bias exists in both periods and is the same for each period. Then 
differencing the differences between the two groups of households can remove the 
bias and yield the true programme effect (Islam and Harris, 2008; Perry and Maloney, 
2007). 
 
4.3 Assessing the women empowerment impact of microcredit 
4.3.1 Concept of ‘women empowerment’ 
Empowerment is generally described as a dynamic process, which involves changes 
from a disadvantageous state to a relatively advantageous one. For example, Kabeer 
(2001b) defines ‘empowerment’ as the process by which those who have previously 
been deprived of the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such ability. 
‘Strategic life choices’ in Kabeer (2001b) is defined as ‘first order choices’, which 
have greater importance than others in terms of their influence on people’s lives, such 
as choice of livelihood (including where to live, whom to marry, whether to have 
child, etc.). Similarly, Cheston and Kuhn (2002, p12) stress that empowerment “is 
about change, choice and power” and it can be described as “a process by which 
individuals or groups with little or no power gain power and ability to make choices 
that affect their lives”. 
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When connecting women empowerment with microcredit, the process of 
empowerment primarily occurs at the individual/household level and is initiated by 
economic betterment in the form of increased independent income resulting from the 
loan-supported activities, which leads to the economic empowerment of poor women. 
Such economic empowerment enables poor women to make economic contributions 
to their families, which leads to increased power in the family decision-making 
process as well as greater control over household resources such as income and assets. 
In addition to economic empowerment, microcredit programmes provide poor women 
with access to human and social resources, such as knowledge, skills, and information 
networks, through activities taking place outside household domain including group 
formation and interaction with programme staff. This helps foster women’s social and 
political awareness, indirectly leading to social and political empowerment on women. 
Economic empowerment, together with social and political empowerment, contributes 
greatly to building up women’s self-esteem and self-efficacy, resulting in an improved 
psychological well-being of women (Gaiha and Thapa, 2006; Ansoglenang, 2006; 
Malhotra et al., 2002). 
 
More specifically, Banu, Farashuddin, Hossain, and Akter (2001, p2) advanced a 
concept of women’s empowerment in the context of microfinance, which defines 
women’s empowerment as “the capacity of women to reduce their socioeconomic 
vulnerability and their dependency on their husbands or other male counterparts, in 
terms of their ability to become involved in income generating activities and freely 
spend the income thus generated; to accumulate assets over which they can have right 
of sale and profit; increase their contribution to household expenditure and thereby 
acquire a greater role in household decision-making and finally, increase their self 
confidence and awareness of social issues”. This concept is employed in our research 
as a reference in analysing the impact of microcredit on women empowerment in rural 
China. 
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4.3.2 Developing empowerment indicators 
Hashemi et al. (1996) argue that developing reliable and valid measures of women’s 
empowerment is the most difficult task when assessing the empowerment impact of 
policy interventions such as microcredit programmes. Such difficulty may arise from 
the context-specific nature of empowerment: behaviours and attitudes that signify 
empowerment in one social context may have no relevance in another. Malhotra et al. 
(2002) assert that even after identifying empowerment as a key development goal, 
neither the World Bank nor any other major development agency has worked out a 
rigorous or universal method of measuring empowerment due to the variation in the 
nature and significance of empowerment across different contexts. 
 
In addition to the contextual nature of empowerment, the methods adopted to evaluate 
empowerment can also pose a challenge on yielding robust indicators. With reference 
to the literature, the two most important methods for assessing women empowerment 
impact are the process-based method and the outcome-based method. The 
process-based method advocates that empowerment cannot be measured directly since 
it is a dynamic process. Instead such evaluations focus on the loan use processes 
through which women borrowers are supposed to achieve empowerment and measure 
empowerment with proxy indicators, such as education level, accounting knowledge, 
and managerial control over loans (see for example, Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Ackerly, 
1995). However the process-based method has been frequently criticised for 
producing unconvincing findings due to the invalid proxy indicators of women 
empowerment selected by this method. As stated in Malhotra et al. (2002, p19), the 
proxy measurements used in the process-based method are always “conceptually 
distant from the dimensions of gender stratification that are hypothesised to affect the 
outcomes of interest, and may in some cases be irrelevant and misleading”. 
 
In contrast, the outcome-based method, an increasingly used method of assessing the 
empowerment impact of microcredit, attempts to capture the empowerment process 
through direct measures of empowerment such as decision-making roles and control 
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over assets (see for example, Garikipati, 2006; Zaman, 1999; Hashemi et al., 1996). 
Such direct measures are usually constructed on the basis of survey questions 
pertinent to very specific and concrete behaviours of women and thus effectively 
represent the empowerment process within a particular social context. Malhotra et al. 
(2002) conclude that the outcome-based method is more successful than the 
process-based method in evaluating women’s empowerment since the direct measures 
are closest to measuring agency. 
 
Following Garikipati (2006), Zaman (1999), and Hashemi et al. (1996), our research 
employs the outcome-based method to assess women empowerment impact of 
microcredit in rural China. The operational measures of empowerment are direct 
measures rather than proxy indicators of empowerment, which are developed based 
on the responses to a questionnaire conducted specially to women villagers. In 
recognition of the context-specific nature of women empowerment, a series of 
specific questions relating to various dimensions of women’s lives in the survey areas 
were included in the questionnaire. Specifically, the survey questions attempt to elicit 
information on four dimensions of women’s behaviours, including control over 
financial resources, mobility, ability to make independent purchase, and involvement 
in major household decision-making. Each dimension contains a number of questions. 
Besides the specific questions capturing women’s actual behaviours, a set of 
statements pertaining to relative freedom from household domination and legal 
awareness were included in the questionnaire to assess women respondents’ 
perceptions of empowerment manifested by these two dimensions37
 
 (the survey 
questionnaire is included in Appendix 5). 
 
                                                             
37  Dimensions such as ‘control over resources’, ‘mobility’ and ‘involvement in household 
decision-making’ are universally considered important in measuring women empowerment (see for 
example, Malhotra et al., 2002; Steele, Amin and Naved, 1998); while other dimensions (such as 
making independent purchases, freedom from household domination, and legal awareness) are 
less-frequently-used but have been thoroughly investigated in some empirical studies (such as Corsi, 
Botti, Rondinella and Zacchia, 2006; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2003; Zaman, 1999; Hashemi et 
al., 1996). 
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Table 4.1 Empowerment indicators 
Ei (i=1,2,…,24) Indicators Description of indicators 
E1 CINC Control over own income 
E2 CSAV Control over own cash savings 
E3 CITY Travel alone to city 
E4 PARNT Visit parent home without asking for consent 
E5 UTENS Independently purchase utensils 
E6 CLOTH Independently purchase clothes 
E7 FURNT Independently purchase furniture 
E8 JEWL Independently purchase jewellery 
E9 LIVSK Independently purchase livestock 
E10 EQUIP Independently purchase farming machinery 
E11 DESHOUS Involvement in deciding house repair/construction 
E12 DESEDU Involvement in deciding children education 
E13 DESLAND Involvement in deciding land lease 
E14 DESCRP Involvement in deciding what crops to grow 
E15 DESLVSK Involvement in deciding livestock sale/purchase 
E16 DESEQP Involvement in deciding what farm machine to buy 
E17 DESCSM Involvement in deciding what consumer durable to buy 
E18 DESACCT Involvement in deciding to open bank account 
E19 DESBIR Involvement in deciding when to have a child 
E20 FABUSE Aware of women rights against domestic abuse 
E21 FCTCEP Aware of the use of contraception 
E22 FARMAGE Aware of the incorrectness of arranged marriage 
E23 LMAGE Aware of female minimum marriage age 
E24 LDIVC Aware of legal method of divorce 
 
Hashemi et al. (1996) adopted an index approach to construct empowerment 
indicators. In this approach, each dimension of empowerment is treated as an 
empowerment indicator and the empowerment indicators are constructed as scale 
variables by assigning different weights to the components involved in each indicator. 
The weights assigned to different components are based on the authors’ in-depth 
knowledge of women in the sampled villages based on a three-year prior ethnographic 
study. However, this approach has been criticised as ‘quite arbitrary’ since the weights 
of components are chosen without reference to any theory (Pitt et al., 2003). Our 
research does not construct any empowerment indices due to the problem of 
allocating different subjective weights to different responses. Following the 
suggestion by Zaman (1999), our research assesses all empowerment indicators 
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separately and then draws general conclusions on the impact of RCC’s microcredit 
programme on various aspects of women empowerment. 
 
A basic idea of developing empowerment indicators is to identify those women who 
appear to be relatively more empowered than other women, rather than singling out 
extremely unusual respondents. Twenty four empowerment indicators were developed 
from women’s responses to our surveyed questions and they are presented in Table 
4.1. All indicators are expressed in the form of binary variables with value one for 
‘empowered’ and zero otherwise (the construction of empowerment indicators is 
described in Appendix 3). 
 
4.3.3 Model specification 
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables (empowerment indicators), 
logistic regression models have been widely used in assessing women empowerment 
impact of microcredit programmes, which examines whether borrowing from 
microcredit programmes can influence the possibility of being empowered in different 
dimensions (see for example, Basher, 2007; Garikipati, 2006; Zaman, 1999; Hashemi 
et al., 1996). Following the previous empirical work, our research employs the 
logistic model to explore relationships between RCC microcredit programmes and 
various aspects of women empowerment in rural China. Specifically, to assess the 
empowerment impact of RCC microcredit, two groups of women are compared – one 
group consisting of women who have borrowed money from RCC microcredit 
programmes and the other group with similar socio-economic background to women 
in the first group but having not taken any loan from the microcredit programme. The 
data used in the empirical analysis of women empowerment were collected from a 
survey questionnaire conducted among rural women in China. 
 
It has been well established in the literature that self-selection bias can exaggerate the 
statistical relationship between borrowing from microcredit programmes and 
empowerment because women who are already relatively more enterprising and 
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dynamic are more likely to join the credit programme and thus would be more likely 
to be ‘empowered’ compared to a random sample of eligible women (see for example, 
Sukontamarn, 2007; Garikipati, 2006; Zaman, 1999; Hashemi et al., 1996). In other 
words, the estimated empowerment impact could be partly due to the pre-programme 
characteristics between women borrowers and women non-borrowers. In addition to 
self-selection bias, the empirical relationship between programme participation and 
outcomes of empowerment could also be biased by non-random programme 
placement, where the location-specific characteristics are likely to affect women’s 
lives and hence the outcome of being empowered (Sukontamarn, 2007; Osmani, 
2006). 
 
To deal with the potential non-random placement problem, both groups of women 
were selected from villages where RCC programmes are operating. Moreover, a set of 
village dummy variables indicating which village the woman comes from was 
included in the regression model to further correct for the location effects. 
 
In addition, the literature suggests that the self-selection bias in assessing 
empowerment impact of microcredit with cross-sectional data could be partially 
adjusted by introducing a set of control variables into the regression model. These 
control variables represent the heterogeneous background of women respondents, 
which are assumed to influence the empowerment measures. The control variables 
encompass those capturing household characteristics (socio-economic status) and 
those measuring women’s personal characteristics (e.g., age and education level). 
More importantly, whether the woman contributes to family support has been 
documented to be a crucial factor that affects her empowerment and therefore a 
variable indicating women’s contribution to family support should be included in the 
model to control for the bias (see for example, Garikipati, 2006; Zaman, 1999; 
Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley, 1997; Hashemi et al., 1996). 
 
However, if the women borrowers are relatively more empowered than women 
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non-borrowers and if this is irrelevant to the control variables, then it is still likely to 
yield an upward bias in the impact estimation. Our research attempts to further 
address selection bias by including the variable of accumulated loan amount as a 
regressor (Zaman, 1999). The accumulated loan amount borrowed by the women 
respondents is used as a proxy for the extent of women’s involvement in the 
microcredit programme, which examines whether the impact of microcredit on 
empowering women increases as their involvement in the programme (captured by 
the accumulated loan size) increases (Zaman, 1999; Montgomery, Bhattacharya and 
Hulme, 1996). 
 
Based on the above discussion, the empirical model used to analyse the impact of 
RCC microcredit on empowering rural women in China is written as follows: 
*
1( 1| , , , )
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e−
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+
         (4.34) 
*
1 2 3 5i ij ij j iE H F V LOANα θ θ θ θ= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑        (4.35) 
where Pi is the estimated possibility of a woman respondent being empowered as 
measured by a certain indicator; Ei* is the log-odds ratio; θ’s are coefficients to be 
estimated; and α is constant term. The dependent variables and independent variables 
used in the model are discussed below. 
 
1) Dependent variable 
The dependent variables used in the logistic model (Equation 4.34) are Ei (i=1, 2,…, 
24) which are empowerment indicators as described in Table 4.1. All dependent 
variables are in binary forms with a value of one for ‘empowered’ and zero otherwise. 
The empirical model is regressed repeatedly with a different indicator as dependent 
variable for twenty four times. 
 
2) Independent variables 
The independent variables can be grouped into two categories: primary variables of 
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interest that are related to microcredit (LOANi) and control variables including those 
reflecting households’ socio-economic features (Hij), those capturing women’s 
personal characteristics (Fij), and a vector of village variables (Vj). 
 
The microcredit-related variable LOANi is a categorical variables denoting the 
cumulative loan amount that the woman respondent has borrowed from RCCs and 
takes value 0, 1, 2, and 3 [where LOANi=0 for no loan (non-borrowers), LOANi=1 for 
amount 30,000 yuan or less, LOANi=2 for amount more than 30,000 yuan but less 
than 60,000 yuan, LOANi=3 for amount 60,000 yuan or more38
 
]. The LOANi variable 
is hypothesised to positively influence women’s empowerment measured by the 
twenty-four indicators (dependent variables): a woman’s participation in a microcredit 
programme is likely to enhance her opportunity to access economic and social 
resources and consequently give her impetus to be empowered in different manners. 
Therefore, as the loan amount borrowed from the microcredit programme grows 
(indicating a growing involvement in the programme), the probability of being 
empowered is expected to increase (Zaman, 1999). 
Household-specific variables (Hij) include household annual income (HAI), major 
occupation of household head (HHOCP), household size (HHSZ), and the number of 
income earners in the household (EARNER). HAI and HHOCP are included in the 
regression model as a proxy for household socio-economic status, while HHSZ and 
EARNER reflect household composition. The purpose of using these household level 
variables is to test whether the socio-economic factors and/or demographics of a 
household have any effects on women’s empowerment. There are no explicit 
expectations on the signs of coefficients for this set of variables in relation to 
empowerment indicators. 
 
Vj is a vector of village dummy variables specifying the village surveyed (for example, 
                                                             
38 For the categorical variable, the smallest category (i.e., LOANi=0 for non-borrwer) is specified as a 
reference category and the contrast type is specified as an ‘indicator’. The ‘indicator’ thus creates a set 
of dummy variables indicating the presence or absence of the category membership. 
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‘1’ if the woman is from Heping village and ‘0’ otherwise). The purpose of using 
village dummies is to control for the location effects that might bias the impact 
estimation. There are no explicit expectations on the signs of coefficients linked to 
these dummies in relation to empowerment indicators. 
 
Female-specific variables (Fij) include woman’s age (AGE), woman’s educational 
background (EDU), woman’s contribution to family support39
 
 (CTRN), and woman’s 
owning of male children (MCHILD). It is expected that EDU, CTRN, and MCHILD 
are positively related to a woman’s empowerment: as a woman obtains more 
education, she becomes more literate and is more likely to be well-informed, which 
might allow her to be more empowered particularly in terms of knowledge-based 
dimensions (e.g., legal knowledge). Furthermore, contribution to family support is 
supposed to enhance a woman’s intra-household status, which in turn might positively 
influence her empowerment at household level such as a greater role in household 
decision-making and making household purchases independently. Finally, having one 
or more male children is a crucial factor in improving a woman’s status within a 
household due to the strong preference for male children and thus is expected to have 
a positive effect on empowering the woman within the household. There is no specific 
expectation on the relationship between women’s empowerment and AGE. The 
variables used in the empirical models are listed in Appendix 2 with a detailed 
description at each. 
4.4 Description of the study area 
This research was conducted in the rural areas of Hubei Province situated in the 
central part of China. For administrative purposes, Hubei Province is divided into 13 
prefecture-level divisions and four directly administered county-level divisions, which 
in turn can be subdivided into 1,235 township-level divisions (Hubei Yearbook, 2007). 
                                                             
39 The ‘contribution’ variable is constructed based on women’s response to the question ‘whether you 
spend money on family expenses if you own money’. A positive response is coded as ‘1’ and a negative 
response is coded as ‘0’. 
 125 
The total rural population in Hubei is about 35.38 million (59% of the total population 
in the province) which comprises of 9.95 million households (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China – NBSC, 2007). Hubei is one of the largest agricultural provinces 
in China, where rural households are geographically dispersed in both plain and 
mountainous areas and engaged in various agricultural production, such as crops, 
aquatic products, and livestock. However, the frequent occurrence of natural disasters 
(such as drought and flood) in the province throughout the year severely damages the 
agricultural production especially in the areas with poor farming infrastructure such as 
irrigation facilities. This leaves farmers as a disadvantaged group in terms of 
improving their livelihood because they depend solely on agriculture as their means 
of living (Hou, 2006). 
 
There are a total of 1,470 RCC branches located in towns throughout Hubei and at 
least 60% are engaged in micro-financing. RCC initiated microcredit programme in 
the Province in 2002 (RCC Hubei Head office, 2008). According to the statistics from 
RCC Hubei Head Office, the amount of micro loans granted to rural households by 
RCCs has totalled 10.1 billion yuan as of end of 2006 and 4.28 million rural 
households have obtained micro loans, accounting for 43% of the total rural 
households in Hubei. 
 
4.5 Data sources and data description 
The data in our study include both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data 
were collected through survey interviews using a structured questionnaire. A pre-test 
of the questionnaire was conducted with a random sample of 20 farmers in China (12 
males and 8 females) to evaluate the clarity, consistency, and appropriateness of the 
survey questions. Changes and revisions were made according to the comments 
suggested by the 20 respondents, and the questionnaire was personally administered 
to the rural households in Hubei Province between November 2008 and January 2009. 
The survey questionnaire was divided into six sections. The first section was designed 
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to gather information on the respondent’s accessibility to microcredit provided by 
RCC. Section two focused on the respondents who are borrowers of RCC microcredit 
programme while Section three focused on the non-borrower respondents only. 
Section four and five were designed to understand how RCC’s microcredit affects the 
respondent’s household welfare and the respondent’s empowerment (for women 
respondents only) respectively. Information of the respondent’s demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics was addressed in the final section (see Appendix 5). 
 
The primary data were collected via the survey questionnaire. Household 
characteristics, such as age, gender, household size, etc., are used to identify key 
household-level factors influencing households’ accessibility to RCC microcredit. 
These household characteristics also serve as control variables in the impacts analyses 
(welfare and empowerment) of RCC microcredit. The responses from female 
respondents to the questions in the empowerment impact section are used to construct 
the women empowerment indicators used as dependent variables in assessing the 
empowerment impact of RCC microcredit (see Table 4.1). 
 
In addition, pertinent secondary data of all sampled households were obtained from 
the selected RCC branch offices. The secondary data comprises household 
characteristics (such as age, household size, etc.) in the pre-programme period; 
household annual income and annual total consumption in both the pre- and the 
post-programme periods; and household accumulative micro-loan amounts in 
post-programme period only. Data on household characteristics and annual 
income/consumption were obtained from the RCC branch offices through the annual 
rural household census40
 
. Data on accumulative loan amounts were obtained from the 
borrower information filed by the RCC branch offices.  
                                                             
40 The yearly rural household census conducted by RCC branch offices helps to identify potential 
clients with credit demand. The income and consumption data collected from the census also provide 
crucial information to RCC officials on the efficiency of their microcredit programmes in improving 
household living conditions. 
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Ashenfelter (1978) cautions that estimates of the impact of a programme on earnings 
may be biased upward if the period immediately prior to participation in the 
programme is associated with a decline in earnings (also known as an ‘Ashenfelter 
dip’). A standard approach to solving this problem, when using DD method, is to set 
the pre-programme time period early enough to avoid the dip (Perry and Maloney, 
2007). The earliest year in which the selected RCCs began to implement the 
microcredit programme is 2004 (see sample selection in the following section). 
Consequently, our research excludes the year immediately prior to 2004 but used 
2002 as the year of pre-programme data for empirical analysis. Year 2008 was chosen 
as the post-programme period. Specifically, a two-period (2002/08) household panel 
dataset was used in the DD model for welfare impact analysis with 
income/consumption as welfare measures. Accumulative loan amounts reflect the 
extent of the household involvement in microcredit programmes, which are the 
primary independent variables of interest used in impacts analyses (welfare and 
empowerment) of microcredit. 
 
4.6 Sample selection 
The sampling framework in this research includes two groups of rural households: a 
group of households who have borrowed from RCC microcredit programme, referred 
as the borrowing group; and a group of households who have never borrowed from 
RCC’s microcredit programme, referred to as the non-borrowing group. A major 
objective of this research is to assess the impact of the RCC microcredit programme 
on rural households, it is thus necessary to obtain a sample containing a sufficient 
number of rural households borrowing from RCC’s programme throughout Hubei 
Province. Accordingly, a multi-stage stratified random sampling technique was 
applied to draw the household sample. This type of sampling technique involves a 
process of stratification or segregation, followed by random selection of subjects from 
each stratum. It ensures that each important segment of the population is better 
represented and provides more valuable and differentiated information of each group 
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in the sample compared to simple random sampling (Sekaran, 2003). Further, 
stratified sampling yields more precise estimates at a national level by dividing the 
population into more homogeneous strata, compared to the case where population is 
not divided in this way (SSA, 2003). Our research reaches ‘household’ through a 
systematic process from selection of townships, to villages, and finally to households. 
The detailed sample selection process is discussed as follows. 
 
In the first stage of the sampling process, sample townships were selected on the basis 
of the availability of the RCC microcredit programme. A list of rural townships was 
obtained from RCC Hubei Head Office, indicating in which townships a RCC 
microcredit programme was available, as well as the programme operation duration 
and geographic location of these townships. Due to time and resources constraints, 
only ten townships were selected from the 768 townships hosting the RCC 
microcredit programme. The selected townships are Xugu, Yezhou, Jianshi, Xianfeng, 
Xinchong, Fenghuang, Yaojiaji, Anshan, Husi, and Wulijie. The RCC microcredit 
programme has been operating in Xugu, Xinchong and Fenghuang townships since 
2004; while the other townships have had a RCC programme for less than three years 
since 2006. In addition, three of the ten townships are located in mountain areas (i.e., 
Jianshi, Xianfeng and Anshan) and the rest are situated in plain areas, which 
represents Hubei townships in terms of geographic features of the Province. 
 
Following the selection of sample townships, sample villages are selected. A total of 
five villages from each selected township are randomly chosen from a list of villages 
(the list was provided by the administrative office in each selected township). A total 
of 50 villages were included. 
 
The selection of sample rural households was accomplished in the final stage of 
sampling process. The sample households were divided into two groups: borrowing 
group versus non-borrowing group. A list of borrowers was obtained from each RCC 
township office in the selected township, which contained basic information on the 
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borrowers, such as gender of borrower, from which village, borrowing frequency, 
amount of each single loan, accumulative loan amounts, etc. Following this, a total of 
328 borrowers were randomly selected to participate in the interview. A certain 
proportion of female borrowers were included in the borrower sample to assess the 
women empowerment impact of microcredit. There were a total of 64 females out of 
the 328 selected borrowers. The borrower respondents in our research are heads of 
households because RCC micro loans are issued to the households under the name of 
household heads. For the selection of the non-borrowing group, a list of rural 
households was obtained from the village committee office in each selected village, 
which provided information on all households residing in the village including status 
and gender of household members. A total of 96 household heads from non-borrowing 
households were selected for the survey, of which 28 were female household heads. 
 
In total, 424 households were included in the sample, including 328 borrowing 
households and 96 non-borrowing households. In terms of gender, 332 male 
household heads and 92 female household heads were interviewed in the survey. 
 
4.7 Sample size 
The desired sample size is calculated based on the formula given by Selvanathan, 
Selvanathan, Keller, and Warrack (2007, p. 465): 
2
/2z p qn
B
α
∧ ∧ 
 =  
  
              (4.36) 
where: n is the desired sample size; 
  p
∧
is sample proportion, and 1q p
∧ ∧
= − ; 
  B is acceptable error margin. 
 
The problem faced in solving n is that the values of p
∧
 and q
∧
 are unknown since 
the sample has not yet been determined. As suggested by Selvanathan et al. (2007), 
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let p
∧
= q
∧
=0.5 because the product of p
∧
q
∧
 can reach the maximum value given p
∧
=0.5. 
Therefore the desired sample size derived from equation (4.36) is 385, estimated with 
a confidence level of 95% (i.e., zα/2 = 1.96) and an acceptable error margin of 0.05. 
The sample size must be larger than the calculated sample response to take into 
account sample attrition. Literature indicates that sample response rates based on 
survey questionnaires are normally between 60% and 90% (see for example, Atieno, 
2001; Coleman, 1999; Husain, 1998). The survey interview in our study is conducted 
with the help of a group of trained survey assistants. Using a conservative estimated 
response rate of 80%, the calculated working sample size for our study was 482 
(=385/0.8). In practice, the working sample size was 500 and the real sample size 
used for empirical analyses was 424. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings of the credit accessibility model, welfare 
impact model and empowerment impact model. The chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 5.1 presents the main characteristics of the sampled rural households and 
micro loans provided by Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) respectively. Section 5.2 
discusses the estimated results of the credit accessibility model. Household-level 
factors that influence households’ accessibility to RCC microcredit are identified and 
explained. Section 5.3 and 5.4 discuss the estimated results of the welfare impact 
model and empowerment impact models respectively. The empirical relationships 
between RCC microcredit and outcomes investigated (i.e., household welfare and 
women empowerment) are also discussed. 
 
5.1 Characteristics of households and micro loans 
5.1.1 Characteristics of the rural households 
This section discusses the characteristics of the sampled rural households, including 
demographics and socio-economic characteristics. The discussions are based on the 
data collected from the surveyed questionnaires, including results and findings from a 
descriptive analysis (i.e., compare means, frequency tables, etc.). 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the primary household variables used in this research for the 
whole sample according to the status of respondents’ access to microcredit41
                                                             
41 Throughout this chapter, “borrowers” or “borrowing households” refer to those who have obtained 
micro loans from RCCs, and “non-borrowers” or “non-borrowing households” refer to those who did 
not obtain RCC’s micro loans. 
. The 
t-test is used to test whether the mean values of household characteristics between the 
two groups, borrower group and non-borrower group, are statistically different, and 
the Chi-square test is to test the relationship (independent or not) between the 
non-metric household variables and access to microcredit. Our results show the t-test 
results are not statistically significantly at the 10 percent level, except for household 
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asset value. In addition, the households’ access to microcredit is strongly associated 
with Gender, Education, Self-employment, Farm size, Geographic location, Distance, 
Savings, Aversion to debt, and Alternative credit source because the Chi-square tests 
on these variables are all significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
 
Out of the 424 sampled household heads, 328 are microcredit borrowers of RCC. In 
terms of gender, the sample comprises 332 (78.3%) male household heads and 92 
(21.7%) female household heads. Approximately 79.5% of the sampled male 
household heads are borrowers of RCC microcredit programme and 69.6% of the 
sampled female household heads are engaged in the micro borrowing. However, the 
borrowers group mainly consists of males (see Table 5.1). 
 
The age of the respondents ranges from 24 to 72 years old and the overall mean age 
for the sample is around 41 years old. When grouped into different age categories, a 
substantial proportion (76.3%) of the borrower respondents fall into the 36-55 years 
old category while majority (73.9%) of the non-borrower respondents belong to 24-45 
years old category. The average age of the borrower and non-borrower respondents’ is 
very similar. 
 
The survey respondents are divided into three groups with respect to educational 
attainment, including those without education, those with secondary school education 
or less, and those with post-secondary education. It can be seen from Table 5.1 that 
the vast majority of the respondents have obtained some education and only 3.8% of 
the respondents reported having no education. The proportion of without education 
for the borrowers is only 1.8%, much lower than that for the non-borrowers (10.4%). 
Approximately 92.4% of the borrowers and 80.2% of the non-borrowers have 
acquired secondary education or less (including primary, middle and high school). 
However, the proportion of non-borrowers with post-secondary education (college 
and university) is higher than that of borrowers (9.4% versus 5.8%). 
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Approximately 29.3% of the surveyed households have three or fewer family 
members and only 2.1% have seven or more members in their families. In addition, 
more than 70% of the borrowing households, as well as non-borrowing households, 
reported to have four or more family members and the survey results do not show 
much variation in the average household size between the two group households (see 
Table 5.1). 
 
Our survey results reveal that only a small proportion (24.3%) of the respondents is 
engaged in self-employment. The results also suggest that the borrower respondents 
are more likely to take up self-run business compared to the non-borrower 
respondents (26.5% versus 18.7%). The χ2 test (equals 3.92) indicates a strong 
association between households’ access to microcredit and self-employment 
engagement. 
 
The economic dependency ratio (EDR), calculated as the ratio of household members 
without income to household income earners, reflects the economic activity of a 
household. Households with higher EDRs will be more financially stressed than those 
with lower ratios. According to this ratio, the non-borrowing households appear to be 
relatively more economic active than the borrowing households because the 
proportion of non-borrowing households with EDRs higher than 1.0 is lower than that 
of the borrowing households (16.7 versus 22.6). The t-test (equals -0.73) does not 
suggest a significant mean difference between the two group households. 
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Table 5.1 Profile of the respondents (Borrowers and Non-Borrowers) 
 Non-Borrower Borrower All respondents Statistical  
test  (N1=96) (N2=328) (N3=424) 
 
Count 
(n1) 
% to N1 Count 
(n2) 
% to N2 Sub-total 
(N4=n1+n2) 
% to N4 
Demographics       
Gender       
Male 68 70.8 264 80.5 332 78.3 χ2 = 4.07** 
Female 28 29.2 64 19.5 92 21.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Education Level        
No education 10 10.4 6 1.8 16 3.8 χ2 = 17.183*** 
Secondary school or less 77 80.2 303 92.4 380 89.6  
Post secondary 9 9.4 19 5.8 28 6.6  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Age (in years)        
24-35 32 33.3 72 21.9 104 24.5  
36-45 39 40.6 171 52.2 210 49.6  
46-55 16 16.7 79 24.1 95 22.4  
56-65 6 6.3 6 1.8 12 2.8  
66-72 3 3.1 0 0.0 3 0.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Mean 41.02  41.28 41.22 t = -0.22 
Household Size        
1-3 27 28.1 97 29.6 124 29.3  
4-6 65 67.7 226 68.9 291 68.6  
7-10 4 4.2 5 1.5 9 2.1  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Mean 4.18 4.16 4.17 t = 0.12 
Self-employment        
Yes 16 18.7 87 26.5 103 24.3 χ2 = 3.92** 
No 80 83.3 241 73.5 321 75.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Socio-economics        
Economic dependency ratio         
r<=1 80 83.3 254 77.4 334 78.8  
r>1 16 16.7 74 22.6 90 21.2  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Mean 0.84 0.90 0.4 t = -0.73 
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Table 5.1 Profile of the respondents (Borrowers and Non-Borrowers) (Cont.) 
 Non-Borrower Borrower All respondents Statistical  
test  (N1=96) (N2=328) (N3=424) 
 
Count 
(n1) 
% to N1 Count 
(n2) 
% to N2 Sub-total 
(N4=n1+n2) 
% to N4 
Income (in yuan)        
<=50,000 76 79.1 261 79.6 337 79.5  
50,001-100,000 19 19.8 56 17.1 75 17.7  
>100,000 1 0.1 11 3.3 12 2.8  
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  
Mean 31,867 52,619 47,920 t = -1.19 
Main income sources1        
Agriculture 77 80.2 246 75.0 323 76.2 χ2 = 3.76 
Non-agriculture 5 5.2 9 2.7 14 3.3  
Both 14 14.6 73 22.3 87 20.5  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Assets (in yuan)        
400-15,000 51 53.1 241 73.5 292 68.8  
15,001-24,950 45 46.9 87 26.5 132 31.2  
Mean 13,667 12,278 12,592 t = 2.46** 
Farm Size (in mu)        
10 or less 83 86.5 233 71.0 316 74.5 χ2 = 9.30*** 
More than 10 13 13.5 95 29.0 108 25.5  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Land Holding Status        
Contracted 85 88.5 304 92.7 389 91.7 χ2 = 2.23 
Leased 11 11.5 24 7.3 35 8.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Other Characteristics        
Geographic Location        
Mountainous 62 64.6 164 50.0 226 53.3 χ2 = 6.35** 
Non-mountainous 34 35.4 164 50.0 198 46.7  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Distance (in li)        
1-10 51 53.1 205 62.5 256 60.4 χ2 = 13.97*** 
11-20 30 31.3 108 32.9 138 32.5  
>20 15 15.6 15 4.6 30 7.1  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Savings        
Yes 59 61.5 139 42.4 198 46.7 χ2 = 10.86*** 
No 37 38.5 189 57.6 226 53.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
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Table 5.1 Profile of the respondents (Borrowers and Non-Borrowers) (Cont.) 
 Non-Borrower Borrower All respondents Statistical  
test  (N1=96) (N2=328) (N3=424) 
 
Count 
(n1) 
% to N1 Count 
(n2) 
% to N2 Sub-total 
(N4=n1+n2) 
% to N4 
 
RCC Shareholding 
      
 
Yes 29 30.2 63 19.2 92 21.7 χ2 = 5.29** 
No 67 69.8 265 80.8 332 78.3  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Official Status        
Yes 14 14.6 43 13.1 57 13.4 χ2 = 0.14 
No 82 85.4 285 86.9 367 86.6  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Aversion to Debt        
Yes 54 56.3 79 24.1 133 31.4 χ2 = 35.69*** 
No 42 43.7 249 75.9 291 68.6  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Alternative Credit Source        
Yes 88 91.7 188 57.3 276 65.1 χ2 = 38.56*** 
No 8 8.3 140 42.7 148 34.9  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Note:  1. Data are summarised from the information obtained on ‘household main income 
sources’ and ‘other income sources’ in the survey questionnaire. 
*, **, and ***, represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
The household annual income is divided into three levels in the sample (see Table 5.1). 
The annual income for most of the borrowing households, as well as the 
non-borrowing households, is no higher than 50,000 yuan, with 79.6% and 79.1% of 
group respondents respectively having income below 50,000 yuan. The mean annual 
income for the borrowing households is 20,752 yuan higher than that of the 
non-borrowing households, but this difference is not statistically significant based on 
the t-test result. A total of 323 respondents (76.2%) rely on agriculture (crop farming, 
livestock raising, fishery, etc.) as their major source of income while only 14 of the 
respondents (3.3%) are engaged in non-agricultural income-generating activities. 
Approximately 22.3% of the borrowing households earn income from both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities, whereas 14.6% of the non-borrowing 
 137 
households source their income from non-agricultural activities in addition to 
agriculture production. 
 
The household asset value42
 
 of the respondents varies from 400 yuan to 24,950 yuan 
and the overall mean asset value is 12,592 yuan. Our result shows that the borrowing 
households tend to possess relatively low value assets since the majority (73.2%) of 
them own assets valued at less than 15,000 yuan. In contrast, almost half of the 
non-borrowing households possess assets worth more than 15,000 yuan. The mean 
household asset value of the non borrowers is higher than that of the borrowers 
(13,667 yuan versus 12,278 yuan) and the mean difference is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level (see Table 5.1). 
None of the respondents own farmland. The overwhelming majority (91.7%) of the 
respondents contract their farming land from villages while 8.3% farm on leased land. 
In terms of farm size, up to three quarters of the respondents work on farms no larger 
than 10 mu. In addition, the proportion of borrowing households who work on large 
farms (larger than 10 mu) is 29%, which is more than two times higher than that of 
the non-borrowing households (13.5%). This implies that households with larger farm 
sizes are more likely to become RCC’s microcredit borrowers. 
 
The geographic distribution of the respondents in Table 5.1 shows that nearly two 
thirds of the non-borrowing households live in mountain regions. In addition, the 
proportion of the borrowing households who live within 10 lis from the nearest RCC 
branch is higher than that of the non-borrowing households (62.5 versus 52.1) and the 
share of the borrowers living more than 20 lis from the RCC branches is lower 
compared to the non-borrowers (4.6 versus 15.6). This suggests that households who 
live physically closer to RCC branches are more likely to access RCC’s microcredit. 
 
Less than half of the respondents have saving accounts in RCC branches. Compared 
                                                             
42 The household asset values in this research exclude the value of the house and farmland. 
 138 
to the borrowers, the non borrowers appear to be more inclined to deposit money with 
RCCs (61.5% versus 42.4%). In addition, the majority (78.3%) of the respondents do 
not hold RCCs shares with a relatively higher proportion of shareholding observed in 
the non-borrower group. Similarly, a small portion (13.4%) of the respondents has one 
or more family members working as government official(s). Approximately 14.6% of 
the non-borrowing households have family member(s) with official status, which is 
slightly higher than that of the borrowing households (13.1%). 
 
The frequency distributions of Aversion to debt and Alternative credit source in Table 
5.1 show that the non-borrower respondents are generally more averse to having debt 
and more able to access alternative credit sources when they need to borrow, 
compared to the borrower respondents. 
 
5.1.2 Characteristics of micro loans 
Table 5.2 provides some general information on the micro loans obtained by the 
respondents from RCCs. With regard to the maximum amount of a single loan, all 
micro loans acquired by the borrowers are in small amounts. The shares of the 
borrowers who could borrow no more than 10,000 yuan, between 10,001 and 20,000 
yuan, and between 20,001 and 30,000 yuan are almost identical (about 29%). Only a 
small portion (13.7%) of the borrowers obtained micro loans with a single amount 
above 30,000 yuan. In addition, the average total loan amount borrowed by the 
households is 44,012 yuan. 
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Table 5.2 Characteristics of micro loans 
 All Borrowers 
 (N=328) 
 Sub-total % to N 
Single Loan Amount   
<=10,000 yuan 96 29.3 
10,001-20,000 yuan 92 28.0 
20,001-30,000 yuan 95 29.0 
>30,000 yuan 45 13.7 
Total  100.0 
Cumulative loan amount  
(mean value in yuan) 
44,012 
Loan Term   
Short term (<=1 year) 165 50.3 
Medium term (1-3 years) 163 49.7 
Total  100.0 
Collateral   
Yes 26 7.9 
No 302 92.1 
Total  100.0 
Collateral Form   
Mortgage Property 2 0.6 
Chattel Mortgage 2 0.6 
Promissory Note 10 3.0 
Co-signer 12 3.7 
Total 26 7.9 
Loan Processing Time   
Within 1week  293 89.3 
More than 1week 35 10.7 
Total  100.0 
Payment Frequency   
Weekly 6 1.8 
Monthly 76 23.2 
Semi-annually 45 13.7 
Annually 201 61.3 
Total  100.0 
Loan Purpose   
Agricultural activities only 238 72.6 
Non-agricultural activities only 9 2.7 
Both 81 24.7 
Total  100.0 
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Table 5.2 also shows that no borrower has received long term micro loans. About half 
of the micro loans obtained by the borrowers are characterised as short term (within 
one year). In addition, the overwhelming majority (92.1%) of the micro loans do not 
require collateral. With regard to the loans issued with a collateral requirement, the 
collateral pledged to RCCs include mortgage property, chattel mortgage, promissory 
notes and co-signer43
 
 (see Table 5.2). 
In general the RCC loan processing time is short since 89.3% the borrowers are 
granted micro loans within one week from their loan application submission. In 
addition, Table 5.2 shows that the main purpose of obtaining micro loans by the 
borrowing households is to finance their agricultural activities including farm 
cropping, livestock raising, produce processing, and farming machinery purchases. 
The majority (72.6%) of the borrowers used their micro loans for agricultural 
purposes and 2.7% for non-agricultural purpose (such as financing self-run enterprises, 
household consumption, children’s education, etc.). Approximately 25% of the 
borrowers invested the loans in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. 
 
Finally, most (61.3%) of the borrowers repay their loans annually and the micro loans 
are seldom repaid weekly (less than 2 percent). The repayment schedule of RCC 
micro loans is established according to the type of the loan-funded activity (IFAD, 
2001). Most of the micro loans in our research are invested in agricultural production 
and hence the repayment structure is closely linked to the production cycle. For the 
loans used to develop small-scale self-employed activities, the repayment period is 
relatively short (e.g., monthly or semi-annually) since these activities can generate 
income on a more flexible schedule. This finding is similar to Yehuala (2008) and 
Wu’s (2001) studies, who found that the payment period of production loans is one 
year or longer, while loans for non-agricultural activities such as self-run business and 
                                                             
43 Since all the micro loans in this study are issued to individuals rather than in group forms which can 
provide ‘social collateral’, RCCs may put additional collateral requirement on some risky borrowers to 
cover the loss of non-performing loans. 
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handicrafts are usually repaid within less than one year on an irregular basis (for 
example, three months or seven months). 
 
5.2 Factors influencing household accessibility to microcredit 
5.2.1 Empirical results of credit accessibility model 
A logistic regression analysis (Equation 4.14) was conducted to investigate 
household-level factors that influence households’ accessibility to microcredit and 
was estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation technique. Table 5.3 presents 
the estimated results of the logistic model. 
 
Overall the logistic model successfully predicts the possibility of households’ 
microcredit access at 82.31 percent. The likelihood ratio test has a Chi-square statistic 
equal to 130 with 18 degrees of freedom and fails to accept the null hypothesis that 
the parameter estimates for the model are equal to zero, at the 1 percent level of 
significance. It can be concluded that the explanatory power of the logistic model is 
satisfactory and the model can be used to explain the probability of accessing RCC’s 
microcredit by the rural households. 
 
The significant positive sign on the Income variable indicates that households with 
higher annual income have higher probability of accessing RCC microcredit. One 
possible reason for this result is that high income households tend to have more 
investment opportunities, leading to stronger potential need for credit support. 
High-income households may also be more confident in repaying loans if they borrow. 
Therefore, they are more inclined to access microcredit. On the contrary, the 
significant negative sign on the Assets variable implies that households’ accessibility 
to microcredit decreases with increased asset values. This is because assets 
correspond to a household’s initial capital. Households with higher asset values may 
be less budget constrained and therefore less likely to access microcredit. 
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The significant positive sign on Education(2) dummy variable indicates that 
households who have acquired secondary school education or less have higher 
probability to access microcredit than the uneducated households, holding other 
factors constant. In contrast, a significant but negative relationship is found between 
variable Household size and households’ accessibility to microcredit, suggesting that 
larger households are less likely to borrow from RCC’s microcredit programme. This 
is possibly because larger-size households tend to have low repayment capacity 
resulting from the smaller future expected income per capita, which lowers the 
probability of borrowing. This finding contradicts Ho (2004) and Vaessen (2001), 
who conclude that the probability of accessing formal credit increases with household 
size. 
 
The estimated coefficients of variables Distance(3), Attitude, and Alternatives are all 
negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Holding other factors 
constant, the households residing more than 20 lis away from RCC branches have 
significantly lower probability of accessing RCC microcredit compared to those who 
live within 10 lis of RCC branches, mainly due to the perceived high borrowing costs 
arising from the travelling expenses and time opportunity costs. In addition, an 
adverse attitude towards having debt decreases the likelihood of accessing any type of 
credit by households, including microcredit. Furthermore, the availability of other 
credit sources (such as informal credit) also tends to reduce the probability of 
borrowing from RCC microcredit programme. This finding is consistent with Vaessen 
(2001) who observes that many poor households are more willing to use informal 
credit owing to low transaction costs and flexible loan contracts. 
 
The empirical results show that the variables Self-employment and Official status are 
significant at the 95% confident level. As hypothesised, the probability of accessing 
microcredit increases when households become involved in self-employed businesses 
apart from agriculture production. This can be explained by the higher capital 
requirement for investing in self-run enterprises. Official status is also a contributor to 
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households’ access to microcredit. One possible reason is that households with 
members working as village or township officials have greater need of credit for 
off-farm investment and thus have higher probability of accessing microcredit. 
Households with members working as local officials may also access RCC’s 
microcredit easier due to their good relationship with the local financial institutions 
such as RCCs. 
 
Economic dependency ratio, Savings, and Shareholding are found to significantly 
influence households’ accessibility to microcredit but have unexpected signs. The 
estimated coefficient of Economic dependency ratio is positive, implying that the 
households who are less economic active have higher probability of being engaged in 
RCC microcredit programme. One possible explanation for this unexpected sign is 
that households with higher dependency ratios have fewer family members taking up 
income-generating activities and thus are more inclined to rely on loans for household 
activities such as consumption and children’s education due to insufficient income. As 
a result, they are more likely to access RCC’s microcredit. The inverse relationship 
between Savings and households’ accessibility suggests that households who deposit 
money with RCCs have lower chances to access RCC’s microcredit. This is possible 
since these households are able to access their savings in RCCs when they need 
financial support, which in turn weakens the likelihood of borrowing micro loans 
from RCCs44
 
. Similarly, the households who bought shares in a RCC are likely to 
have more surplus money in their own control, which reduces their intentions to 
borrow. This might account for the negative relationship between Shareholding and 
households’ access to RCC’s microcredit. 
 
 
 
                                                             
44 Savings in RCCs are not compulsory to collateralise the micro loans issued. Instead, households can 
deposit money voluntarily and access savings freely. 
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Table 5.3 Logit estimates for households’ accessibility to microcredit 
Independent Variables1/ 
Estimated 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistics 
Marginal 
Effect2/ 
Age 0.0103 0.0191 0.2874 0.0011 
Gender -0.3710 0.3288 1.2726 -0.0437 
Location -0.4565 0.4477 1.0398 -0.0392 
Household size -0.2262* 0.1356 2.7851 -0.0236 
Farm size 0.7010 0.4375 2.5667 0.0548 
Income (in 1,000 yuan) 0.0117** 0.0059 3.8842 0.0012 
Self-employment 0.7000** 0.3605 3.7672 0.0547 
Dependency ratio 0.5353** 0.2255 5.6339 0.0558 
Assets (in 1,000 yuan) -0.0617** 0.0303 4.1265 -0.0064 
Savings  -1.2124*** 0.3624 11.1588 -0.1895 
Attitude -1.1050*** 0.3046 13.1609 -0.1676 
Alternatives -2.1137*** 0.4512 21.9483 -0.1002 
Official status 1.0596** 0.4707 5.0668 0.0724 
Shareholding -1.0391*** 0.3694 7.9128 -0.1544 
     
Dummy variables3/     
(Distance)     
Distance(2) -0.2071 0.3162 0.4290 -0.0230 
Distance(3) -1.4804*** 0.5525 7.1785 -0.2495 
(Education)     
Education(2) 1.1641* 0.6811 2.9214 0.1797 
Education(3) 0.6809 0.8935 0.5808 0.0536 
     
Constant 3.6876** 1.4357 6.5976  
     
McFadden R-squared    0.2878 
Log likelihood    -161.5214 
LR statistic    130.5594*** 
Degree of Freedom    18 
Total observations    424 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 39 310 349 
% of correct 40.63 94.51 82.31 
No. of incorrect 57 18 75 
% of incorrect 59.38 5.49 17.69 
Note: 1/. Dependent variable=1 if household has accessed microcredit and zero otherwise; 
2/. Marginal effect is at the mean value. For binary variable, marginal effect is P|1-P|0; 
3/. To avoid a multicollinearity problem, a dummy variable is dropped in each group. 
*,**,***, represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 5.3 shows that the coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables: Age, 
Gender, Location, Distance(2), Education(3), and Farm size, are not significantly 
different from zero, and they do not have significant effects on households’ access to 
microcredit. In addition, the estimated sign on Age contradicts the hypothesised sign, 
while the others have the expected signs. 
 
Based on the estimated results, twelve variables are found to have significant 
influences on households’ accessibility to RCC’s microcredit, including Distance2, 
Household size, Education1, Income, Self-employment, Economic dependency ratio, 
Assets, Savings, Attitude, Alternatives, Official status and Shareholding. Except for 
Age, Economic dependency ratio, Savings, and Shareholding, most of the explanatory 
variables have signs as hypothesised (see Table 5.3). 
 
It has been argued that the estimated logistic coefficients obtained by maximum 
likelihood estimation do not generate a direct economic interpretation, and the sign of 
an estimated coefficient only provides the direction of the effect of that explanatory 
variable on the probability of a success (i.e., an observation at value one) (Greene, 
2003; Train, 1986). To address this limitation, marginal effects – that is, the change in 
the predicted probability associated with changes in the explanatory variables are 
calculated (Greene, 2003). 
 
Table 5.3 also presents the marginal effects for the regressors of the logit model. For 
example, the marginal effect of Household size indicates that an additional member 
increase in the family would decrease the probability of accessing microcredit by 2.36 
percent on average. In addition, the probability of borrowing from RCC microcredit 
programmes would increase by 0.12 percent on average with every 1,000 yuan 
increase in Income. By contrast, an additional 1,000 yuan increase in Assets would 
reduce households’ probability of accessing RCC microcredit by 0.64 percent. The 
marginal effects of both Income and Assets on the probability of accessing microcredit 
are minimal. Furthermore, the marginal effect of Economic dependency ratio shows 
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that on average a one percent increase in the ratio would change the probability of 
borrowing from the programme by 0.0558 percent. 
 
The results indicate that the probability of accessing microcredit is decreased by 24.95 
percent for households who live more than 20 lis away from RCC branches compared 
to those living within 10 lis from RCC branches (see Table 5.3). Conversely, 
households who have obtained secondary school education or less are 17.97 percent 
more likely to borrow from the microcredit programme than uneducated households 
(see Table 5.3).  
 
The marginal effect of Self-employment shows that the probability of being a 
microcredit borrower would rise by 5.47 percent when the household is engaged in 
self employment. Similarly, the probability of accessing microcredit for households 
with members working as local officials increases by 7.24 percent. However, the 
marginal effects of Attitude and Alternatives suggest that the probability of accessing 
microcredit would decrease by 16.76 percent when the household holds a negative 
attitude towards debt, and by 10.02 percent when the household can find alternative 
credit sources other than RCC microcredit. In addition, if the household is a 
Shareholder of RCC, the probability of borrowing from RCC microcredit programme 
would be considerably reduced by 15.44 percent. 
 
In summary, the empirical results from the logistic regression reveal that household 
income, self-employment and official status are three contributors to households’ 
accessibility to microcredit because they imply a higher credit demand resulting from 
the higher capital requirements (on/off farm), which in turn raises the likelihood of 
accessing microcredit by households. Conversely, household assets and savings can 
be used as proxies for household initial capital, and a higher value of either of them 
can potentially decrease the probability of accessing microcredit by the households. 
The probability of accessing microcredit would be substantially reduced if the 
households are averse to have debt or can access alternative credit sources. The results 
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also imply that households with higher education levels and/or living nearer to the 
RCC branches are more likely to access microcredit. 
 
5.2.2 Other factors affecting household accessibility to microcredit 
Some qualitative information gathered from the surveyed questionnaires is discussed 
in this section to investigate factors, other than those discussed in the empirical model, 
that also affect households’ access to microcredit. 
 
Knowledge of RCC microcredit programme 
From the total 96 non-borrower respondents, 28 respondents reported that they had no 
knowledge about the microcredit programme operated by RCC. Three main reasons 
were found for such lack of knowledge. One of the most cited reasons was the lack of 
understanding of the concept ‘microcredit’ (60.7%). This was followed by the 
inadequate promotion of the microcredit programme by RCC (21.4%) and the 
unawareness of the RCC branches nearby (17.9%). 
 
Need to borrow 
The survey results show that 77% (n=74) of the total non-borrower respondents had 
no need to borrow money in the past two years. This further confirms that credit 
demand determines households’ access to microcredit to a large extent. For the other 
22 non-borrowers who signalled credit needs, 18 had applied for micro loans from 
RCCs but were rejected, and four had resorted to either formal lenders (e.g., 
Agricultural Bank of China) or informal lenders (e.g., friends, relatives). 
 
Reasons for loan rejection 
Table 5.4 exhibits the major reasons why the micro loan applications were rejected 
from the respondents’ own perspective. Approximately 55.6% of the 18 non-borrower 
respondents who had been rejected from accessing microcredit reported that their loan 
applications were denied because the loan officers from RCC branches perceived 
them as risky in repaying loans due to low household income. Similarly, 55.6% of the 
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respondents attributed their loan denials to the inadequate collateral or the inability to 
find loan guarantors. On the other hand, creditworthiness potentially influences the 
households’ access to microcredit since about 33% considered their failures in 
securing micro loans as a result of the blemished credit history due to the previous 
loan defaults. Furthermore, approximately 28% report that the difficulty in meeting 
the required documents by the RCC loan officers also prevented them from accessing 
microcredit. 
 
Table 5.4 Reasons for loan rejection 
Reasons 
Non-borrower respondents 
(n=18) 
Count % to n 
1. Insufficient income to repay the loans 10 55.6 
2. Bad credit history due to previous defaults 6 33.3 
3. Lack of collateral or co-guarantor 10 55.6 
4. Difficulty in preparing required documents 5 27.8 
Note: Total responses do not tally with the number of respondents due to multiple answers. 
 
Reasons for not applying for micro loans 
The non-borrower respondents were also asked to state whether they needed to 
borrow in the future and if they did, would they apply for micro loans from RCCs. 
For non-borrower respondents (n=96), 83 signalled borrowing intentions in the future. 
In addition, 53 of the respondents expressed that they would give priority to RCC 
micro loans if they had credit needs. The remaining 30 respondents indicated that they 
would not apply for RCC micro loans when they need to borrow. Table 5.5 presents 
the major reasons for not applying for the micro loans. 
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Table 5.5 Reasons for not applying for micro loans 
Reasons 
Non-borrower respondents 
(n = 30) 
Count % to n 
1. Insufficient household income 20 66.7 
2. Bad credit record 8 26.7 
3. Lack of collateral 10 33.3 
4. Interest rate on RCC’s micro loan is too high 15 50.0 
5. Difficulty in meeting the required documents 13 43.3 
6. The loan application process takes too much time 8 26.7 
7. Much easier to access informal lenders 15 50.0 
Note: Total responses do not tally with the number of respondents due to multiple answers. 
 
Household income is a determinant of the households’ future borrowing from RCC 
microcredit programmes where 66.7% of the households would not borrow because 
their meagre income is not sufficient to repay loans. Interest rate is another crucial 
factor that restrains the households from applying micro loans since 50% voiced that 
the interest rate from RCCs is too high. Similarly, 15 non-borrower respondents prefer 
informal loans over RCC micro loans because the former can be easily obtained. In 
addition, the complicated application procedure adopted by RCCs in terms of 
documentation requirements and processing time also makes the households shy away 
from applying for micro loans. It is worth nothing that 33.3% of non-borrower 
respondents would not apply for micro loans due to the lack of proper collateral. 
Furthermore, approximately 26.7% non-borrower respondents would not apply for 
micro loans in view of their poor credit records. 
 
We can conclude that the households’ limited access to microcredit can be largely 
attributed to the low or zero credit needs of the households. Household income and 
available alternative credit sources (e.g., informal credit) are found to significantly 
influence households’ borrowing decisions, and consequently, influence households’ 
access to microcredit. This confirms the empirical findings from the logistic 
regression. On the other hand, institutional-level factors such as interest rate, 
documentation requirements and loan processing time can potentially harm the 
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households’ access to microcredit: leading to either loan rejection or reluctance to 
apply. This is consistent with Umoh (2006) and Atieno’s (2001) findings who note 
that the access problem is mainly created by the lending policies of financial 
institutions. Furthermore, our findings imply that there is an imperative for RCCs to 
enhance promotion of their microcredit programmes among the rural households and 
make the households fully aware of the features of microcredit (e.g., collateral free). 
This might help improve the access to microcredit by rural households. 
 
5.3 Microcredit and welfare impact 
The welfare of the rural households is measured in terms of household annual income 
and annual consumption. This research estimates the average impact of microcredit on 
the households’ welfare and the empirical analysis is based on the 
difference-in-difference (DD) approach. Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 discuss the empirical 
results obtained from the standard DD analysis and adjusted DD analysis respectively. 
Section 5.3.3 investigates the client target of RCC microcredit programme. 
 
5.3.1 Impact estimation with standard difference-in-difference method 
This research estimates the welfare impact of microcredit using the standard DD 
approach based on Equation (4.30). In the standard DD framework, the treatment 
variable, or microcredit variable, is of binary form signifying households’ 
participation in the programme (1=yes, 0=otherwise). In addition, the estimated 
model is a logarithmic function where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of the welfare indicator such as annual income or consumption. This makes the 
estimates less sensitive to outlying observations on the dependent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2007). Accordingly, the coefficient (γ) of the treatment variable, when 
multiplied by 100, measures the approximate average percentage change in the 
household outcomes (income or consumption) with respect to the treatment variable 
(Wooldridge, 2007; 2002). Table 5.6 shows the standard DD impact estimates. 
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Table 5.6 Standard DD estimates of microcredit impact on household welfare 
 Borrowing Households (N=328) Non-borrowing Households (N=96) DD 
 impact 
estimator 
(7)  
Year 
2002 
(1) 
Year 
2008 
(2) 
Differences 
(2002-08) 
(3) 
Year 
2002 
(4) 
Year 
2008 
(5) 
Differences 
(2002-08) 
(6) 
Outcome 
Variables(Yit) YB,02 YB,08 D1 = YB,08 – YB,02 YN,02 YN,08 D2 =YN,08 – YN,02 
sddγ
∧
 
=D1-D2 
Log of annual 
income  
4.177 
(0.018) 
4.500 
(0.018) 
0.323*** 
(0.025) 
4.080 
(0.043) 
4.349 
(0.040) 
0.269*** 
(0.059) 
0.053* 
(0.032) 
        
Log of annual 
consumption  
3.974 
(0.016) 
4.241 
(0.018) 
0.267*** 
(0.024) 
3.885 
(0.037) 
4.123 
(0.035) 
0.237*** 
(0.051) 
0.030 
(0.029) 
Note: Entries represent means of log household annual income and log household annual 
consumption for the borrowing group and non-borrowing group respectively; 
 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;  
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level for the t-test, respectively. 
 
The results in Table 5.6 show that the household welfare measured by household 
annual income (HAI) and household annual consumption (HAC) has been 
substantially improved for the borrowing group between 2002 and 2008 (column 3 in 
Table 5.6). For example, the average HAI for the borrowing households has risen by 
roughly 32% over six years and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar 
positive and significant change is also evident in the average HAC for the borrowing 
households during the same period. It should be noted however that the significant 
improvement in HAI and/or HAC for the borrowing group could be a combined result 
of time influence and microcredit programme impact. To isolate the true programme 
impact on the borrowing households, the potential time trend must be controlled for. 
The average outcome changes for the non-borrowing group between 2002 and 2008 
are used to approximate the time trend suffered by the borrowing group (column 6 in 
Table 5.6). After differencing the mean gains between the two groups, the standard 
DD estimation suggests that the average HAI for the borrowing households rises by 
5.3% as a direct result of programme participation and this positive impact is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. On the other hand, the standard DD 
estimation implies that the average HAC is roughly increased by 3% for the 
borrowing households simply due to participating in the microcredit programme. 
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However, the positive impact of microcredit on household consumption is not 
statistically significant (column 7 in Table 5.6). 
 
Based on the standard DD estimation, the impact of microcredit programmes on the 
participants’ household annual income is positive and marginally significant. However, 
the positive effect of microcredit on the household consumption is not statistically 
significant. The standard DD estimation assumes that no variables other than 
treatment variables would affect the trend of outcome investigated (Yit) between the 
borrowing and non-borrowing groups. This assumption can be violated if the two 
groups of households are different and unbalanced in the household characteristics 
that are probably associated with Yit. Therefore, the standard DD method without 
controlling for other variables is likely to yield biased impact estimates. 
 
5.3.2 Impact estimation with adjusted difference-in-difference method 
To address the potential deficiency of the standard DD method, this study also 
evaluated the welfare impact of RCC microcredit using the adjusted DD strategy (see 
Equation 4.33). In the adjusted DD estimation, the treatment variable (Mit) takes on 
two forms: a binary variable similar to that in the standard DD analysis; or a 
continuous variable denoting cumulative loan amount borrowed by households in 
2008. In addition to the treatment variable, a set of household characteristics is 
included in the regression equation to correct for the observed differences between the 
two groups. Similarly, the adjusted DD strategy uses the natural logarithms of HAI 
and HAC as dependent variables in the regression and estimates an average 
percentage effect of microcredit. Furthermore, the fixed effects method is adopted to 
control for the households’ unobserved heterogeneities that affect both households’ 
participation in the programme (or receipt of credit) and the welfare outcome 
investigated (i.e., selection bias). Table 5.7 presents the fixed effects regression results 
when the treatment variable in Equation (4.33) is a binary variable. 
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Table 5.7 Fixed effects estimation of the impact of programme participation 
 Dependent variable 
 Log of household annual 
income (HAI) 
Log of household annual 
consumption (HAC) 
   
Intercept  4.2630*** 
(0.4751) 
4.1597*** 
(0.4319) 
Year dummy (2008) 0.1664** 
(0.0664) 
0.1427** 
(0.0604) 
   
Control variables (Xit)   
Age squared 0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
School-age children  
(in number) 
0.0148 
(0.0239) 
0.0067 
(0.0217) 
Household size 
(in numbers) 
0.0005 
(0.0889) 
-0.0291 
(0.0808) 
Earner 
(in numbers) 
0.0496 
(0.0323) 
0.0265 
(0.0293) 
   
Treatment variable (Mit)   
Programme participation 
(binary variable) 
0.0514 
(0.0322) 
0.0289 
(0.0293) 
   
F-statistics (423,418) 5.18*** 5.31*** 
Household fixed effects Jointly significant Jointly significant 
R-squared 0.8711 0.8705 
Total observations 848 848 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;  
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level for the t-test, respectively. 
 
The regression results in Table 5.7 show that participating in the microcredit 
programme on average increases the borrowing households’ annual income by 5.14% 
and annual consumption by 2.89%, compared to the non-borrowing group. 
Unfortunately, the adjusted DD estimation fails to demonstrate a significant impact of 
programme participation on either welfare indicator investigated. It can be seen that 
after controlling for household characteristics, the adjusted DD estimates of the 
impact of programme participation differ slightly from those of the standard DD 
analysis. This might imply that the observed differences between the borrowing 
households and non-borrowing households do not substantially influence the trend of 
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the outcomes investigated (Abadie, 2005a). 
 
This study also uses the cumulative loan amounts borrowed by the households as a 
better measure of their involvement in RCC microcredit programme (i.e., Mit in 
Equation 4.33 is a continuous variable denoting loan size) and estimates the average 
impact of additional credit amount borrowed on the borrowing households (Nguyen et 
al., 2007; Alexander, 2001). The results are summarised in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8 Fixed effects estimation of the impact of micro loan 
 Dependent variable 
 Log of household annual 
income (HAI) 
Log of household annual 
consumption (HAC) 
   
Intercept  4.2976*** 
(0.4454) 
4.2012*** 
(0.4105) 
Year dummy (2008) 0.1315** 
(0.0590) 
0.1059** 
(0.0544) 
   
Control variables (Xit)   
Age squared 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
School-age children  
(in number) 
0.0175 
(0.0224) 
0.0090 
(0.0207) 
Household size 
(in numbers) 
-0.0173 
(0.0833) 
-0.0463 
(0.0768) 
Earner 
(in number) 
0.0615** 
(0.0304) 
0.0360 
(0.0280) 
   
Treatment variable (Mit)   
Cumulative borrowings 
(in 1,000 yuan) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0003) 
   
F-statistics (423,418) 5.72*** 5.80*** 
Household fixed effects Jointly significant Jointly significant 
R-squared 0.8861 0.8824 
Total observations 848 848 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;  
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level for the t-test, respectively. 
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The results in Table 5.8 reveal that micro loans provided by RCCs have a positive and 
significant impact on household welfare outcomes. On average an additional 1,000 
yuan in the borrowing raises a household’s annual income by 0.29% and annual 
consumption by 0.23%. Since the average total loan amount borrowed by the 
borrowing households is 44,012 yuan (see Table 5.2), the results imply that on 
average, the borrowing households increase their annual income and consumption by 
approximately 12.76% and 10.12% respectively, compared to the non-borrowing 
households. Thus, we can argue that the households will benefit more as they become 
more involved in the programme (signified by the growing loan size). The empirical 
findings of the impact of borrowings are consistent with the findings of Nguyen et al. 
(2007) and Pitt and Khandker (1998), who show positive and significant relationships 
between the loan size and a set of household outcomes including income and 
consumption. 
 
Overall the explanatory power of the fixed effects model is satisfactory (see 
R-squared in Table 5.7 and 5.8). In addition, an F-test was performed to test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of household fixed effects (hi) are all zero. The 
F-statistics in both Table 5.7 and 5.8 are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
therefore strongly reject the null hypothesis in favour of the fixed effects model in 
correcting for selection bias in the impact estimation. 
 
In general, the empirical findings based on the adjusted DD approach confirm the 
findings in the microfinance literature that microcredit can improve the households’ 
welfare such as income and consumption. The impact estimates of the Programme 
participation (binary variable) are somewhat disappointing because the impact is not 
statistically significant for either outcome variable investigated. When using the 
Cumulative borrowings to better express the involvement in microcredit programme 
by the households, the impact estimates are improved: the impacts of cumulative loan 
amount on both outcomes investigated are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Although the impact of micro loans on welfare is pronounced from the statistical 
perspective, it is not significant in an economic sense. As documented in Table 5.8, 
the coefficient (γ) values of variable Cumulative borrowings are small (0.0029 in 
income impact and 0.0023 in consumption impact), compared to the coefficients of 
other variables such as Earner (0.0615 and 0.036). Since the coefficient γ (when 
multiplied by 100) measures the percentage change in the household outcomes, the 
small values suggest a small or economically insignificant effect of microcredit on the 
real levels of household income and consumption (Niño-Zarazúa, 2007). 
 
5.3.3 Poverty targeting of RCC microcredit programme 
In this study a household is defined as poor if the per capita annual income is below 
the official poverty threshold published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC). We use two poverty lines in our study: low poverty line and low income line 
(also called the relative poverty line)45
 
. The low poverty line has been traditionally 
considered to be too low compared to the growing national GDP per capita and lags 
behind the poverty threshold set by the World Bank. To reflect the stable improvement 
in households’ living standards, the Chinese government has set another poverty line, 
i.e., the low income line, since 2000. To better analyse the depth that RCC 
programmes reach the poor, both the poverty line (PL) and low income line (LIL) are 
adopted in our study to identify the poverty status of the households. 
Using the sample data the poverty targeting of the RCC programme is projected in 
Table 5.9. The upper panel of the Table 5.9 examines the poverty incidence across the 
sample in the post-programme period (i.e., 2008). It shows slight poverty incidence in 
the sample: only two households (2.1%) are hard-core poor using the low poverty line, 
or five households (5.2%) live in the relative poverty according to the low income line. 
Nevertheless, no borrowing household in the sample is classified as poor using either 
the official poverty line or the low income line. This implies that the RCC microcredit 
programme does not primarily focus on the poor population alone. 
                                                             
45 For details of the construction of the two poverty lines, see NBSC (2004). 
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Nguyen et al. (2007) cautions that using the poverty status of households in the 
post-programme period can lead to an inaccurate analysis of the programme targeting. 
Households who obtained micro loans may increase their income and/or consumption, 
and thus lift themselves out of poverty. Therefore, the poverty status of the 
households in 2002 (i.e., before the programme implementation) is also examined and 
the results are reported in the lower panel in Table 5.9. The results do not show much 
variation compared to the poverty examination in 2008. When using the low poverty 
line, the poor account for only 0.3% of the borrowing households and 6.3% for the 
non-borrowing households. When classified by the low income line, only 1.8% of the 
borrowing households and 8.4% of the non-borrowing households are poor. The 
results suggest that a large proportion of the borrowing households were not poor 
before they participated in the microcredit programme. 
 
Table 5.9 Poverty status of the sampled households by type and year 
 Borrowing 
Households 
Non-borrowing 
households 
Total 
 Count  Share 
(%) 
Count  Share 
(%) 
Count  Share 
(%) 
Poor by PL 20081 0 0 2 2.1 2 0.5 
Poor by LIL 20082 0 0 5 5.2 5 1.2 
Sample size 328 96 424 
       
Poor by PL 20021 1 0.3 6 6.3 7 1.7 
Poor by LIL 20022 6 1.8 9 8.4 15 3.5 
Sample size 328 96 424 
Note: 1. The low poverty line in 2008 and 2002 are 786 yuan and 627 yuan, respectively; 
  2. The low income line in 2008 and 2002 are 1,067 yuan and 869 yuan, respectively. 
 
There are two main reasons why the RCC microcredit programme does not explicitly 
target the poor population. First, the main goal of the RCC microcredit programme is 
to facilitate the credit accessibility by Chinese rural households as required by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC). According to the PBC (2001), there is no specific 
client target requirement for the RCCs and micro loans of RCCs are issued to 
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households who are registered as rural residents and engaged in land farming and 
other agriculture-related business. Unlike the microcredit programmes provided by 
NGOs or government agencies, which are specifically designed to reduce poverty by 
providing loans to the poor only, the RCC programmes have been carried out to 
increase the provision of credit services in rural areas and their participants are 
traditionally rural middle-income households (Du, 2005, 2004; Sun, 2003; Druschel, 
2002). Second, RCCs are a formal financial institutions that assume sole 
responsibility for the profits and losses. To ensure the financial viability of the 
microcredit programme, RCCs emphasise loan repayment performance and are likely 
to exclude poor households who may not be able to use credit effectively and repay 
loans punctually from participating in the microcredit programme (Cheng, 2006; Du, 
2005). As Du (2005) concludes, while the NGO and government microcredit 
programmes pay more attention to poverty alleviation to achieve social development, 
the RCC microcredit programme focuses on business sustainability and risk 
management. 
 
5.4 Microcredit and women empowerment 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
Table 5.10 provides the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the 
empirical models for both women borrowers (n=64) and women non-borrowers 
(n=28). The table shows a strong association (significant χ2 value) between family 
support contribution and group type (borrower/non-borrower). The women borrowers 
are more able to contribute to their family support than the women non-borrowers 
(76.6% versus 50.0%). This is possible since the women borrowers are expected to 
earn independent income through loan-supported income-generating activities, which 
can be used to meet family expenses. In addition, the results show that the 
relationship between education attainment and group type is not independent, 
indicating that the women borrowers are more likely to be educated than the 
non-borrowers (96.9 versus 89.3), whereas the non-borrowers tend to have achieved a 
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higher level of education such as post-secondary education than the borrowers (14.3 
versus 4.7). Moreover, the women borrowers on average have more income earners 
(Earner) in their families when compared to the non-borrower women, and the t-test 
result shows a significant mean difference at the 10 percent level in Earner between 
the two groups. Furthermore, the frequency distribution of the villages shows that the 
non-borrower women are mostly concentrated in Villages 4 and 5 (28.6 and 25.0 
percent respectively) where the women borrowers dwell least (4.7 and 6.3 percent 
respectively). The statistical test results in Table 5.10 shows no significant mean 
difference between the two groups’ women in regards to Age, Annual income, and 
Household size, and group type is independent with Male children and Household 
occupation. 
 
Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables in empowerment models 
Variables Non-borrower Borrower Statistic test 
Personal Characteristics    
Age 41.1 39.8 t = -0.623 
Family support contribution    
Yes  50.0 76.6 χ2 = 6.367** 
No  50.0 23.4  
Total  100.0 100.0  
Male children     
Yes 75.0 78.1 χ2 = 0.108 
No  25.0 21.9  
Total  100.0 100.0  
Education attainment:    
Uneducated  10.7 3.1 χ2 = 5.084* 
Secondary school or less 75.0 92.2  
Post-secondary 14.3 4.7  
    
Household Characteristics    
Annual income (in 1,000 yuan) 25.2 71.4 t = -0.96 
Household head occupation    
Agriculture  89.3 90.6 χ2 = 0.04 
Non-agriculture 10.7 9.4  
Total  100.0 100.0  
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Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables in empowerment models 
(Cont.) 
Variables Non-borrower Borrower Statistic test 
Household size 4.18 4.31 t = -0.468 
Earner  2.64 2.14 t = 1.956* 
    
Village Dummies    
Village 1 (% of Yes) 0.0 17.2 χ2 = 23.467*** 
Village 2 (% of Yes) 14.3 10.9  
Village 3 (% of Yes) 7.1 14.1  
Village 4 (% of Yes) 28.6 4.7  
Village 5 (% of Yes) 25.0 6.3  
Village 6 (% of Yes) 10.7 14.1  
Village 7 (% of Yes) 7.1 14.1  
Village 8 (% of Yes) 7.1 18.8  
    
No. of observations 28 64  
Note: Entries for variables Age, Annual income, Household size, and Earner are mean 
values; 
  *, **, ***, represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
The results in Table 5.10 suggest some selection bias especially with respect to the 
Family support contribution, Education, Earner, and village dummies, which justifies 
the inclusion of these variables in the empirical models to correct for the potential 
bias in the impact estimation. 
 
5.4.2 Impacts of RCC microcredit on different empowerment indicators 
In this study, women empowerment is measured by twenty four indicators (Ei) that 
can be grouped into five dimensions including control over financial assets, mobility, 
purchase making ability, decision making power, and freedom/legal awareness (see 
Table 4.1). The impact of microcredit on different aspects of women empowerment is 
estimated using the logistic regression model (Equation 4.34) and the coefficients 
estimates are summarised in Table 5.11. Each row in Table 5.11 represents a separate 
logistic model with a different dependent variable (i.e., empowerment indicator) and 
same explanatory variables listed in Table 5.10. Given the large number of estimates 
involved, and since the effects of other explanatory variables (such as female and 
household characteristics) on empowerment are not of interest to this study, Table 
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5.11 only reports the results for the primary variables related to microcredit (see the 
complete coefficients estimates in Appendix 4). 
 
It can be seen from Table 5.11 that the coefficients of loan dummy variables LOAN1, 
LOAN2, and LOAN3 have the expected positive signs in most of the empowerment 
models except for PARNT, DESHOUS, and DESBIR. In the models with PARNT and 
DESHOUS as dependent variables, the coefficients of the three loan variables show a 
negative impact of RCC microcredit on these two empowerment indicators. In the 
model with DESBIR as dependent variable, the coefficients are negative for LOAN1 
and LOAN2, but positive for LOAN3, implying that borrowing from RCC’s 
programme has a mixed impact on this indicator. Table 5.11 also shows that both 
LOAN2 and LOAN3 have significant impacts on eleven empowerment indicators 
including CINC, CSAV, CITY, UTENS, FURNT, LIVSK, DESEDU, DESLVSK, 
DESEQP, DESCSM, and DESACCT. In addition, LOAN2 has a significant effect on 
indicators such as JEWL and DESLAND, and LOAN3 has a significant impact on 
indicators, such as EQUIP, FABUSE, FCTCEP, FARMAG, and LMAGE. In contrast to 
LOAN2 and LOAN3, LOAN1 is found to have a significant effect on indicator 
DESBIR only. 
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Table 5.11 Coefficient estimates of micro loan variables in empowerment models 
 Microcredit variable LOANi (denoting different loan categories) 
Dependent 
variables (Ei) 
LOAN1 
(<30,000 yuan) 
LOAN2 
(30,000-60,000 yuan) 
LOAN3 
(>60,000 yuan) 
 Coefficients S.E.  Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. 
       
Control over financial assets       
CINC 1.232 0.985 1.581* 0.859 2.257** 0.957 
CSAV 1.649 1.111 2.142** 0.979 2.364** 1.047 
       
Mobility        
CITY 1.081 1.051 1.980** 0.877 2.202** 0.948 
PARNT -1.431 0.996 -1.355 0.839 -0.585 0.949 
      
Purchase making ability      
UTENS 0.670 0.949 1.775** 0.796 2.244** 0.914 
CLOTH 0.588 0.955 0.981 0.816 1.434 0.904 
FURNT 1.133 0.947 2.235*** 0.836 2.376** 0.928 
JEWL 0.911 1.083 1.402* 0.776 1.402 0.864 
LIVSK 1.240 1.232 1.737* 0.893 2.869*** 1.035 
EQUIP 1.437 1.083 1.459 0.973 1.892* 1.064 
       
Involvement in decision making     
DESHOUS -1.406 0.974 -1.216 0.854 -0.144 0.923 
DESEDU 0.993 0.978 1.815** 0.895 2.283** 0.993 
DESLAND 1.040 1.154 1.389* 0.798 1.101 0.878 
DESCRP 0.989 0.923 0.759 0.781 1.474 0.905 
DESLVSK 1.070 1.168 2.637** 1.043 3.122** 1229 
DESEQP 1.315 1.051 1.976** 0.878 2.100*** 0.982 
DESCSM 1.063 0.996 1.566* 0.827 1.799* 0.939 
DESACCT 2.261 1.455 2.273** 0.963 2.443** 1.053 
DESBIR -2.741** 1.065 -1.062 0.815 0.805 0.947 
       
Freedom/legal awareness      
FABUSE 0.184 0.966 0.240 0.827 1.857* 0.991 
FCTCEP 0.781 0.997 0.991 0.775 1.549* 0.853 
FARMAG 0.659 0.977 1.163 0.741 1.801** 0.876 
LMAGE 0.298 0.951 0.758 0.827 1.907** 0.969 
LDIVC 1.326 0.946 0.995 0.840 0.851 0.963 
       
Total observations 92 
Note: *, **, *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively 
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The overall model fit is evaluated for each of the twenty four logistic models and the 
goodness-of-fit statistics are summarised in Table 5.12. The likelihood ratio (LR) 
statistics reject the null hypothesis that the parameters for the model are equal to zero 
at the 5 percent significance level or better for most of the twenty four models except 
for models UTENS, DESCRP and DESCSM. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 
percent significance level in these three models. The overall correct prediction is 
higher than 75 percent in most of the models with the highest percentage observed in 
DESLVK model (87 percent). The McFadden R-squared is also highest in DESLVK 
model (0.3694) but is lowest in DESCRP model (0.2252). This implies that the 
logistic model employed in this study is effective in predicting the probability of 
female empowerment related to involvement in making family decision on purchasing 
livestock (DESLVK) but may be relatively less effective in predicting female 
involvement in deciding what crops to grow (DESCRP). In general, the empirical 
models fit the data well and can be used to predict the probability of women 
empowerment in different aspects. 
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Table 5.12 Goodness-of-fit statistics for the empowerment models 
 LR Statistic McFadden  
R-squared 
Overall Predicted 
Percentage Correct 
Models:    
CINC 30.15** 0.2487 77.2 
CSAV 40.85*** 0.3294 78.3 
CITY 34.53** 0.2804 80.4 
PARNT 37.50*** 0.2949 76.1 
UTENS 29.68* 0.2367 77.2 
CLOTH 30.45** 0.2535 78.3 
FURNT 31.69** 0.2493 76.1 
JEWL 36.65*** 0.2877 79.3 
LIVSK 38.00*** 0.3232 75.0 
EQUIP 38.98*** 0.3315 80.4 
DESHOUS 36.60*** 0.2878 75.0 
DESEDU 43.95*** 0.3489 78.3 
DESLAND 40.09*** 0.3153 82.6 
DESCRP 27.92* 0.2252 75.0 
DESLVSK 39.01*** 0.3694 87.0 
DESEQP 40.90*** 0.3208 78.3 
DESCSM 27.87* 0.2465 77.2 
DESACCT 38.99*** 0.3692 84.8 
DESBIR 33.07** 0.2651 82.6 
FABUSE 35.56** 0.2803 75.0 
FCTCEP 31.18** 0.2459 75.0 
FARMAG 33.16** 0.2622 75.0 
LMAGE 38.77*** 0.3108 79.3 
LDIVC 30.29** 0.2679 82.6 
Note: *, **, *** the represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
The predicted probabilities of empowerment manifested by the twenty four indicators 
are calculated to illustrate the levels of empowerment experienced by women 
borrowers with different cumulative loan sizes and by women who never borrow. The 
results are presented in Table 5.13. The magnitude of the impacts of RCC microcredit 
on female empowerment is obtained by comparing the empowerment levels between 
the non-borrower women and women borrowers in different loan size categories, 
where the empowerment levels of non-borrower women are used as a reference 
category to mimic the empowerment status of women borrowers had they not 
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participated in the microcredit programme46
 
. The following discussion of how RCC’s 
microcredit influences the female empowerment is based on the empirical results in 
Table 5.11 and 5.13. 
1) Control over financial assets 
Borrowing from a RCC microcredit programme has a positive and significant impact 
on female control over financial resources such as income and savings, and the impact 
increases with the cumulative loan size. For example, holding other factors constant, 
the probability of controlling own income (CINC) for the women with loan size 
between 30,000-60,000 yuan is 33 percent higher than for the non-borrowers, and the 
difference is significant at the 10 percent level. Such probability would be increased 
by 49 percent for women who have borrowed over 60,000 yuan in total compared to 
the non-borrowers and this is significant at the 5 percent level. Similarly, the 
probability of controlling over own savings (CSAV) for the women who have 
borrowed 30,000-60,000 yuan and more than 60,000 yuan in total is 48 percent and 
53 percent higher than the non-borrowers respectively, and both differences are 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
2) Mobility  
The RCC microcredit however does not influence the mobility indicators in the same 
direction. On the one hand, the probability of going to the city alone (CITY) is greater 
for the women borrowers than that of the non-borrowers. For example, women with 
cumulative loans between 30,000-60,000 yuan and greater than 60,000 yuan are 27 
and 29 percent more likely to go to city alone than the non-borrowers respectively, 
and both differences are significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, the 
chance of visiting parent home without asking for consent (PARNT) is lower for the 
women borrowers than that of the non-borrowers. For example, women with total 
loan size less than 30,000 yuan are 5 percent less likely to be able to visit their 
                                                             
46 The estimated differences in the probabilities between women borrowers (but with different loan sizes) can also 
be obtained from Table 5.13, but the statistical significance of these differences cannot be tested using the 
empirical models. 
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parent’s home freely compared to non-borrowers. The negative impact of the micro 
loans is not statistically significant. 
 
The predicted probabilities of empowerment in terms of the two mobility indicators 
are relatively high in our study. For example, the probability of independently 
travelling to the city is over 60 percent and 80 percent for the non-borrowers and 
borrowers respectively (see Table 5.13). This is in sharp contrast to Zaman’s (1999) 
findings where the probability of going alone to a downtown market is lower than 15 
percent for both the non-borrowers and borrowers. A possible reason for the 
difference in findings is that women in Muslim and Hindu societies such as 
Bangladesh suffer from the Purdah norms which restrict their freedom of travelling 
inside and outside villages to a large extent (Hashemi et al., 1996). Purdah however is 
not a custom in modern China and there is no social criterion limiting Chinese 
women’s (including rural women’s) mobility. 
 
3) Ability to make purchases independently 
The results show that the RCC microcredit has a positive impact on all “purchase 
making ability’ indicators and the impact increases with loan sizes. In addition, the 
positive impact appears to be statistically significant on all indicators except for 
CLOTH. For example, assuming all else equal, the probability of independently 
purchasing utensils (UTENS) for the family is 2.6 times higher for the women 
borrowers in the ‘30,000-60,000 yuan’ category and 2.9 times greater for the women 
with more than 60,000 yuan in cumulative loans (both significant at the 5 percent 
level) compared to non-borrowers. Borrowing between 30,000-60,000 yuan or more 
than 60,000 yuan from RCC would double the probability of women purchasing 
furniture independently (FURNT) compared to the non-borrowers and is significant at 
the 5 percent level. Similarly, the microcredit appears to have significant impact on 
the female ability of independently purchasing livestock (LIVSK) when women have 
borrowed more than 30,000 yuan from RCC. The likelihood of purchasing jewellery 
alone (JEWL) is only 12 percent for the women non-borrowers, but this is 
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significantly raised to 35 percent if the women have borrowed more than 30,000 but 
less than 60,000 yuan. Furthermore, microcredit has a significant impact on the 
women’s ability to independently make significant purchases such as farming 
machinery (EQUIP) until they have borrowed greater than 60,000 yuan in total. The 
probability of purchasing clothes independently (CLOTH) for a woman is not 
significantly influenced by microcredit, and it varies little with the cumulative loan 
size. 
 
Table 5.13 Predicted probabilities of empowerment for women in different 
groups 
 Non-borrower Borrower 
L<30,000 30,000-60,000 L>60,000 
Models:     
CINC 0.16 0.40 0.49 0.65 
CSAV 0.20 0.57 0.68 0.73 
CITY 0.66 0.85 0.93 0.95 
PARNT 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.97 
UTENS 0.27 0.42 0.69 0.78 
CLOTH 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.98 
FURNT 0.43 0.70 0.88 0.89 
JEWL 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.35 
LIVSK 0.49 0.77 0.85 0.94 
EQUIP 0.26 0.60 0.60 0.70 
DESHOUS 0.81 0.51 0.55 0.78 
DESEDU 0.29 0.52 0.71 0.80 
DESLAND 0.13 0.30 0.37 0.31 
DESCRP 0.53 0.75 0.70 0.83 
DESLVSK 0.67 0.86 0.97 0.98 
DESEQP 0.07 0.21 0.34 0.37 
DESCSM 0.78 0.91 0.94 0.96 
DESACCT 0.34 0.830 0.832 0.85 
DESBIR 0.95 0.56 0.87 0.98 
FABUSE 0.42 0.47 0.48 0.82 
FCTCEP 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.30 
FARMAG 0.33 0.49 0.62 0.75 
LMAGE 0.73 0.79 0.85 0.95 
LDIVC 0.45 0.75 0.68 0.65 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated at the mean or median value for all control variables. 
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4) Involvement in family decision making process 
Six ‘involvement in family decision-making’ indicators including DESEDU, 
DESLAND, DESLVSK, DESEQP, DESCSM and DESACCT are positively and 
significantly influenced by the RCC microcredit. For example, borrowing between 
30,000-60,000 yuan from RCC would almost triple the probability of a woman’s 
involvement in deciding farmland lease (DESLAND) compared to a non-borrower and 
this is significant at the 10 percent level. Women who have borrowed between 
30,000-60,000 yuan in total are also 42 percent (significant at the 5 percent level) 
more likely to get involved in deciding children’s education (DESEDU) than 
non-borrowers and the difference in probability rises to 51 percent (significant at the 5 
percent level) when women have a total loan amount greater than 60,000 yuan from 
RCC microcredit programme. Compared to non-borrowers, women with loan sizes 
between 30,000-60,000 yuan or greater than 60,000 yuan are about 30 percent more 
likely to be involved in deciding what livestock to buy (DESLVSK) and this is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The probability of being involved in deciding what 
farming machinery to buy (DESEQP) is very low and only 7 percent for 
non-borrowers. This rises to 37 percent when women have borrowed in excess of 
60,000 yuan and the impact is significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, 
borrowing between 30,000-60,000 yuan and more than 60,000 yuan significantly 
raises the probability of women involvement in deciding what consumer durables to 
buy (DESCSM) by 16 and 18 percent respectively compared to the non-borrowers. 
The probability of making joint decisions on opening saving accounts at bank 
(DESACCT) is also increased significantly when women have borrowed 30,000 yuan 
or more but the probability varies little with loan size. 
 
The empirical results also reveal that the RCC microcredit has a negative impact on 
female participation in making decision on house repair/construction (DESHOUS) but 
such impact is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. For example, the 
probability of such decision involvement is 30 percent lower for women with 
cumulative loan size below 30,000 yuan than for non-borrowers. However, the impact 
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of the microcredit on women’s involvement in deciding to have a child (DESBIR) is 
not clear. On the one hand, the probability of making joint decisions on having a child 
would be reduced by about 40 percent for women with loan sizes less than 30,000 
yuan compared to non-borrowers, and is significant at the 5 percent level. On the 
other hand, such probability would be slightly higher for women who have borrowed 
in excess of 60,000 yuan than that of non-borrowers, but this is not statistically 
significant. The RCC micro loans do not significantly influence women’s involvement 
in family decisions on what crops to grow (DESCRP) based on the empirical results. 
 
5) Freedom/legal awareness 
Borrowing from RCC microcredit programme has a positive and significant impact on 
the ‘freedom/legal awareness’ indicators, such as FABUSE, FCTCEP, FARMAG, and 
LMAGE, and the impacts rise steadily with cumulative loan sizes. For example, 
women who have borrowed more than 60,000 yuan from RCC are twice as likely to 
understand that women have the rights to protest against domestic abuse (FABUSE) 
compared to the non-borrowers and is significant at the 10 percent level. The 
probability of being aware of the use of contraception (FCTCEP) is only 8 percent for 
the non-borrowers, but the probability would be significantly raised to 30 percent as 
women’s cumulative loan sizes grow over 60,000 yuan. Furthermore, women 
borrowers borrowing more than 60,000 yuan in total would raise the probability of 
knowing that parents should not arrange marriage for children (FARMAG) and the 
probability of being aware of the minimum legal marriage age (LMAGE) by 42 and 
22 percent respectively when compared to the non-borrowers, and both impacts are 
significant at the 5 percent level. The probability of knowing the legal means of 
divorce (LDIVC) is also positively affected by the loan variables, but the impacts are 
not statistically significant. 
 
A potential limitation in assessing the impact of RCC microcredit on the 
‘freedom/legal awareness’ indicators is that these indicators reflect female perceptions 
of empowerment rather than their real behaviours. Whether any of the awareness 
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would be actually put into practice is unknown. However, it can be argued that 
stronger legal or freedom knowledge plays important roles in arousing women’s 
consciousness of fighting for their rights within the household domain or even at 
higher levels such as community and society (Zaman, 1999). 
 
In addition to microcredit, the empirical results indicate that some dimensions of 
empowerment are also significantly influenced by other variables such as AGE, 
EARNER, MCHILD, and Village dummies (see Appendix 4). AGE has a significantly 
positive association with most ‘purchase making ability’ indicators including CLOTH, 
LIVSK, and EQUIP (see Appendix 4-3), implying that age is a determinant in female 
ability to make independent purchases. In addition, EARNER is positive and 
significant in both mobility models (see Appendix 4-2), suggesting that women with 
more income earners in the families have more freedom of mobility. One possible 
reason is that as the number of income earners within the family increases, the 
probability of women’s involvement in income-generating activities also rises. This 
may give women more opportunities to travel rather than staying at home, and thus 
expands women’s mobility. 
 
Moreover, MCHILD is positive and significant in both ‘control over financial assets’ 
models (see Appendix 4-1), suggesting that having one or more male children in the 
family has a positive and significant effect on a woman’s ability to control her own 
financial assets such as income and savings. This is likely especially in families that 
prefer male to female children (like the patriarchal tradition). Furthermore, Village 
dummy variables are significant in most of the empowerment models, indicating that 
the female empowerment is also significantly influenced by the geographic locations 
where the women reside. For example, women who live in villages adjacent to urban 
areas would have more chances to travel to the city, and thus would be more 
empowered in terms of mobility, compared to women living in remote regions. 
 
However, it is difficult to draw general conclusions for the remaining variables in the 
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models with respect to their impacts on women empowerment because their impacts 
are insignificant in most of the empowerment models. These variables have minimal 
or no influences on the indicators within the empowerment dimensions (see Appendix 
4). Overall, cumulative borrowing is the only variable that has significant positive 
impact on almost every empowerment dimension investigated. 
 
5.4.3 Conclusion- microcredit impact on women empowerment 
Overall, our empirical findings confirm the findings in previous studies such as 
Hashemi et al. (1996), Zaman (1999), and Pitt et al. (2003), suggesting that 
microcredit has a positive and significant impact on women empowerment manifested 
cross various dimensions. First, the empirical results suggest that the use of 
microcredit leads women to having a greater control over their own financial assets 
such as income and savings, which is referred as economic empowerment in the 
literature. This finding is important since the literature indicates that economic 
empowerment always forms the base of female empowerment in other dimensions 
(Ansoglenang, 2006; Mayoux, 2002; Zaman, 1999). In addition, microcredit 
borrowing strengthens women’s familial standing represented by their greater role in 
the family decision-making process. Participation in microcredit programmes also 
augments women’s autonomy in making not only small purchases (such as utensils) 
but also large purchases (such as farming machinery). Furthermore, even after 
controlling for knowledge-related variables such as education level, being a 
microcredit borrower contributes greatly to enhancing women’s freedom and legal 
awareness. However the impact of microcredit on women’s freedom of mobility is 
dubious based on our empirical results. 
 
The empirical findings also imply that there is a threshold loan size beyond which 
microcredit can have significant effect on one or some dimensions of women 
empowerment. For example, in this study, for most indicators related to control over 
financial assets, ability to make purchase and involvement in family decision-making, 
the loan threshold appears to be 30,000 yuan. In other words, significant impact on 
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these indicators emerges until women’s borrowings reach 30,000 yuan or above. On 
the other hand, the threshold loan size beyond which the level of empowerment 
manifested by women’s freedom/legal awareness begins to rise significantly is 60,000 
yuan. The finding is similar to the findings by Zaman (1999) that women’s borrowing 
should at least reach a certain amount to allow for a significant effect of microcredit 
on the female empowerment such as asset control. 
 
Our empirical findings also reveal that microcredit not only has positive and 
significant impacts on female empowerment, such impacts also increase as the 
cumulative loan sizes grow larger. This finding helps to address the self-selection bias 
issue in the impact assessment. It is possible that women who are already relatively 
more empowered even in the absence of the microcredit programme tend to 
participate in the programme than others. However, the significant coefficients of the 
cumulative loan size variables on the empowerment indicators investigated suggest 
that the microcredit programme can further empower women who participate in it: the 
level of a woman’s empowerment is likely to rise as she becomes more involved in 
the programme (reflected by the growing loan sizes), compared to her starting-level 
(i.e., the level of empowerment in the non-borrowing status). In other words, a true 
programme impact can be reflected by this upward trend in women’s empowerment 
along with their involvement in the programme (Osmani, 2007; Hashemi et al., 1996). 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarises the research. Section 6.1 presents a summary of the research 
objectives, data and methodology, and major findings. The implications of the 
research findings are discussed in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses the research 
limitations and Section 6.4 provides recommendations for future research. 
 
6.1 Summary and major findings 
Chinese agriculture is dominated by small farms and farmer households are the basic 
units of agricultural production. A large number of farmers are still trapped in poverty. 
Limited access to formal financial services, credit in particular, is an important 
constraint in expanding farmers’ production, which restrains farmers from improving 
their living conditions. Credit inaccessibility in the rural areas thus impedes the 
development of the rural sector, which potentially decelerates the development of the 
Chinese rural economy. 
 
Microcredit was introduced to China as an efficient anti-poverty programme, aiming 
to facilitate credit access by farmers and mitigate rural poverty in China. However, 
the impacts of microcredit on China rural households’ livelihoods are not well 
documented. In addition, despite the efforts made by the Chinese government to 
support and popularise the implementation of microcredit, the access to institutional 
credit including microcredit by the rural population remains insufficient. 
 
The purpose of this research was to assess the impact of microcredit on household 
welfare measured by household income and consumption in rural China. This 
research also evaluated the impact of microcredit on women empowerment 
manifested in various dimensions. Furthermore, it examined the key factors that 
influence the accessibility of microcredit by rural households in China. Consequently, 
the findings of this research enrich the existing literature on microfinance in China. 
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This research focused on the microcredit provided by the Rural Credit Cooperative 
(RCC), the largest microcredit provider in China. Both primary and secondary data 
are used in this research. The primary data were collected through survey interviews 
using a structured questionnaire. Using stratified random sampling technique, a total 
of 424 rural households (usable sample) from 50 villages in 10 townships in Hubei 
Province were included in the sample, which were grouped into borrowers and 
non-borrowers. The survey questionnaire was personally administered to the rural 
households between November 2008 and January 2009. Moreover, pertinent 
secondary data of all sampled households were obtained from the selected RCC 
branches. The primary data, together with secondary data, form a two-year household 
panel dataset used in the welfare impact analysis. The women empowerment impact 
of microcredit and households’ accessibility to microcredit are analysed using 
cross-sectional data. 
 
The impact of microcredit on household welfare is analysed using the 
difference-in-difference (DD) approach to control for selection bias in the impact 
assessment. The microcredit impact on women empowerment is examined using a 
logistic regression and the selection bias is addressed in two ways. First, the empirical 
models adjust for selection bias by controlling for female personal characteristics 
(such as age and education level) and household characteristics (such as income and 
household size). Second, a cumulative borrowing variable is included in the empirical 
models to test whether the microcredit impact on empowering women increases with 
women’s involvement in the programme. All sampled households in this research are 
selected from villages where the microcredit programme is available to minimise the 
potential non-random programme placement bias in the impact assessments. Logistic 
regression is also employed to identify the factors influencing households’ 
accessibility to microcredit  
 
Table 6.1 summarises the estimated results of the empirical models. In summary, the 
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results on households’ accessibility to microcredit show that: 
 Households with higher annual income (Income) have higher probability of 
accessing microcredit (see Table 5.3) because they tend to have more investment 
opportunities, leading to stronger potential need of credit support. Higher income 
households are more inclined to access credit because they are more capable to 
repay loans than low-income households. 
 Households who are involved in self-run businesses (Self-employment) apart from 
agricultural production are more likely to access microcredit due to higher capital 
requirement for investing in self enterprises (see Table 5.3). 
 The official status of family member(s) (Official status) is also a contributor to 
households’ access to microcredit (see Table 5.3). For example, households with 
member(s) working as village or township officials may have greater need of 
credit for off-farm investment and thus have higher probability of accessing 
microcredit. The results on Income, Self-employment, and Official status imply 
that credit demand arising from on/off farm capital requirement is an important 
determinant of households’ accessibility to microcredit. Households with higher 
demand for credit are more inclined to borrow and thus more likely to access 
credit including microcredit. 
 Household assets (Assets) and Savings can be used as proxies for household 
initial capital and both negatively influence households’ accessibility to 
microcredit (see Table 5.3). This is because households with higher asset values 
and/or having bank deposits may be less financially constrained and thus less 
likely to borrow. 
 Holding shares of RCC (Shareholding) has a negative influence on households’ 
accessibility to microcredit (see Table 5.3) because households who bought 
shares of RCC are likely to have more surplus money in their own control, which 
reduces their intentions to borrow. 
 An adverse attitude towards having debt (Attitude) tends to decrease the 
likelihood of accessing any type of credit by households, including microcredit 
(see Table 5.3). 
 176 
 The probability of accessing microcredit would be substantially reduced if the 
households can access Alternative credit sources such as informal credit (see 
Table 5.3). 
 There is a negative relationship between Household size and household’s 
accessibility to microcredit (see Table 5.3). This result suggests that the larger 
households are less likely to borrow from RCC microcredit programmes because 
they tend to have low repayment capacity resulting from the smaller future 
expected income per capita. 
 The positive relationship between Economic dependency ratio and households’ 
access to microcredit (see Table 5.3) implies that households who are less 
economically active have a higher probability of borrowing from the microcredit 
programme mainly due to insufficient income for household activities such as 
consumption and children education. 
 Households’ accessibility to microcredit differs according to their education level 
(Education), as well as the physical distances (Distance) between their residence 
and RCC branches. In general, households with higher education levels and/or 
residing nearer to the RCC branches have better chances to access microcredit 
(see Table 5.3). 
 The qualitative analysis of household accessibility to microcredit also shows that 
households may be denied access to microcredit if they have a blemished credit 
history (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, households’ accessibility to microcredit can 
be potentially weakened by the institutional factors such as interest rate, 
documents requirement and loan processing time (see Table 5.5). 
 
With respect to the evaluation of the impacts of microcredit on rural households, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
 Programme participation (binary variable) has a positive impact on both welfare 
measures: household annual income (HAI) and annual consumption (HAC). 
However, such positive impacts are not statistically significant except for HAI in 
the standard DD estimation (see Table 5.6). Furthermore, the results of the 
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standard and adjusted DD approach differ slightly (see Table 5.6 and 5.7). This 
might imply that the observed differences between the borrowing households and 
non-borrowing households do not substantially influence the trend of the 
outcomes investigated. 
 Cumulative borrowings (continuous variable) have a positive and significant 
impact on HAI and HAC respectively (see Table 5.8). The results imply that the 
households will benefit more as they become more involved in the microcredit 
programme (characterised by the growing loan size). However, the results imply 
that the impacts of micro loans on the welfare might not be significant in an 
economic sense. 
 Cumulative borrowings also have a positive and significant impact on women 
empowerment demonstrated in various dimensions (see Table 5.11). 
 The use of microcredit leads women to have a greater control over their own 
financial assets such as income and savings, resulting in economic empowerment 
of women. This is important since economic empowerment forms the base of 
women empowerment in other dimensions. 
 As the loan sizes grow, women are more actively involved in making family 
decisions (e.g., children education, opening bank account). This result implies 
that women’s position within the family is strengthened through the microcredit 
borrowing. 
 Women’s autonomy in making purchases (e.g., utensils, farming machinery) and 
women’s legal and freedom awareness also increase with loan size. However, the 
results show that the impact of micro loans on women’s freedom of mobility is 
dubious.  
 The results imply that there is a threshold loan size beyond which microcredit can 
have significant effect on one or some dimensions of women empowerment. 
 The results further show that some dimensions of women empowerment are 
significantly influenced by other variables, such as women’s age (AGE), having 
male children (MCHILD), the number of earners in the family (EARNER), and 
residence location (Village dummies) (see Appendix 4). For example, EARNER 
 178 
and MCHILD show a positive and significant effect on a woman’s freedom of 
mobility and control over her own financial assets such as income and savings, 
respectively (see Appendix 4-2 and 4-1). The variable Village dummies show a 
significant effect on most of the empowerment models. Furthermore, women’s 
age (AGE) is found to have a mixed effect on women’s ability to make 
independent purchases (see Appendix 4-3). AGE has a positive and significant 
impact on the female ability to independently purchase livestock (LIVSK), 
farming machinery (EQUIP) and clothes (CLOTH). One possible explanation is 
that as a woman’s age increases, she becomes more self-confident or 
self-dependent (Osmani, 2007), which in turn augments women’s independence 
in making purchases. In addition, the sampled women in the research were 
selected from rural areas and the dominant occupation as reflected in the sample 
is related to agriculture such as crop farming and raising livestock (see Table 
5.10). Thus it can be argued that as women’s age increases, they are more likely 
to engage in agricultural activities, which enhances the opportunities for women 
to purchase production inputs (such as livestock and farming machinery) 
independently. However, women’s ability to independently purchase jewellery 
(JEWL), utensils (UTENS), and furniture (FURNT) appears to be negatively 
influenced by their age according to the results. This might be because women 
are likely to form their own families as their age increase, and they tend to buy 
household items (such as kitchen utensils and furniture) with their family 
members rather than by themselves. To some extent, this decreases the 
opportunities for making independent purchases by women. 
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Table 6.1 Factors affecting credit accessibility, household welfare, and women 
empowerment 
Factors  Credit accessibility Household welfare Women empowerment 
Household characteristics   
Income (+)  Dependent variable 
in welfare 
models 
UC 
Self-employment (+) NI NI 
Official status (+) NI NI 
Assets  (-) NI NI 
Savings (-) NI NI 
Shareholding  (-) NI NI 
Attitude (-) NI NI 
Alternative credit  (-) NI NI 
Household size (-) (0) UC 
Dependency ratio (+) NI NI 
Education  (+) NI UC 
Distance  (-) NI NI 
Age  (0) (0) UC 
Income earners NI  (+) on HAI in 
adjusted DD 
analysis 
 (+) in ‘Mobility’ 
models 
Having male child NI NI  (+) in ‘Control over 
financial assets’ 
models 
Village dummies NI NI  (+) or (-) 
    
Programme variables   
Programme 
participation 
NI  (+) only on 
HAI in 
standard DD 
analysis 
NI 
Cumulative 
borrowings 
NI  (+) on both 
HAI and HAC 
in adjusted DD 
analysis 
 (+) in ‘Control over 
financial assets’ 
models; 
 (+) in ‘Purchase 
making ability’ 
models; 
 (+) in ‘Decision 
making 
involvement’ 
models except for 
DESHOUS and 
DESCRP; 
 (+) in 
‘Legal/freedom 
awareness’ models; 
 (+) in mobility 
model CITY but (-) 
in PARNT 
Note: 1. (+), (-), and (0) represent positive, negative, and no significant impact, respectively; 
2. ‘NI’ means that the variable is not included in the model; ‘UC’ means the impact of the 
variable on women empowerment is uncertain. 
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 Female and household characteristics (such as age and family size) are used as 
control variables in the empirical models to help isolate the pure impact of 
microcredit on women empowerment measured by the empowerment indicators. 
The results show that the impacts of these control variables on different 
dimensions of women empowerment are ambiguous (see Appendix 4). Previous 
empirical studies on the empowerment impact of microcredit focus on explaining 
the relationship between the microcredit variable (which is the primary variable 
of interest) and women empowerment indicators (e.g., mobility, independence to 
make purchase), but does not provide reasons why the control variables influence 
the empowerment indicators (see for example, Pitt et al., 2003; Zaman, 1999; 
Hashemi et al., 1996). Following the previous literature, this research does not 
attempt to explain the relationship between the control variables and 
empowerment indicators. 
 
6.2 Implications of the research findings 
The findings of this research have important implications for academics, rural 
households, RCCs, and policy makers. For academics, the research findings on the 
welfare impact of microcredit show that microcredit borrowing has a significant 
impact on improving households’ welfare measured by income and consumption. 
However, since this research estimates an average percentage effect, the results 
indicate that such impact might not be significant economically (i.e., the impacts on 
the real levels of income and consumption are minimal). In addition, the results show 
that the main beneficiaries of China’s microcredit programmes are non-poor 
households. Therefore, the significant impacts of microcredit on increasing household 
income and consumption do not necessarily mean that microcredit can reduce 
(material) poverty in China since the programme does not target the poor population. 
This, however, may be unique to the case of China because the microcredit 
programmes (operated by the RCCs) focus primarily on expanding credit access in 
rural areas and thus do not specifically target the poor. In comparison, microcredit 
 181 
programmes in Bangladesh, for example, are implemented especially for poverty 
alleviation purposes. They have effectively targeted the poor (represented by the high 
participation rates of the poor) and improved the poor’s living conditions, and as a 
result, have contributed greatly to rural poverty reduction in Bangladesh (see 
Khandker, 2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
 
The results from empowerment models show that microcredit is a powerful 
instrument in promoting women empowerment on various aspects ranging from 
economic security (i.e., control of financial resources) to awareness of social/legal 
issues (for example, rights to protest against domestic abuse, minimum legal marriage 
age, etc.). This indicates that microcredit programmes such as RCC’s programme can 
transform the participants (especially women) from a passive acceptor of credit to a 
responsive and dynamic agent in economic and non-economic areas of life. The 
research findings also reveal that microcredit can make a significant impact on 
women empowerment until women’s cumulative borrowings reach a certain amount. 
Since the cumulative loan size is used as a proxy of women’s involvement in the 
microcredit programme, the findings imply that microcredit does not necessarily 
empower a woman who newly joins the programme. 
 
This research also estimates the level of empowerment for women with different 
cumulative loan sizes and non-borrower women as well. The results indicate that the 
level of a woman’s empowerment is likely to rise as she becomes more involved in 
the programme compared to the empowerment level in the non-borrowing status. This 
is important because it means that microcredit programmes can further empower 
women who participate in them regardless of their initial levels of empowerment, 
which provides a way of addressing the selection bias issue in the impact assessment 
using cross-section data. This is comparable to Hashemi et al.’s (1996) study who 
include ‘the length of programme membership’, another measure of women’s 
participation in microcredit programmes, to address the selection bias issue, and 
reveal that a woman’s level of empowerment increases as she stays longer in the 
 182 
programme. 
 
The results of the credit accessibility analysis indicate that rural households 
(especially the poor) and women in China have limited access to institutional credit 
including the microcredit provided by RCCs. From the demand side, this can be 
largely attributed to the low or lack of credit demand by households for either 
agricultural production or off-farm activities, where the demand for credit is 
determined by a number of household-related factors (e.g., income and family size). 
This is comparable to Yehuala (2008) and Bokosi’s (2004) findings, which indicate 
that household characteristics (e.g., age and educational level) play important roles in 
households’ access to credit via their demand for credit. The results also indicate that 
poor households have restricted access to microcredit because they effectively ration 
themselves out of the credit market for reasons such as inability to provide collateral 
and low repayment capacity arising from their poor wealth situation (e.g., 
low/unstable income, little/no cash savings, etc.). This is supported by Cheng (2006) 
who find households who think they cannot repay micro loans, i.e., risk-rationed 
households, normally have very low demand for microcredit and thus tend to have 
poor access to microcredit. The findings of this research thus favours Evans et al.’s 
(1999) argument that simply expanding microcredit programmes in rural areas would 
not increase credit access by the rural households when the heterogeneous nature of 
this population leads to the differential opportunities of accessing microcredit. 
 
The results further indicate that microcredit is not a substitute for informal credit and 
households are likely to borrow from informal credit when the need for credit arises. 
This is because when the loan size is comparable between microcredit and informal 
credit (both lend in small amounts), informal credit possesses some merits that 
microcredit lacks, such as flexible loan contracts and simple lending processes, which 
make informal credit more attractive to the households. This view is shared by Tsai 
(2004) who finds that microfinance is not a perfect substitute for informal finance in 
both rural China and India. Tsai (2004) argues that various forms of credit (for 
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example, formal, informal, and microcredit) are not functionally equivalent for 
potential borrowers with different preferences in terms of loan characteristics (such as, 
loan size, duration, interest rate, etc.) and loan conditions (such as, collateral 
requirement). Both institutional design and lending methodology of different forms of 
credit affect their relative attractiveness to potential borrowers with particular needs. 
 
The research findings show that rural households’ access to microcredit is largely 
restricted by their low demand for credit. Therefore, to facilitate their access to 
microcredit, households should be encouraged to create investment opportunities in 
on/off farm activities. This is considered as an efficient way of increasing households’ 
demand for credit (see Cheng, 2006). In addition, the research findings suggest that 
households who are actively engaged in the microcredit programme and effectively 
invest the micro loans in income-generating activities can improve their livelihoods. 
Since the borrowers in this research are generally middle-income households with 
relatively stronger economic backgrounds, the findings imply that microcredit 
programmes may not equally benefit the poor (especially the ultra-poor) who lack 
income (or means of repayment) or simply borrow for consumption smoothing rather 
than investment purposes. This view is also embodied in earlier studies (such as Islam, 
2007; Cheng, 2006; Maclsaac, 1997), which indicate that microcredit programmes are 
not appropriate in helping the (extremely) poor who cannot effectively use loans. 
Instead, these people should be provided with other forms of support before they can 
make use of loans, which are important in helping the poor build up capital and 
increase their repayment capacity. These supports include small grants, infrastructure 
improvement, health care, and employment and education training. 
 
The research results show that supply-side factors such as interest rates, 
documentation requirements, and loan processing time can impair households’ access 
to microcredit. Similar findings are also found in other studies (see Yehuala, 2008; 
Atieno, 2001; Evans et al., 1999), which reveal that households’ difficulty in 
accessing credit is often created by lending institutions through their lending policies. 
 184 
Therefore, RCCs should improve their micro lending policies (such as simplifying 
lending procedures) and re-design their micro loan products to allow for more flexible 
terms and conditions to better suit the diverse needs of the local rural households. 
These flexible services help make RCC’s microcredit more accessible by the rural 
households, especially the worse-off households who are more disadvantaged in 
dealing with risks. The need to introduce product innovations for microcredit 
programmes is also highlighted by Islam (2007) who claims that these innovations 
(especially client-responsive loan products) are deemed to be more desirable by the 
poor whose living conditions are generally associated with uncertainty and 
vulnerability because these flexible services can help them smooth consumption and 
thus reduce vulnerability.  
 
The research results show that the primary lending scheme of the RCC microcredit 
programme is individual lending without collateral requirement. Group lending, 
however, is uncommon in the RCC programme. This is in sharp contrast to the 
Grameen Bank (GB) programme or GB-style programmes where group lending 
schemes are widely adopted to overcome problems created by information asymmetry 
and control for default risk in the absence of collateral (see Vigenina and Kritikos, 
2004; Aghion and Morduch, 2000; Morduch, 1999). Like other microcredit 
programmes which lend on individual basis (see for example, Vigenina and Kritikos, 
2004; Morduch, 1999), the RCC programme uses alternative mechanisms to mitigate 
credit risks and ensure loan repayment. Specifically, the RCC programme centres on 
the borrower screening process and uses a credit rating scheme to select borrowers 
(see also Yang, 2006; Xie, Xu, Cheng, and Shen, 2005; Sun, 2003). Although this 
mechanism is efficient in controlling for default risks since only households with 
relatively strong repayment capacities and satisfactory creditworthiness are granted 
loans, it also effectively excludes poor households who are actually creditworthy but 
rated as high risk in repaying loans from accessing micro loans (as evidenced in this 
research, non-poor households are the primary borrowers of the RCC programme). 
While group-based microcredit programmes effectively target poor people, lending to 
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non-poor or wealthy people is common in individual-based programmes (see 
Vigenina and Kritikos, 2004; Morduch, 1999). Therefore, as suggested in Vigenina 
and Kritikos (2004), it would be good for RCC to use a combination of individual and 
group lending approaches in its microcredit programme where group loan contracts 
now can be offered to higher risk households (either poor or with blemished credit 
history). This mixed lending approach would help RCC expand its programme 
outreach especially to the poor population, and at the same time, ensure RCC’s 
lending security. 
 
In addition, the results indicate that the households’ inadequate access to microcredit 
can be due to their poor knowledge of RCC’s microcredit programme. Thus, to 
improve households’ accessibility to microcredit, there is an imperative for RCC to 
enhance promotion of its microcredit programme among the rural households and 
make the households fully aware of the features of microcredit (e.g., collateral free). 
This can be done through village meetings (or social gatherings) and mass media such 
as radio and newspaper. 
 
The strong link between repayment capacity (perceived by the households) and access 
to microcredit indicates that increasing households’ repayment capacity helps increase 
their access to microcredit. Hence, it is important for RCC to combine its micro loans 
with other services or products that help improve the efficiency of loan use, which in 
turn helps build up the households’ confidence in repaying loans. A useful service is 
to provide borrowing households with an evaluation of the profitability of the 
loan-supported projects. Other services may include agricultural technical extension, 
off-farm business introduction and training in cash flow and risk management. 
 
For policy makers, to further expand the access to credit by rural households, 
legislation reforms on secured-transactions in rural financial markets should be 
accelerated. The reforms should highlight the legally acceptable forms of collateral. A 
good example is the legalisation of using the contractual rights on farmland as 
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collateral by farmers when applying for formal loans. This is because farmland in 
China is owned by collectives rather than individuals and thus farmers lack proper 
collateral for borrowing. Correspondingly, the reforms of the regulatory and legal 
system of rural land management must be promoted to increase land tenure security 
for farmers and formalise land transactions including transfer, rental, and leasing. This 
will provide lenders with formal procedures for claims against property and 
enforcement of financial contracts, and consequently, increase lenders’ willingness to 
transact with rural people. 
 
New credit policy is also required to allow the existing rural financial institutions 
(RFIs) to provide unsecured loans to potentially productive activities. Group lending 
is efficient in reducing the high overhead costs associated with small lending (see for 
example, Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab, 2005; Besley and Coate, 1995). It also 
promotes the building-up of good credit culture and helps achieve acceptable loan 
repayment performance. Therefore, group lending methods should be popularised 
among RFIs in their unsecured transactions to minimise the operational risks. 
 
To ensure or increase financial services in rural areas, there is a crucial need to 
formulate an integrated approach to reform the Chinese rural financial system, with 
the aims of developing well-functioning rural financial markets and improving 
financial performance and efficiency of RFIs. This requires a clear demarcation of the 
functions between commercial and policy finance. Specifically, the policy financial 
business such as agricultural development lending business operated by the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) or RCC should be transferred to the policy bank, 
i.e. the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), while the commercial 
loans operated by the ADBC should be devolved to the ABC or RCCs. The less 
confusion regarding their own responsibilities in rural financing, the more efficiently 
these RFIs can meet the financial demands of the rural people. 
 
In addition, the reform on restructuring the RCCs into rural commercial banks with a 
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clear property rights system (namely, shareholding system) should be implemented 
with caution. This is because regional economic development in China is uneven, and 
hence, the demand for financial services by rural households and enterprises varies 
from area to area. In the economically underdeveloped areas, especially in remote and 
impoverished areas, farmers usually require credit in small amounts for maintaining 
simple production and do not have the ability to bear the risks arising from the 
commercialised operation of the RCCs. Therefore, farmers in these areas need credit 
cooperatives that offer mutual aid, rather than profit-oriented commercial banks. The 
development of RCCs is closely linked to the growth of the rural sector, which in turn 
determines China’s rural economic development. Therefore, to effectively promote 
China’s rural economy, reform of RCCs in different regions should be adapted to local 
economic circumstances and the actual funding requirements of farmers and rural 
enterprises. Moreover, the transformation of RCCs into commercial banks or the 
overemphasis on pursuing profit will undermine their microfinance business. 
Therefore, policy makers should take into account such issues when reforming RCCs. 
 
Furthermore, reforms should be introduced to promote agricultural insurance 
innovations in rural areas. Agricultural insurance such as crop insurance provides 
farmers with a means of risk management in their production and helps them stabilise 
their household incomes. As a result, agricultural insurance is beneficial to farmers’ 
access to credit: it can motivate farmers to demand more capital for expansion of 
production; on the other hand, it protects farmers from production losses in case of 
bad harvests, and thus, increases RFIs’ willingness to lend to farmers. 
 
However, it should be noted that China’s agriculture is characterised by small-scale 
farming operations which take place in different climatic regions. Consequently, the 
high underwriting costs associated with small size farms makes the implementation of 
conventional crop insurance difficult. Alternative insurance instruments, such as 
index-based weather insurance (IWI) (see Skees, 2008a and b), should be introduced 
and popularised among Chinese farmers. A number of merits of IWI, such as simpler 
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information requirements and low administrative costs, make IWI superior to 
conventional crop insurance and appealing for policymakers in lower income 
countries, especially those with small farm-size (Skees, 2008a). In particular, the 
contracts of IWI are flexible since they can be in small or micro size and tailored to 
farmers’ individual weather needs. This makes IWI more affordable to small 
(especially poor) farmers, and thus, farmers are more willing to adopt it to manage 
their production uncertainties (Turvey, Kong and Belltawn, 2009). 
 
The findings of the research indicate that informal credit plays an important role in 
meeting the credit needs of Chinese rural households. This includes not only 
households who fail to obtain financial support through formal channels (such as 
RCC’s microcredit programme), but also those who may be able to obtain formal 
credit but choose to borrow from informal lenders due to the potential merits of 
informal lenders (example, flexible lending schemes). This implies that the existence 
of informal finance may not simply be a result of insufficient supply of formal credit 
or credit rationing by formal institutions. It is likely that the different lending 
approaches adopted by formal and informal lenders make them cater to distinct 
groups of borrowers with various concerns. This is another main reason for the 
persistent co-existence of formal and informal finance in many developing countries 
including China (see, Zhang and Fang, 2005; Tsai, 2004; Floro and Ray, 1997). 
 
Policymakers in China should re-evaluate the role of the informal financial sector in 
rural credit delivery and formulate new policies regarding the development of 
informal finance. For example, rather than trying to eliminate informal finance, it 
would be more appropriate to reinforce the linkages between the formal and informal 
financial sectors in China. Better linkages between the two sectors enable one sector 
to overcome its own weaknesses by drawing from the other’s strengths, such as banks 
can make use of the outreach and local knowledge of informal lenders while informal 
lenders can benefit from formal lenders’ strong resource mobilisation ability and wide 
networks across the region. Consequently, strengthening the association between the 
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formal and informal sectors helps expand credit delivery and improve the overall 
efficiency of the financial system, and hence, accelerates the development of the 
Chinese rural economy. 
 
The significant impacts of microcredit on the economic and non-economic aspects of 
households’ livelihoods found in this research demonstrate the potential influence of 
microcredit programmes on Chinese rural economic and social development. 
Therefore, policy makers should be motivated to establish supportive regulatory 
environments in which the microfinance sector can gain sustainable development. It 
would be appropriate to legally permit non-financial institutions (NFIs) including 
NGOs to provide some form of financial services including microcredit. This expands 
NFIs’ ability to raise funds for their microfinance businesses from multiple sources 
such as the public deposits and financing support from the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC), and therefore, helps them to achieve sustainable development. Since most of 
the NGO-led microfinance programmes in China have concentrated explicitly on 
poverty alleviation (see Du, 2005; Park et al., 2004), the sustainable development of 
NGOs’ programmes will help expand the outreach of these programmes and thus 
realise nationwide poverty reduction. 
 
Governmental interventions in setting interest rates of micro loans should be removed 
and different types of microfinance organisations (government agencies, NGOs and 
financial institutions) should be allowed to establish micro-lending rates in 
accordance with their own business objectives (e.g., reducing poverty or increasing 
credit supply) and financial performance. In short, market-determined interest rates 
should be favoured. It has also been documented in Fernando (2006) and Helms and 
Reille’s (2004) studies that microfinance institutions (MFIs) (for example, GB in 
Bangladesh and Bank Rakyat Indonesia) that are free to set interest rates based on 
their own institutional factors and market characteristics are likely to realise both 
(financial) sustainability and high growth in programme outreach. By contrast, in 
countries (such as China and Vietnam) where setting of interest rates is not liberalised, 
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MFIs generally fail to achieve sustainable development. Furthermore, preferential tax 
policies (for example, reducing income tax) should be adopted to decrease the 
operating costs of microfinance businesses, and hence, enhance the enthusiasm of 
microfinance institutions for providing microfinance services. 
 
6.3 Research limitations 
There are a number of limitations in this research related to sample selection, data, 
and estimation techniques. These include:  
 The scope of this research is restricted to one province in China. Data used in this 
research is collected from a small-scale household survey covering different areas 
within the province. Therefore, the results of this research may not be applicable 
to the whole country. In addition, this research focuses on the microcredit 
programme implemented by the RCCs only. Therefore, the results cannot 
represent the characteristics (such as client target) and economic/social influences 
of the overall Chinese microfinance sector which consists of different types of 
institutions with different business goals and objectives. 
 Only the data and information of current microcredit borrowers are collected. 
There is no information and data on households who were once borrowers but 
dropped out during the survey time. Therefore, this research estimates the impacts 
of microcredit by comparing outcomes between current borrowers and those who 
never borrow. This may lead to an overestimate (if the dropped-out households 
are mainly failures) or underestimate (if the dropped-out households are mainly 
successes) of impact.  
 This research uses the ‘non-borrowers group’ as the comparison group in the 
impact assessments and uses the outcomes (such as income and consumption) of 
non-borrowers to approximate the counterfactual outcomes of borrowers in the 
absence of programme participation. In case where the non-borrowers sample 
used does not provide an accurate comparison group to the borrowers group, the 
reliability of the impact estimation results will be reduced, especially in the 
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models using cross-sectional data. Unfortunately, this research does not examine 
the appropriateness of the use of the comparison group. 
 Households’ welfare (such as income and/or consumption) is likely to be affected 
by family shocks, such as hospitalisation and wedding. Unfortunately, 
information related to such shocks in both the pre- and post-programme periods is 
not available and is thus not included in the models. This may reduce the 
accuracy of impact estimations. As such, this research neglects the influence of 
family shocks on households’ accessibility to microcredit. 
 This research adopts a fixed-effects method to address selection bias in impact 
estimations. A limitation of using the fixed-effects method is that it only controls 
for fixed unobserved characteristics that affect both households’ programme 
participation and outcomes investigated, and thus it may yield biased impact 
estimations if such unobserved characteristics vary over time. 
 The empowerment indicators used in this research have been constructed largely 
on the basis of the universally accepted empowerment indicators documented in 
the literature while taking into account the local culture of the sampled areas. 
Therefore, the results of this research may not provide a complete picture of how 
microcredit has influenced the rural women’s empowerment since some 
context-specific information may have been omitted. 
 This research only demonstrates a significant impact of microcredit on improving 
participants’ welfare while the poverty reduction potential of microcredit has not 
been investigated. Moreover, it is possible for microcredit to have impacts on 
other household outcomes such as access to health care services, educational 
attainment, and nutritional levels. However, such impacts have not been 
addressed in this research.  
 Both the borrowing costs and repayment incentives (and thus the efficiency of 
loan use) are likely to vary according to the type of lending contract (individual 
or group loan) that households have entered into. Therefore, the impacts of 
microcredit may also be different between individual borrowers and group 
borrowers. Unfortunately, the models used in this research cannot differentiate 
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such impacts. 
 
6.4 Recommendations for future research 
To make the research findings more generalisable, the research scope should be 
enlarged to include households in other regions of the country, such as Eastern China 
(more economically developed) and Western China (relatively underdeveloped), and 
the household sample size should be increased accordingly. Furthermore, a number of 
variables can be added to the models to improve the performance of the models. This 
includes information on family shocks (see Cheng, 2006; Alexander, 2001; Zeller, 
1994), health status of the household head (see Ho, 2004; Li et al., 2004; Evans et al., 
1999; Zaman, 1999), financial assistance received (see Nguyen et al., 2007), village 
infrastructure (see Islam and Harris, 2008; Nguyen et al., 2007), and outstanding 
loans from other sources (see Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Garikipati, 2006). 
 
To provide a comprehensive understanding of Chinese microcredit, a systematic 
evaluation of the different types of microcredit programmes implemented in China 
should be conducted. This may include investigations of client targeting, impacts on 
participants and operational performance for each type of programme. Future research 
should also be extended to examine the poverty reduction potential of microcredit 
which is the major concern of the Chinese policy makers in developing the 
microcredit programme. Furthermore, it would be ideal for future research to conduct 
exploratory analyses to identify the impacts of microcredit on other household 
outcomes (except income and consumption), or impacts at higher levels such as 
communities and regions. 
 
For assessing the women empowerment impact of microcredit, future research should 
conduct ethnographic studies in the sampled areas and develop empowerment 
measures through extensive observation and personal interviews with women 
respondents and/or local programme staff. This is useful to construct context-specific 
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empowerment measures, and thus, enhance the validity and reliability of the impact 
estimation. 
 
To improve the efficiency or accuracy of impact estimation, the following attempts 
should be considered: 
1. Households who have dropped out from the microcredit programme should be 
identified and included in the sample as previous borrowers. Accordingly, 
empirical models should be adjusted to differentiate non-borrowers, previous 
borrowers and current borrowers to allow for impact comparisons between the 
three different groups. 
2. A more accurate ‘control group’ that better resembles the borrowers in the absence 
of microcredit programmes should be established. A propensity-score (PS) 
matching method can be adopted to select the control group. The basic idea of the 
PS method is to match each programme participant with a non-participant who 
has nearly the same probability of participating in the programme, based on the 
observed characteristics (see for example, Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Baker, 2000; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). A potential problem of using this matching method 
arises from the estimation of the propensity score (or participation probability), 
which is sensitive to the specification adopted (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). As a 
result, the impact estimates may be inconsistent due to different specifications 
used for estimating the propensity score. 
3. Furthermore, where panel (or longitudinal) data is available, an instrumental 
variables method can be used in combination with the fixed-effects method to 
control for time-varying unobservable factors (see for example, Khandker, 2005). 
However, finding instruments that directly affect programme participation without 
influencing the outcomes investigated is difficult. 
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Appendix 1  Description of Variables Used in Welfare Impact Analyses 
 
Variables Type of variables Description of variables 
HAI Continuous Log of household annual income 
HAC Continuous Log of household annual consumption 
AGE Continuous Age of household head squared 
SCHILD Continuous Number of children in school-age in the household 
HHSZ Continuous Household size 
EARNER Continuous Number of income earners in the household 
YEAR Dummy Year indicator equal to ‘1’ for 2008 and ‘0’ otherwise 
PARTN Dummy Programme participation indicator equal to ‘1’ for ‘yes’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
CUMUL Continuous Total loan amount borrowed by the household 
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Appendix 2 Description of Variables Used in Women Empowerment Impact 
Analyses 
 
Variables Type of variables Description of variables 
LOAN Categorical  
Total loan amount borrowed by the woman, equal to 
‘0’ for no loan, ‘1’ for 30,000 yuan or less, ‘2’ for 
between 30,000 and 60,000 yuan, and ‘3’ for more 
than 60,000 yuan 
HAI Continuous Household annual income 
HHOCP Dummy Occupation of household head equal to ‘1’ for ‘agriculture’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
HHSZ Continuous Household size 
EARNER Continuous Number of income earners in the household 
AGE Continuous Age of the surveyed woman 
EDU Categorical 
Educational attainment of the surveyed woman, 
equal to ‘0’ for no education, ‘1’ for secondary 
school or less and ‘2’ for post-secondary 
MCHILD Dummy Woman’s owning of male children equal to ‘1’ for ‘yes’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
CTRN Dummy Woman’s contribution to family support equal to ‘1’ for ‘yes’ and ‘0’ otherwise 
V1 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village one and ‘0’ otherwise 
V2 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village two and ‘0’ otherwise 
V3 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village three and ‘0’ otherwise 
V4 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village four and ‘0’ otherwise 
V5 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village five and ‘0’ otherwise 
V6 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village six and ‘0’ otherwise 
V7 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village seven and ‘0’ otherwise 
V8 Dummy  Village indicator taking value ‘1’ for women from village eight and ‘0’ otherwise 
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Appendix 3  Construction of the Empowerment Indicators 
 
The twenty four empowerment indicators were developed according to the women’s 
responses to the survey questions (see Section 5 in Appendix 5). All indicators are in 
binary form, with value ‘1’ for ‘empowered’ and value ‘0’ otherwise: 
1. The answers to the questions to ‘control over financial assets’ and ‘mobility’ are 
in binary format (yes or no), with the ‘yes’ responses labelled as ‘empowered’. 
Therefore, the empowerment indicators for these two dimensions (whether 
women have control over the given financial assets and whether women can 
travel to the given places by themselves) are developed based on the responses to 
the questions, with value ‘1’ for ‘yes’ and ‘0’ for ‘no’;  
2. To examine the ‘ability to make purchase independently’, women were shown 
with a list of items and asked to choose the items they could purchase 
independently. For each chosen item, the woman is classified as ‘empowered’ and 
the indicator showing whether the woman can make independent purchase for 
that particular item is given a value of ‘1’. If the given item is not chosen, the 
empowerment indicator then takes a value of ‘0’ 
3. The responses are transformed into binary variables where necessary. For 
example, for questions to ‘involvement in household decision-making’, answers 
‘wife’ and ‘both (which means wife and husband)’ are merged into one category 
of ‘empowered’. Therefore the indicators (whether women are involved in the 
family decision making process) take a value of ‘1’ for response either ‘wife’ or 
‘both’, and a value of ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, for questions related to ‘relative 
freedom from household domination’ and ‘legal awareness’, responses ‘disagree’ 
and ‘neutral’ are combined into one category as well. Hence the indicators 
(whether women are aware of the freedom/legal issues) are equal to ‘1’ for 
answers ‘agree’ (empowered) and ‘0’ for either ‘disagree’ or ‘neutral’. 
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Appendix 4  Complete coefficients estimates of empowerment models 
 
Appendix 4-1 Control over financial assets 
 
Logit Model 1: Control Over Own Income (CINC) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.2324  0.9845  1.2518  0.2107  
LOAN2* 1.5805  0.8594  1.8391  0.0659  
LOAN3** 2.2566  0.9570  2.3579  0.0184  
HAI -0.0014  0.0030  -0.4591  0.6461  
HHOCP 1.0268  1.0650  0.9641  0.3350  
HHSZ** 0.6864  0.3408  2.0139  0.0440  
EARNER -0.5305  0.3953  -1.3421  0.1796  
AGE 0.0481  0.0486  0.9886  0.3229  
EDU1 -0.6139  1.6441  -0.3734  0.7089  
EDU2 0.4312  2.1214  0.2033  0.8389  
MCHILD* 1.5041  0.7870  1.9113  0.0560  
CTRN 1.1049  0.6869  1.6086  0.1077  
V1 -0.5716  1.0854  -0.5267  0.5984  
V2** 2.4341  1.1459  2.1241  0.0337  
V3 0.1140  1.0542  0.1082  0.9139  
V4 1.6765  1.2257  1.3678  0.1714  
V5 -0.7046  1.1920  -0.5911  0.5545  
V6 -0.6716  1.2401  -0.5416  0.5881  
V7 0.2126  1.0689  0.1989  0.8423  
Constant** -8.2279  3.9638  -2.0758  0.0379  
McFadden R-squared    0.2487 
Log likelihood    -45.5294 
LR statistic    30.1465 
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0499 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 49 22 71 
% of correct 84.5 64.7 77.2 
No. of incorrect 9 12 21 
% of incorrect 15.5 35.3 22.8 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 2: Control Over Own Savings (CSAV) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.6493  1.1106  1.4851  0.1375  
LOAN2** 2.1419  0.9789  2.1881  0.0287  
LOAN3** 2.3637  1.0471  2.2573  0.0240  
HAI* 0.0280  0.0156  1.8001  0.0718  
HHOCP 0.8796  1.0507  0.8372  0.4025  
HHSZ -0.1704  0.3770  -0.4521  0.6512  
EARNER** 0.9454  0.4772  1.9813  0.0476  
AGE 0.0417  0.0492  0.8476  0.3967  
EDU1 2.8755  1.8365  1.5657  0.1174  
EDU2 3.4021  2.3117  1.4716  0.1411  
MCHILD* 1.3370  0.7893  1.6939  0.0903  
CTRN 0.9666  0.6894  1.4020  0.1609  
V1 -0.7066  1.2760  -0.5538  0.5797  
V2 1.8800  1.2505  1.5034  0.1327  
V3 1.5155  1.2252  1.2369  0.2161  
V4 0.3508  1.4035  0.2500  0.8026  
V5 -0.9081  1.2809  -0.7090  0.4784  
V6 1.6793  1.2757  1.3164  0.1880  
V7 1.2257  1.1859  1.0335  0.3014  
Constant*** -12.1592  4.3313  -2.8073  0.0050  
McFadden R-squared    0.3294  
Log likelihood    -41.5732 
LR statistic    40.8482  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0025 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 46 26 72 
% of correct 83.6 70.3 78.3 
No. of incorrect 9 11 20 
% of incorrect 15.4 29.7 21.7 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Appendix 4-2 Mobility 
 
Logit Model 3: Go To City Alone (CITY) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.0814  1.0506  1.0293  0.3033  
LOAN2** 1.9804  0.8771  2.2578  0.0240  
LOAN3** 2.2021  0.9477  2.3236  0.0201  
HAI -0.0008  0.0034  -0.2344  0.8147  
HHOCP -1.9065  1.2264  -1.5546  0.1200  
HHSZ -0.2696  0.3301  -0.8166  0.4141  
EARNER* 0.7596  0.4221  1.7995  0.0719  
AGE -0.0210  0.0441  -0.4757  0.6343  
EDU1 1.0907  1.8319  0.5954  0.5516  
EDU2 -0.3800  2.0693  -0.1836  0.8543  
MCHILD 0.7600  0.7008  1.0845  0.2782  
CTRN** 1.3357  0.6650  2.0087  0.0446  
V1 -1.1443  1.2303  -0.9301  0.3523  
V2 -0.7959  1.1610  -0.6855  0.4930  
V3 -1.0097  1.2001  -0.8414  0.4001  
V4 0.2585  1.3080  0.1977  0.8433  
V5 -0.0229  1.3397  -0.0171  0.9864  
V6** -3.0026  1.2773  -2.3508  0.0187  
V7 -0.9335  1.1623  -0.8032  0.4219  
Constant -0.2981 3.6701 -0.0812 0.9353 
McFadden R-squared    0.2804  
Log likelihood    -44.3107  
LR statistic    34.5349  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0159 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 24 50 74 
% of correct 66.7 89.3 80.4 
No. of incorrect 12 6 18 
% of incorrect 33.3 10.7 19.6 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 4: Visit Parent Home Without Asking For Consent (PARNT) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 -1.4315  0.9960  -1.4372  0.1506  
LOAN2 -1.3556  0.8389  -1.6158  0.1061  
LOAN3 -0.5854  0.9493  -0.6167  0.5374  
HAI** 0.0391  0.0161  2.4270  0.0152  
HHOCP -0.4153  0.9893  -0.4198  0.6746  
HHSZ* -0.6446  0.3369  -1.9130  0.0557  
EARNER*** 1.2404  0.4801  2.5834  0.0098  
AGE 0.0045  0.0436  0.1042  0.9170  
EDU1 -0.1039  1.5562  -0.0667  0.9468  
EDU2 -2.4880  2.0259  -1.2282  0.2194  
MCHILD -0.1580  0.6981  -0.2263  0.8209  
CTRN 0.7402  0.6754  1.0958  0.2732  
V1** -3.2107  1.3651  -2.3520  0.0187  
V2 -1.7460  1.1688  -1.4938  0.1352  
V3** -3.6966  1.5087  -2.4501  0.0143  
V4 -2.1477  1.3795  -1.5569  0.1195  
V5 -1.4070  1.2500  -1.1256  0.2603  
V6** -3.1314  1.2820  -2.4426  0.0146  
V7 0.5475  1.3090  0.4183  0.6757  
Constant 1.4721 3.4026 0.4326 0.6653 
McFadden R-squared    0.2950  
Log likelihood    -44.8217  
LR statistic    37.5042  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0069 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 31 39 70 
% of correct 72.1 76.1 76.1 
No. of incorrect 12 10 22 
% of incorrect 27.9 23.9 23.9 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Appendix 4-3 Purchase making ability  
 
Logit Model 5: Independently Purchase Utensils (UTENS) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.6703  0.9490  0.7064  0.4800  
LOAN2** 1.7748  0.7964  2.2284  0.0259  
LOAN3** 2.2437  0.9143  2.4541  0.0141  
HAI 0.0009  0.0021  0.4427  0.6580  
HHOCP -0.3023  0.9409  -0.3213  0.7480  
HHSZ -0.2701  0.3166  -0.8530  0.3936  
EARNER 0.1320  0.3727  0.3542  0.7232  
AGE -0.0499  0.0395  -1.2641  0.2062  
EDU1 1.3040  1.5264  0.8543  0.3930  
EDU2 1.5279  1.9124  0.7989  0.4243  
MCHILD -0.2564  0.6553  -0.3913  0.6956  
CTRN -0.3862  0.6168  -0.6262  0.5312  
V1 0.5122  1.1118  0.4607  0.6450  
V2 0.4306  1.0532  0.4088  0.6827  
V3 -1.7298  1.1093  -1.5593  0.1189  
V4 0.0036  1.0347  0.0035  0.9972  
V5 1.4999  1.1655  1.2869  0.1981  
V6 -0.5197  0.9999  -0.5197  0.6032  
V7 0.0413  1.0167  0.0406  0.9676  
Constant 1.4617 3.0910 0.4729 0.6363 
McFadden R-squared    0.2367  
Log likelihood    -47.8619  
LR statistic    29.6765  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0561 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 26 45 71 
% of correct 66.7 84.9 77.2 
No. of incorrect 13 8 21 
% of incorrect 33.3 15.1 22.8 
Note: ** represents 5% significance level. 
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Logit Model 6: Independently Purchase Clothes (CLOTH) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.5878  0.9554  0.6153  0.5384  
LOAN2 0.9813  0.8163  1.2021  0.2293  
LOAN3 1.4335  0.9041  1.5855  0.1129  
HAI 0.0007  0.0071  0.0969  0.9228  
HHOCP -0.9823  1.0060  -0.9764  0.3289  
HHSZ -0.5327  0.3626  -1.4693  0.1418  
EARNER 0.3556  0.4101  0.8671  0.3859  
AGE** 0.1070  0.0450  2.3780  0.0174  
EDU1 1.5243  1.5120  1.0082  0.3134  
EDU2 1.5253  1.8875  0.8081  0.4191  
MCHILD** 1.4217  0.7030  2.0225  0.0431  
CTRN* 1.1789  0.7034  1.6760  0.0937  
V1** -2.7964  1.3757  -2.0327  0.0421  
V2 -0.7468  1.2352  -0.6046  0.5454  
V3** -3.3950  1.3885  -2.4452  0.0145  
V4* -2.3892  1.3486  -1.7716  0.0765  
V5** -2.6198  1.3095  -2.0006  0.0454  
V6* -2.1300  1.2742  -1.6717  0.0946  
V7 0.7004  1.5094  0.4640  0.6427  
Constant -3.5209  3.3178  -1.0612  0.2886  
McFadden R-squared    0.2535  
Log likelihood    -44.8210  
LR statistic    30.4482  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0464 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 21 51 72 
% of correct 63.6 86.4 78.3 
No. of incorrect 12 8 20 
% of incorrect 36.4 13.6 21.7 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 7: Independently Purchase Furniture (FURNT) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.1333  0.9470  1.1968  0.2314  
LOAN2*** 2.2348  0.8364  2.6720  0.0075  
LOAN3** 2.3760  0.9279  2.5605  0.0105  
HAI 0.0012  0.0030  0.4024  0.6874  
HHOCP 0.3053  0.9843  0.3102  0.7564  
HHSZ -0.2032  0.3195  -0.6360  0.5248  
EARNER -0.0725  0.3720  -0.1948  0.8455  
AGE -0.0671  0.0420  -1.5980  0.1101  
EDU1 -1.1965  1.6481  -0.7260  0.4679  
EDU2 -1.4465  1.9740  -0.7328  0.4637  
MCHILD 0.4591  0.6703  0.6849  0.4934  
CTRN 0.5503  0.6210  0.8863  0.3755  
V1** -2.3494  1.0867  -2.1620  0.0306  
V2 0.9329  1.2021  0.7760  0.4377  
V3* -1.8120  1.0501  -1.7255  0.0844  
V4 -0.0314  1.1006  -0.0285  0.9772  
V5 -0.2558  1.1707  -0.2185  0.8270  
V6 -0.5828  1.0936  -0.5329  0.5941  
V7 -1.4535  1.0768  -1.3498  0.1771  
Constant 3.2622  3.2147  1.0148  0.3102  
McFadden R-squared    0.2493  
Log likelihood    -47.7280  
LR statistic    31.6916  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0338 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 34 36 70 
% of correct 79.1 73.5 76.1 
No. of incorrect 9 13 22 
% of incorrect 20.9 26.5 23.9 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 8: Independently Purchase Jewellery (JEWL) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.9106  1.0827  0.8410  0.4003  
LOAN2* 1.4021  0.7764  1.8058  0.0709  
LOAN3 1.4016  0.8637  1.6228  0.1046  
HAI 0.0013  0.0018  0.7270  0.4672  
HHOCP -0.4991  1.0516  -0.4746  0.6351  
HHSZ -0.3880  0.3341  -1.1614  0.2455  
EARNER 0.2808  0.3816  0.7358  0.4618  
AGE -0.0829  0.0437  -1.8966  0.0579  
EDU1 1.1095  1.5140  0.7328  0.4637  
EDU2 -0.6584  1.9465  -0.3383  0.7352  
MCHILD -0.5550  0.6698  -0.8286  0.4073  
CTRN -0.2231  0.6124  -0.3644  0.7156  
V1** 2.2202  1.1171  1.9876  0.0469  
V2 0.1304  0.9859  0.1322  0.8948  
V3 -1.6778  1.4185  -1.1828  0.2369  
V4 0.0651  1.1523  0.0565  0.9550  
V5** 2.5320  1.1001  2.3016  0.0214  
V6* 1.8334  1.0544  1.7389  0.0821  
V7** 2.0683  1.0513  1.9675  0.0491  
Constant 2.4148  3.3036  0.7310  0.4648  
McFadden R-squared    0.2877  
Log likelihood    -45.3593  
LR statistic    36.6465  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0088 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 39 34 73 
% of correct 81.3 77.3 79.4 
No. of incorrect 9 10 19 
% of incorrect 18.7 22.7 20.6 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 9: Independently Purchase Livestock (LIVSK) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.2400  1.2323  1.0063  0.3143  
LOAN2* 1.7372  0.8928  1.9457  0.0517  
LOAN3*** 2.8693  1.0350  2.7722  0.0056  
HAI 0.0002  0.0025  0.0978  0.9221  
HHOCP 0.5158  1.0647  0.4845  0.6281  
HHSZ 0.4943  0.3591  1.3765  0.1687  
EARNER 0.2726  0.4446  0.6132  0.5397  
AGE** 0.1255  0.0526  2.3838  0.0171  
EDU1 1.9238  2.1514  0.8942  0.3712  
EDU2 1.6002  2.3826  0.6716  0.5018  
MCHILD 0.9779  0.7783  1.2566  0.2089  
CTRN 0.9963  0.6649  1.4985  0.1340  
V1 -1.5182  1.2658  -1.1994  0.2304  
V2 1.1601  1.1769  0.9858  0.3242  
V3 -0.5687  1.2109  -0.4697  0.6386  
V4** 3.8542  1.6563  2.3270  0.0200  
V5 0.5600  1.3626  0.4110  0.6811  
V6 1.8444  1.3005  1.4182  0.1561  
V7 -1.5730  1.1923  -1.3193  0.1871  
Constant*** -12.2480  4.5712  -2.6794  0.0074  
McFadden R-squared    0.3232  
Log likelihood    -39.7890  
LR statistic    37.9973  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0059 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 18 51 69 
% of correct 58.1 83.6 75.0 
No. of incorrect 13 10 23 
% of incorrect 41.9 16.4 25.0 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 10: Independently Purchase Farming Machinery (EQUIP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.4370  1.0826  1.3273  0.1844  
LOAN2 1.4594  0.9726  1.5005  0.1335  
LOAN3* 1.8922  1.0637  1.7789  0.0753  
HAI -0.0051  0.0154  -0.3327  0.7394  
HHOCP* 2.7427  1.4723  1.8629  0.0625  
HHSZ** 0.6996  0.3534  1.9799  0.0477  
EARNER** -1.4540  0.5645  -2.5756  0.0100  
AGE* 0.0977  0.0542  1.8033  0.0713  
EDU1 -1.1689  1.7596  -0.6643  0.5065  
EDU2 1.1847  2.2322  0.5308  0.5956  
MCHILD** 1.9873  0.9056  2.1944  0.0282  
CTRN 0.9355  0.7508  1.2459  0.2128  
V1** -3.1940  1.4726  -2.1690  0.0301  
V2 1.6504  1.1743  1.4054  0.1599  
V3 -0.9931  1.1363  -0.8739  0.3822  
V4 1.5262  1.3376  1.1410  0.2539  
V5 -1.2984  1.2286  -1.0568  0.2906  
V6 -1.7657  1.3399  -1.3177  0.1876  
V7 -0.6524  1.1956  -0.5456  0.5853  
Constant* -8.8291  4.5061  -1.9594  0.0501  
McFadden R-squared    0.3315  
Log likelihood    -39.2984  
LR statistic    38.9784  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0044 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 53 21 74 
% of correct 86.9 67.7 80.4 
No. of incorrect 8 10 18 
% of incorrect 13.1 32.3 19.6 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 226 
Appendix 4-4 Involvement in family decision making 
 
Logit Model 11: Involvement In Making Family Decision On House 
Repair/Construction (DESHOUS) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 -1.4061  0.9739  -1.4438  0.1488  
LOAN2 -1.2159  0.8545  -1.4230  0.1547  
LOAN3 -0.1441  0.9226  -0.1562  0.8759  
HAI 0.0103  0.0141  0.7312  0.4647  
HHOCP 0.0017  0.9191  0.0018  0.9985  
HHSZ* 0.6001  0.3501  1.7138  0.0866  
EARNER 0.0096  0.4111  0.0233  0.9814  
AGE*** -0.1383  0.0478  -2.8910  0.0038  
EDU1 -0.4962  1.8048  -0.2749  0.7834  
EDU2 0.2832  2.2085  0.1282  0.8980  
MCHILD -0.5299  0.7578  -0.6992  0.4844  
CTRN** 1.6159  0.6611  2.4442  0.0145  
V1* 1.9782  1.2016  1.6463  0.0997  
V2 -0.6088  0.9932  -0.6130  0.5399  
V3 -0.3408  1.0664  -0.3195  0.7493  
V4 0.7423  1.1781  0.6301  0.5286  
V5 -1.0554  1.1664  -0.9048  0.3656  
V6 -1.0992  1.1359  -0.9677  0.3332  
V7 -0.7302  1.1635  -0.6276  0.5303  
Constant 3.2292  3.3932  0.9517  0.3413  
McFadden R-squared    0.2878  
Log likelihood    -45.2762  
LR statistic    36.5951  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0089 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 30 39 69 
% of correct 69.8 79.6 75.0 
No. of incorrect 13 10 23 
% of incorrect 30.2 20.4 25.0 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 12: Involvement In Making Family Decision On Children 
Education (DESEDU) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.9930  0.9783  1.0151  0.3101  
LOAN2** 1.8151  0.8954  2.0271  0.0427  
LOAN3** 2.2829  0.9928  2.2995  0.0215  
HAI 0.0013  0.0042  0.3080  0.7581  
HHOCP -0.7474  1.0161  -0.7355  0.4620  
HHSZ 0.2582  0.3789  0.6814  0.4956  
EARNER -0.1850  0.4492  -0.4118  0.6805  
AGE** -0.1090  0.0485  -2.2489  0.0245  
EDU1 0.2198  1.6955  0.1296  0.8969  
EDU2 0.4037  2.1140  0.1910  0.8485  
MCHILD 0.2415  0.7462  0.3236  0.7462  
CTRN -0.3318  0.7275  -0.4562  0.6483  
V1 1.7777  1.3617  1.3055  0.1917  
V2* -4.1050  1.4458  -2.8392  0.0045  
V3 0.4109  1.0939  0.3756  0.7072  
V4 0.2919  1.1213  0.2603  0.7946  
V5 -0.0134  1.1548  -0.0116  0.9908  
V6 -0.5243  1.0632  -0.4931  0.6219  
V7 0.9713  1.2594  0.7712  0.4406  
Constant 3.3349  3.6812  0.9059  0.3650  
McFadden R-squared    0.3489  
Log likelihood    -41.0109  
LR statistic    43.9475  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0010 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 29 43 72 
% of correct 72.5 82.7 78.3 
No. of incorrect 11 9 20 
% of incorrect 27.5 17.3 21.7 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 13: Involvement In Making Family Decision On Farmland Lease 
(DESLAND) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.0404  1.1543  0.9013  0.3674  
LOAN2* 1.3892  0.7980  1.7409  0.0817  
LOAN3 1.1009  0.8784  1.2534  0.2101  
HAI 0.0020  0.0019  1.0712  0.2841  
HHOCP 0.5703  1.0046  0.5677  0.5702  
HHSZ** -0.7479  0.3543  -2.1111  0.0348  
EARNER 0.4307  0.3864  1.1146  0.2650  
AGE -0.0293  0.0448  -0.6529  0.5138  
EDU1 0.1012  1.5389  0.0658  0.9476  
EDU2 -1.6278  1.9423  -0.8380  0.4020  
MCHILD** -1.6934  0.7531  -2.2485  0.0245  
CTRN -0.1674  0.6299  -0.2658  0.7904  
V1 1.6913  1.1365  1.4881  0.1367  
V2 0.8082  1.0491  0.7704  0.4410  
V3 -1.9140  1.4494  -1.3205  0.1867  
V4 1.4731  1.1887  1.2393  0.2152  
V5* 2.0053  1.1048  1.8151  0.0695  
V6 0.4003  1.0782  0.3713  0.7104  
V7*** 3.3987  1.2126  2.8028  0.0051  
Constant 2.5462  3.3785  0.7536  0.4511  
McFadden R-squared    0.3153  
Log likelihood    -43.5309  
LR statistic    40.0856  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0032 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 33 43 76 
% of correct 76.7 87.7 82.6 
No. of incorrect 10 6 16 
% of incorrect 23.3 12.3 17.4 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 14: Involvement In Making Family Decision On What Crops To 
Grow (DESCRP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.9888  0.9225  1.0718  0.2838  
LOAN2 0.7583  0.7812  0.9708  0.3317  
LOAN3 1.4735  0.9053  1.6276  0.1036  
HAI 0.0040  0.0132  0.3071  0.7588  
HHOCP -0.8107  0.8924  -0.9084  0.3636  
HHSZ -0.0049  0.2961  -0.0164  0.9869  
EARNER -0.4957  0.3883  -1.2765  0.2018  
AGE -0.0231  0.0391  -0.5916  0.5541  
EDU1 -0.8635  1.3971  -0.6181  0.5365  
EDU2 -0.0447  1.7909  -0.0250  0.9801  
MCHILD -0.3488  0.6768  -0.5153  0.6063  
CTRN -0.4109  0.6351  -0.6469  0.5177  
V1 1.2043  1.4246  0.8454  0.3979  
V2** -2.1612  1.0340  -2.0902  0.0366  
V3 -0.5891  1.0275  -0.5734  0.5664  
V4 -0.7447  1.0887  -0.6841  0.4939  
V5 -0.4333  1.0601  -0.4087  0.6827  
V6** -2.1944  1.0712  -2.0486  0.0405  
V7 0.3566  1.1671  0.3055  0.7600  
Constant 4.3949  3.1573  1.3920  0.1639  
McFadden R-squared    0.2252  
Log likelihood    -48.0371  
LR statistic    27.9202  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0850 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 24 45 69 
% of correct 64.9 81.8 75.0 
No. of incorrect 13 10 23 
% of incorrect 35.1 18.2 25.0 
Note: ** represents 5% significance level. 
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Logit Model 15: Involvement In Making Family Decision On What Livestock To 
Buy (DESLVSK) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.0703  1.1684  0.9161  0.3596  
LOAN2** 2.6373  1.0428  2.5289  0.0114  
LOAN3** 3.1218  1.2290  2.5401  0.0111  
HAI 0.0007  0.0030  0.2485  0.8037  
HHOCP 0.3792  1.0554  0.3593  0.7194  
HHSZ -0.2727  0.4354  -0.6262  0.5312  
EARNER -0.2898  0.5245  -0.5526  0.5805  
AGE -0.0041  0.0498  -0.0819  0.9347  
EDU1* 3.0054  1.7291  1.7381  0.0822  
EDU2 1.7219  2.2764  0.7564  0.4494  
MCHILD 0.4953  0.9134  0.5423  0.5876  
CTRN 0.4707  0.7886  0.5968  0.5506  
V1 -0.9564  1.6515  -0.5791  0.5625  
V2** -3.3269  1.3466  -2.4706  0.0135  
V3 -1.3041  1.2597  -1.0352  0.3006  
V4 2.5307  1.7251  1.4670  0.1424  
V5 2.1661  1.8064  1.1991  0.2305  
V6 -1.2159  1.3472  -0.9026  0.3667  
V7 -0.1471  1.5449  -0.0952  0.9241  
Constant -1.6846  3.6897  -0.4566  0.6480  
McFadden R-squared    0.3694  
Log likelihood    -33.2975  
LR statistic    39.0144  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0044 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 16 64 80 
% of correct 66.7 94.1 87.0 
No. of incorrect 8 4 12 
% of incorrect 33.3 5.9 13.0 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 16: Involvement In Making Family Decision On What Farming 
Machinery To Buy (DESEQP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.3151  1.0511  1.2511  0.2109  
LOAN2** 1.9759  0.8778  2.2508  0.0244  
LOAN3** 2.1002  0.9822  2.1383  0.0325  
HAI 0.0018  0.0036  0.4984  0.6182  
HHOCP -0.2867  1.0572  -0.2712  0.7862  
HHSZ 0.0272  0.3163  0.0861  0.9314  
EARNER 0.4101  0.4484  0.9147  0.3603  
AGE -0.0571  0.0416  -1.3744  0.1693  
EDU1 2.6831  1.8286  1.4674  0.1423  
EDU2 0.2410  2.1232  0.1135  0.9096  
MCHILD -0.4877  0.7338  -0.6647  0.5063  
CTRN** -1.6054  0.7320  -2.1932  0.0283  
V1** 3.4581  1.4469  2.3901  0.0168  
V2 -1.0199  1.0869  -0.9384  0.3481  
V3 1.4916  1.1246  1.3263  0.1847  
V4 -1.0018  1.4399  -0.6958  0.4866  
V5** 2.4789  1.1750  2.1097  0.0349  
V6 0.6533  1.0356  0.6308  0.5282  
V7 1.4913  1.0511  1.4188  0.1560  
Constant -1.7833  3.6709  -0.4858  0.6271  
McFadden R-squared    0.3208  
Log likelihood    -43.3002  
LR statistic    40.8952  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0025 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 37 35 72 
% of correct 78.7 77.8 78.3 
No. of incorrect 10 10 20 
% of incorrect 21.3 22.2 21.7 
Note: ** represents 5% significance level. 
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Logit Model 17: Involvement In Making Family Decision On What Consumer 
Durables To Buy (DESCSM) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.0632  0.9962  1.0673  0.2858  
LOAN2* 1.5660  0.8270  1.8935  0.0583  
LOAN3* 1.7985  0.9387  1.9159  0.0554  
HAI -0.0004  0.0029  -0.1390  0.8895  
HHOCP -2.0644  1.3138  -1.5714  0.1161  
HHSZ -0.4565  0.3648  -1.2516  0.2107  
EARNER 0.0458  0.4273  0.1072  0.9147  
AGE 0.0429  0.0428  1.0007  0.3170  
EDU1* 2.9428  1.7484  1.6832  0.0923  
EDU2* 3.6120  2.1445  1.6843  0.0921  
MCHILD 0.4677  0.7265  0.6438  0.5197  
CTRN -0.5732  0.7020  -0.8165  0.4142  
V1 -0.9637  1.6317  -0.5906  0.5548  
V2* -2.4668  1.3416  -1.8387  0.0660  
V3 -2.2278  1.3805  -1.6137  0.1066  
V4 -1.8727  1.4278  -1.3116  0.1897  
V5 -0.5629  1.4849  -0.3791  0.7046  
V6* -2.3931  1.3654  -1.7527  0.0797  
V7 -0.8336  1.4527  -0.5738  0.5661  
Constant 0.6406  3.6178  0.1771  0.8595  
McFadden R-squared    0.2465  
Log likelihood    -42.5975  
LR statistic    27.8736  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0859 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 14 57 71 
% of correct 50.0 89.1 77.2 
No. of incorrect 14 7 21 
% of incorrect 50.0 10.9 22.8 
Note: * represents 10% significance level. 
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Logit Model 18: Involvement In Making Family Decision On Opening Bank 
Account (DESACCT) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 2.2612  1.4550  1.5541  0.1202  
LOAN2** 2.2729  0.9630  2.3601  0.0183  
LOAN3** 2.4428  1.0529  2.3201  0.0203  
HAI 0.0015  0.0108  0.1394  0.8891  
HHOCP -2.0419  1.5092  -1.3530  0.1761  
HHSZ 0.2275  0.4353  0.5227  0.6012  
EARNER -0.2057  0.5294  -0.3886  0.6976  
AGE -0.0882  0.0587  -1.5021  0.1331  
EDU1 0.9288  1.7829  0.5210  0.6024  
EDU2 0.1953  2.3480  0.0832  0.9337  
MCHILD* 1.4258  0.8125  1.7549  0.0793  
CTRN 0.8639  0.7659  1.1279  0.2593  
V1 1.6564  1.4309  1.1575  0.2471  
V2 -0.6170  1.0799  -0.5713  0.5678  
V3 2.1557  1.5885  1.3571  0.1748  
V4** 3.7598  1.5928  2.3605  0.0182  
V5 1.3698  1.4988  0.9139  0.3608  
V6 0.1681  1.1703  0.1436  0.8858  
V7 1.6227  1.4511  1.1183  0.2635  
Constant 1.1089  4.2879  0.2586  0.7959  
McFadden R-squared    0.3692  
Log likelihood    -33.3116  
LR statistic    38.9862  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0044 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 15 63 78 
% of correct 62.5 92.7 84.8 
No. of incorrect 9 5 14 
% of incorrect 37.5 7.3 15.2 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 19: Involvement In Making Family Decision On When To Have A 
Child (DESBIR) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1** -2.7408  1.0654  -2.5727  0.0101  
LOAN2 -1.0625  0.8147  -1.3042  0.1922  
LOAN3 0.8045  0.9474  0.8492  0.3958  
HAI* 0.0231  0.0138  1.6766  0.0936  
HHOCP 0.3070  1.0255  0.2994  0.7647  
HHSZ -0.0193  0.3092  -0.0624  0.9503  
EARNER 0.0632  0.3865  0.1636  0.8701  
AGE* 0.0727  0.0440  1.6507  0.0988  
EDU1 2.3192  1.5690  1.4781  0.1394  
EDU2 1.7466  1.8738  0.9321  0.3513  
MCHILD -0.8802  0.7325  -1.2016  0.2295  
CTRN 0.1371  0.6680  0.2052  0.8374  
V1 -2.1255  1.3311  -1.5968  0.1103  
V2** -2.3827  1.1580  -2.0577  0.0396  
V3* -2.1533  1.2197  -1.7654  0.0775  
V4 -0.1628  1.2867  -0.1266  0.8993  
V5* -2.1892  1.2382  -1.7681  0.0770  
V6* -1.9932  1.1808  -1.6880  0.0914  
V7 -0.3234  1.2807  -0.2526  0.8006  
Constant -3.1914  3.2539  -0.9808  0.3267  
McFadden R-squared    0.2652  
Log likelihood    -45.8324  
LR statistic    33.0775  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0236 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 28 48 76 
% of correct 73.7 88.9 82.6 
No. of incorrect 10 6 16 
% of incorrect 26.3 11.1 17.4 
Note: *, ** represent 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 235 
Appendix 4-5 Freedom/legal awareness 
 
Logit Model 20: Awareness of Women’s Rights to Protest Against Domestic 
Abuse (FABUSE) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.1844  0.9660  0.1909  0.8486  
LOAN2 0.2409  0.8273  0.2912  0.7709  
LOAN3* 1.8578  0.9911  1.8744  0.0609  
HAI -0.0050  0.0135  -0.3699  0.7114  
HHOCP** 3.1450  1.2917  2.4347  0.0149  
HHSZ** 0.9267  0.3655  2.5354  0.0112  
EARNER** -0.9507  0.4155  -2.2883  0.0221  
AGE** 0.1007  0.0460  2.1864  0.0288  
EDU1 0.2742  1.5246  0.1799  0.8573  
EDU2 0.8233  1.9234  0.4280  0.6686  
MCHILD 0.8072  0.7429  1.0866  0.2772  
CTRN 0.5162  0.6357  0.8121  0.4167  
V1* -2.0046  1.2021  -1.6676  0.0954  
V2 1.5795  1.1412  1.3841  0.1663  
V3 0.2302  1.0778  0.2136  0.8308  
V4* 2.0544  1.2008  1.7109  0.0871  
V5 0.1534  1.1483  0.1336  0.8937  
V6 -0.9001  1.1575  -0.7776  0.4368  
V7 -0.7276  1.1408  -0.6378  0.5236  
Constant*** -10.5927  3.962866 -2.673 0.0075  
McFadden R-squared    0.2804  
Log likelihood    -45.6404  
LR statistic    35.56176 
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0119 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 40 29 69 
% of correct 80.0 69.1 75.0 
No. of incorrect 10 13 23 
% of incorrect 20.0 30.9 25.0 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 21: Awareness of The Use of Contraception (FCTCEP) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.7809  0.9975  0.7828  0.4337  
LOAN2 0.9909  0.7754  1.2779  0.2013  
LOAN3* 1.5486  0.8531  1.8153  0.0695  
HAI 0.0023  0.0050  0.4584  0.6466  
HHOCP -1.1174  1.0161  -1.0997  0.2714  
HHSZ 0.1378  0.3307  0.4167  0.6769  
EARNER 0.1754  0.3773  0.4647  0.6421  
AGE -0.0671  0.0430  -1.5596  0.1188  
EDU1 2.4757  1.6060  1.5416  0.1232  
EDU2 1.2881  1.8897  0.6816  0.4955  
MCHILD* -1.2109  0.6858  -1.7656  0.0775  
CTRN -0.4878  0.5882  -0.8293  0.4069  
V1* 1.8065  1.0411  1.7352  0.0827  
V2 1.2775  1.0020  1.2750  0.2023  
V3 -0.2829  1.1792  -0.2399  0.8104  
V4 1.7219  1.1018  1.5628  0.1181  
V5** 2.6773  1.1204  2.3897  0.0169  
V6*** 3.1206  1.1866  2.6300  0.0085  
V7** 2.2973  1.0400  2.2088  0.0272  
Constant -0.4991  3.282213 -0.15205 0.8791  
McFadden R-squared    0.2459  
Log likelihood    -47.8291  
LR statistic    31.18438 
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0385 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 28 41 69 
% of correct 66.7 82.0 75.0 
No. of incorrect 14 9 23 
% of incorrect 33.3 18.0 25.0 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 22: Awareness of The Incorrectness of Arranged Marriage 
(FARMAG) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.6593  0.9771  0.6748  0.4998  
LOAN2 1.1633  0.7412  1.5693  0.1166  
LOAN3** 1.8008  0.8764  2.0549  0.0399  
HAI 0.0007  0.0017  0.4284  0.6684  
HHOCP -0.0317  0.9653  -0.0329  0.9738  
HHSZ -0.2341  0.3181  -0.7359  0.4618  
EARNER 0.3114  0.3969  0.7846  0.4327  
AGE -0.0439  0.0412  -1.0665  0.2862  
EDU1 1.9789  1.5330  1.2909  0.1967  
EDU2 1.2219  1.8693  0.6537  0.5133  
MCHILD -0.6969  0.6869  -1.0145  0.3103  
CTRN -0.3396  0.6031  -0.5632  0.5733  
V1 1.5723  1.3092  1.2009  0.2298  
V2 -0.5809  0.9726  -0.5973  0.5503  
V3** -2.6078  1.3052  -1.9981  0.0457  
V4 -0.6751  1.0479  -0.6443  0.5194  
V5 0.9318  1.0595  0.8794  0.3792  
V6 0.5862  1.0390  0.5642  0.5726  
V7 0.3065  0.9982  0.3071  0.7588  
Constant 0.4112  3.1974  0.1286  0.8977  
McFadden R-squared    0.2622  
Log likelihood    -46.6464  
LR statistic    33.1572  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0231 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 27 42 69 
% of correct 65.9 82.4 75.0 
No. of incorrect 14 9 23 
% of incorrect 34.1 17.6 25.0 
Note: ** represents 5% significance level. 
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Logit Model 23: Awareness of The Minimum Legal Marriage Age (LMAGE) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 0.2977  0.9508  0.3131  0.7542  
LOAN2 0.7580  0.8266  0.9169  0.3592  
LOAN3** 1.9072  0.9689  1.9683  0.0490  
HAI -0.0013  0.0030  -0.4419  0.6586  
HHOCP* 1.9228  1.1081  1.7353  0.0827  
HHSZ 0.4383  0.3251  1.3484  0.1775  
EARNER** -0.9069  0.4359  -2.0808  0.0375  
AGE* 0.1005  0.0517  1.9440  0.0519  
EDU1 -0.9660  1.6265  -0.5939  0.5526  
EDU2 0.4514  2.0770  0.2173  0.8279  
MCHILD*** 2.4102  0.8571  2.8119  0.0049  
CTRN** 1.5634  0.7219  2.1658  0.0303  
V1*** -3.3661  1.2825  -2.6246  0.0087  
V2 0.9430  1.1511  0.8193  0.4126  
V3 -1.7246  1.1291  -1.5274  0.1267  
V4 1.0586  1.1714  0.9037  0.3661  
V5* -2.4175  1.2663  -1.9092  0.0562  
V6** -2.9707  1.3761  -2.1589  0.0309  
V7 -1.3689  1.1655  -1.1745  0.2402  
Constant* -7.6881  3.972326 -1.93542 0.0529  
McFadden R-squared    0.3108  
Log likelihood    -42.9862  
LR statistic    38.76988 
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0047 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 46 27 73 
% of correct 85.2 71.1 79.4 
No. of incorrect 8 11 19 
% of incorrect 14.8 28.9 20.6 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Logit Model 24: Awareness of The Legal Means Of Divorce (LDIVC) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
LOAN1 1.3256  0.9461  1.4011  0.1612  
LOAN2 0.9950  0.8401  1.1843  0.2363  
LOAN3 0.8506  0.9626  0.8837  0.3769  
HAI*** 0.0647  0.0232  2.7878  0.0053  
HHOCP 0.2062  1.0241  0.2013  0.8405  
HHSZ -0.0170  0.3610  -0.0470  0.9625  
EARNER 0.1038  0.4087  0.2541  0.7994  
AGE -0.0239  0.0469  -0.5103  0.6098  
EDU1 3.2056  1.9514  1.6427  0.1004  
EDU2 3.3484  2.3340  1.4346  0.1514  
MCHILD -0.8239  0.7724  -1.0668  0.2861  
CTRN** -1.9700  0.7852  -2.5089  0.0121  
V1* 2.6627  1.4966  1.7792  0.0752  
V2 1.6082  1.1771  1.3662  0.1719  
V3 1.2311  1.1907  1.0339  0.3012  
V4 1.2161  1.1407  1.0661  0.2864  
V5 1.0337  1.2127  0.8524  0.3940  
V6** 3.4310  1.4168  2.4216  0.0155  
V7 1.6689  1.1332  1.4727  0.1408  
Constant -3.7531  3.7630  -0.9974  0.3186  
McFadden R-squared    0.2679  
Log likelihood    -41.3890  
LR statistic    30.2906  
Prob. (LR stat.)    0.0482 
Degree of Freedom    19 
Total observations    92 
     
Classification table     
 Dependent=0 Dependent=1 Overall 
No. of correct 15 61 76 
% of correct 53.6 95.3 82.6 
No. of incorrect 13 3 16 
% of incorrect 46.4 4.7 17.4 
Note: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Appendix 5  Survey Questionnaire 
 
Rural Credit Cooperative Microcredit Programme Survey 
 
Instructions: For each question with brackets provided, please tick your answer(s); otherwise, please 
follow the instructions given to answer the questions. 
Note: Make sure that the respondent is the head of a household living in the rural areas of Hubei 
Province before proceeding with the survey. 
 
Section 1 Accessibility of Microcredit by Rural Credit Cooperative 
1. Do you know about the microcredit programme operated by Rural Credit Cooperative 
(RCC)? 
a. YES  [  ]    b. NO  [  ] 
(If yes please go to Q3; if no, please go to Q2) 
 
2. What are the reasons you do not know about RCC microcredit programme? 
(You can tick more than one) 
a. RCC bank in my township does not promote microcredit programme [  ] 
b. I don’t know if any RCC bank exists in my township    [  ] 
c. I am not aware of microcredit programme       [  ] 
d. Other(s) please specify ___________________________ 
 
3. What is the distance of the nearest RCC bank in your area? 
a. 1-5 kilometres            [  ] 
b. 6-10 kilometres            [  ] 
c. 11-15 kilometres            [  ] 
d. 16-20 kilometres            [  ] 
e. More than 20 kilometres          [  ] 
 
4. Did you need to borrow money at any time in the last 2 years? 
a. YES [  ]      b. NO [  ] 
(If yes, please go to Q5; if no, please skip to Q7). 
 
5. If YES in Q4, were you able to borrow money? 
a. YES [  ]      b. NO [  ] 
(If yes, go to Q6; If no, please proceed to Section 3). 
 
6. What was your main source of credit? 
a. Formal lender  [  ]    b. Informal Lender [  ] 
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7. If NO in Q4, why not? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Had enough savings/earnings from other sources      [  ] 
b. Received financial assistance from the government     [  ] 
c. Afraid to borrow            [  ] 
d. Didn’t like to incur a debt          [  ] 
e. Interest rates were not affordable         [  ] 
f. Too many required documents to submit        [  ] 
g. Uncertainty in paying the loan         [  ] 
h. Other(s) please specify ________________ 
 
 
Section 2 Borrowing Behaviour of Rural Households 
1. Have you ever borrowed from RCC microcredit programme over the last 2 years? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO  [  ] 
(If yes, finish all the questions in this section; if no, please proceed to Section 3). 
 
2. If YES in Q1, how many times did you borrow money from RCC microcredit programme 
in the last 2 years? 
a. Once              [  ] 
b. Twice              [  ] 
c. 3 times              [  ] 
d. More than 3 times            [  ] 
 
3. What is the maximum single amount you can borrow from RCC microcredit programme? 
a. Less than 2,000 yuan            [  ] 
b. Between 2,001 and 10,000 yuan         [  ] 
c. Between 10,001 and 20,000 yuan         [  ] 
d. Between 20,001and 30,000 yuan         [  ] 
e. Between 30,001 and 50,000 yuan         [  ] 
f. More than 50,000 yuan           [  ] 
 
4. Was the loan amount received adequate? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
5. If inadequate, did you borrow from other credit sources? 
a. YES  [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
6. If YES in Q6, where did you source your additional credit? 
 
a. Rural commercial Banks (e.g. Agricultural Bank of China)   [  ] 
Formal Sources 
b. Government banks (e.g. Agricultural Development Bank of China) [  ] 
c. People’s Org/NGOs/Coop          [  ] 
d. Pawnshops             [  ] 
e. Other lending institutions          [  ] 
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f. Other(s) please specify _______________ 
 
a. Private Moneylenders (e.g. usurers)        [  ] 
Informal Sources 
b. Traders/Wholesalers or Retailers         [  ] 
c. Input suppliers/dealers           [  ] 
d. Friends/Relatives            [  ]  
e. Rural aid societies            [  ] 
f. Other(s) please specify ______________ 
 
7. What is the purpose of your micro loan? 
 
a. Farm cropping            [  ] 
Agricultural activities 
b. Livestock raising            [  ] 
c. Produce processing           [  ] 
d. Purchase of farming machinery         [  ] 
e. Other(s) please specify _____________________________ 
 
a. To start self-run enterprise           [  ] 
Non-agricultural activities 
b. To finance existing enterprise          [  ] 
c. To finance small-scale project         [  ] 
d. Basic household needs            [  ] 
e. To pay for children education           [  ] 
f. Emergencies (e.g. hospitalisation)         [  ] 
g. Housing (e.g. repair, construction)         [  ] 
h. Payment for other debts           [  ] 
i. Other(s) please specify_______________________ 
 
8. What is the duration of your micro loan? 
a. 3 to 6 months             [  ] 
b. 7 to 12 months             [  ] 
c. 1 to 2 years              [  ] 
d. 2 to 3 years              [  ] 
e. More than 3 years            [  ] 
 
9. What is your mode of payment? 
a. Weekly               [  ] 
b. Monthly              [  ] 
c. Semi-annually             [  ] 
d. Annually              [  ] 
e. Other(s) please specify ____________________ 
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10. Did your micro loan require collateral or security? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO  [  ] 
 
11. If YES in Q10, what kind of collateral or security is/are required? 
a. Mortgage Property           [  ] 
b. Chattel Mortgage (i.e. vehicles, farm equipment)     [  ] 
c. Promissory Notes            [  ] 
d. Co-signor/co-guarantor           [  ] 
e. Deposits               [  ] 
f. Other(s) please specify _______________ 
 
12. What is the status of your existing loan? 
a. Fully paid             [  ] 
b. Current              [  ] 
c. Past due              [  ] 
d. Restructured             [  ] 
 
13. How long did RCC bank take to process your loan application? 
a. Less than a week            [  ] 
b. 1 week              [  ] 
c. 2 weeks              [  ] 
d. 3 weeks              [  ] 
e. 1 month              [  ] 
f. More than a month           [  ] 
 
14. Did any village committee member refer you to RCC bank? 
a. YES [  ]    b. NO  [  ] 
 
15. How long have you been a microcredit borrower of RCC bank? 
a. Less than 1 year             [  ] 
b. 1 to 2 years              [  ] 
c. 2 to 3 years              [  ] 
d. 3 to 4 years              [  ] 
 
 
 
Section 3 Non-borrowers of RCC's Microcredit 
1. Do you have intentions to borrow in the future? 
a. YES  [  ]   b. NO  [  ] 
 
2. If YES in Q1, what is the maximum amount you need to borrow? 
a. Less than 2,000 yuan           [  ] 
b. Between 2,001 and 10,000 yuan         [  ] 
c. Between 10,001 and 30,000 yuan         [  ] 
d. Between 30,001 and 50,000 yuan         [  ] 
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e. More than 50,000 yuan           [  ] 
 
3. Would you borrow from RCC microcredit programme? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
4. If NO in Q3, what are your reasons for not borrowing from RCC? (you can tick more 
than one) 
a. Insufficient income/asset          [  ] 
b. Incurred previous loan(s) (bad credit record)      [  ] 
c. Had no collateral            [  ] 
d. Had difficulty in meeting required documents      [  ] 
e. The loan application process takes too much time     [  ] 
f. I could access informal lenders much easier      [  ] 
g. Other(s) please specify ___________________ 
 
 
Section 4 Welfare Impact of RCC’s Microcredit — for All Respondents 
1. What kind of production assets do you have? 
a. Farm land             [  ] 
b. Cow/buffalo             [  ] 
c. Agricultural tool (reaping hook, plough, sprayer, etc)    [  ] 
d. Tractor, machinery           [  ] 
e. Fishing net, boat for fishing          [  ] 
f. Other(s) please specify _____________________ 
 
2. Do you own a house? 
a. YES [  ]   b. No, I rent it [  ] 
 
3. If YES in Q2, what kind of house do you have? 
a. Brick house             [  ] 
b. Wooden house            [  ] 
c. Makeshift house            [  ] 
d. Other(s) please specify __________________ 
 
4. What kind of household assets do you have? 
a. Savings              [  ] 
b. Motorcycle             [  ] 
c.  Bicycle              [  ] 
d.  Telephone             [  ] 
e. Household appliances (TV, radio, etc)        [  ] 
f. Furniture              [  ] 
g. Other(s) please specify _____________________ 
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5. Did you receive any assistance from the government, NGOs, or aid agencies such as the 
United Nations in the last 2 years? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
6. What kind of assistance did you receive? 
a. Cash subsidies            [  ] 
b. Inputs of agricultural production (e.g., fertiliser, pesticide, seeds)  [  ] 
c. Subsistence support (e.g., grain, vegetables, chicken, goat)   [  ] 
d Interest-subsidised loans for poverty alleviation (not micro loans)  [  ] 
e. Housing              [  ] 
f. Other(s) please specify _____________________ 
 
7. What is/are your primary household incomes? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Crop farming             [  ] 
b. Livestock raising            [  ] 
c. Processing produce (poultry, fish, rice, corn, etc)     [  ] 
d. Fishing              [  ] 
e. Government workers           [  ] 
f. Self-owned enterprise           [  ] 
g. Small-scale project           [  ] 
h. Migrant workers wages           [  ] 
i. Other(s) please specify _____________________ 
 
8. Does your household have any subsidiary income? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
9. If YES in Q8, what are your household subsidiary income sources?  
(You can tick more than one) 
a. Rental of house/land           [  ] 
b. Teaching              [  ] 
c. Street selling (e.g. newspapers, fruits, cold drinks, etc.)    [  ] 
d. Handicrafts             [  ] 
e. Junk collecting (e.g. bottles, boxes, etc.)       [  ] 
f. Poultry/fish processing           [  ] 
g. Rice/corn milling            [  ] 
h. Relief payment from government        [  ] 
i. Remittance from other family member       [  ] 
j. Other(s) please specify _____________________ 
 
 
Section 5 Women Empowerment Impact of RCC’s Microcredit — For Women 
Respondents Only 
Control over financial resources  
1. Do you have your own income, which you can spend without your husband's permission? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
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2. Do you have your own savings, which you can decide how to utilise? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
3. Have you received money from parents/brothers/sisters or other relatives outside the 
household in the last 2 years? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
4. If YES in Q3, can you yourself decide how to use that remittance? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
5. If you can use your money (income, savings, or remittance) at your will, do you spend 
your money on your family expenses? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
6. Do you have any income generating activity which you yourself operate? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
7. If YES in Q6, do you have control over it? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
Mobility 
1. Can you go to post office/bank/doctor, etc. on your own? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
2. If YES in Q1, how do you go to those places? 
a. Walk               [  ] 
b. Car               [  ] 
c. Bicycle              [  ] 
d. Bus               [  ] 
e. Other(s) please specify _______________________ 
 
3. Have you ever been to the city by your own in the last two years? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
4. Have you ever visited your parents or relatives even without your husband’s permission 
in the last two years? 
a. YES [   ]   b. NO [   ] 
 
5. What are the reasons you do not travel alone? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Because women are not allowed to go outside      [  ] 
b.  Because of lack of safety          [  ] 
c. Because I go with husband or children        [  ] 
d. Because I go with a neighbour or relative       [  ] 
e. Other(s) please specify ______________________________ 
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Ability to make purchase independently 
1. Which of the items listed below you made purchase independently in the last 2 years (you 
can tick more than one)       
a. Food              [  ] 
b. Ice-creams, candies, or cookies for your children     [  ] 
c. Utensils, pots and pans for the household       [  ] 
d. Household furniture           [  ] 
e. Clothing for your children          [  ] 
f. Clothing for yourself           [  ] 
g. Jewellery for yourself           [  ] 
h. Livestock             [  ] 
i. Farming equipment           [  ] 
j. Land (including mortgage)          [  ] 
 
Role in household decision making 
1. Who made the following major household decisions in the last 2 years? 
           Wife  Husband  Both 
a. House repair/construction     [  ] [  ] [  ] 
b. Children education      [  ] [  ] [  ] 
c. Agricultural land lease (in/out)   [  ] [  ] [  ] 
d. What crops to grow      [  ] [  ] [  ] 
e. Purchase of livestock     [  ] [  ] [  ] 
f. Sale of livestock      [  ] [  ] [  ] 
g. Purchase of farm machinery    [  ] [  ] [  ] 
h. Purchase of consumer durables   [  ] [  ] [  ] 
i. Open a bank account      [  ] [  ] [  ] 
j. Apply for a loan       [  ] [  ] [  ] 
k. To have a child       [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 
Relative freedom from household domination and Legal awareness 
Below is a series of statements pertaining to your overall perceptions of women’s relative 
freedom from household domination and legal awareness. Please circle the number which 
most accurately reflects how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement on a scale of 
1 to 5, where “1” means “Strongly Disagree” and “5” means “Strongly Agree” 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  
Strongly 
Agree 
Overall perceptions of women’s relative freedom from 
household domination 
     
 Relative freedom from household domination     
1. Women should be able to visit their parents or other 
relatives even without their husbands’ permission  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It is not right for husband to beat his wife 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Women should be able to voice or protest against 
domestic abuse 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Women should initiate the discussion of birth numbers 1 2 3 4 5 
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with their husbands 
5. Women should initiate the discussion of birth control 
use with their husbands 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Parents should not arrange marriage for their children 1 2 3 4 5 
 Legal awareness     
1. There should be a minimum age for women to be 
married 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. If necessary, women can divorce their husbands by 
legal mean 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Women can seek legal protection when they or their 
children suffer from family violence and abuse 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Section 6  Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents – for All 
Respondents  
1. What is your gender? 
a. Male [  ]   b. Female [  ] 
  
2. Which age group do you belong to? 
a. 18 – 25 years old            [  ] 
b. 26 – 35 years old            [  ] 
c. 36 – 45 years old            [  ] 
d. 46 – 55 years old            [  ] 
e. 56 – 65 years old            [  ] 
f. over 66 years old            [  ] 
 
3. Do you belong to any ethnic minority group? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
4. Is your village located in the mountainous areas? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO [  ] 
 
5. What is your marital status? 
a. Single/Never Married           [  ] 
b. Married              [  ] 
d. De factor relationship           [  ] 
e. Divorced/Separated            [  ] 
 
6. How many children do you have? 
a. None              [  ] 
b. 1               [  ] 
c. 2               [  ] 
d. 3               [  ] 
e. 4               [  ] 
f. Other(s) please specify ________________________ 
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7. How many male children do you have? 
a. None              [  ] 
b. 1               [  ] 
c. 2               [  ] 
d. 3               [  ] 
e. 4               [  ] 
f. Other(s) please specify _______________ 
  
8. What is your highest educational or professional qualification? 
a. No Education             [  ] 
b. Primary School            [  ] 
c. Middle School            [  ] 
d. High school             [  ] 
e. Vocational              [  ] 
f. College              [  ] 
g Postgraduate degree           [  ] 
i. Other(s) please specify ___________________ 
 
9. What is your main occupation? 
a. Crop Farming             [  ] 
b. Livestock Raising            [  ] 
c. Fishery              [  ] 
d. Produce processing           [  ] 
e. Daily wage labour            [  ] 
f. Small Entrepreneur           [  ] 
g. Government workers           [  ] 
h. Retired              [  ] 
i. Unemployed             [  ] 
j. Other(s) please specify ____________________ 
 
10. The number of people living in your household is (please state): 
______________ persons 
 
11. The number of income earners in your household is (please state): 
______________ persons 
 
12. What is your annual household income?  
a. Less than 3,000 yuan           [  ] 
b. Between 3,001 yuan and 5,000 yuan        [  ] 
c. Between 5,001 yuan and 10,000 yuan        [  ] 
d. Between 10,001 yuan and 15,000 yuan       [  ] 
e. More than 15,000 yuan           [  ] 
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13. What is the average total annual consumption (food and non-food) of your household? 
a. Less than 3,000 yuan            [  ] 
b. Between 3,001 yuan and 5,000 yuan         [  ] 
c. Between 5,001 yuan and 10,000 yuan        [  ] 
d. Between 10,001 yuan and 15,000 yuan        [  ] 
e. More than 15,000 yuan           [  ] 
 
14. Are you a shareholder of RCC bank? 
a. YES  [  ]   b. NO  [  ] 
 
15. Is any person in your household working as governmental official (e.g., in the village 
committee)? 
a. YES  [  ]   b. NO  [  ] 
 
16. Do you have savings with RCC bank? 
a. YES [  ]   b. NO  [  ] 
 
17. Who make the important family decision in your household? 
a. Husband [  ]   b. Wife [   ]  c. Both [   ] 
 
18. What is the status of your land ownership? 
a. Contracted land from the village         [  ] 
b. Leased land             [  ] 
c. Other(s) please specify ______________ 
 
19. What is the size of your household farm land? 
a. Less than 0.1 hectare           [  ] 
b. Between 0.1 – 0.5 hectare          [  ] 
d. More than 0.5 hectare           [  ] 
e. Other(s) please specify ______________ 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you have further 
comments about RCC microcredit programme, please feel free to comment in the space provided below. 
Once again, we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
